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As is generally agreed, there are good reasons to take a propositional attitude attribution like  
 
Olga believes that Cicero is smart 
 
to express the holding of a relation between Olga and the denotation of ‘that Cicero is smart’. 
But what does ‘that Cicero is smart’ denote? According to the so-called face-value theory, it denotes 
a proposition. While there is no agreement on what propositions are, they are taken to be 
entities not reducible to sentences. According to sententialism, by contrast, ‘that Cicero is smart’ 
denotes the sentence “Cicero is smart”. Sententialism is generally considered to be obviously 
inadequate, and the aim of this dissertation is to show that sententialism is in fact as good an 
option as the face-value theory is, if not a better one. According to the sententialist account that 
I develop, Olga believes that Cicero is smart if she believes something which we can represent 
with the sentence “Cicero is smart”. As I show in Chapter 2, by relying on some features of 
representation, sententialists seem able to account for propositional attitude attributions in quite 
an interesting way. The main reasons why sententialism is generally considered doomed are the 
famous Church translation argument and a problem raised by Schiffer. I examine them in 
Chapter 3, where I conclude that these allegedly fatal objections do not in fact succeed in 
showing that sententialism is incorrect. In Chapter 4 I deal with other attributions, i.e. the so-
called wh-attributions, such as 
 
Jim knows what Rose wants, 
 
and I show that, when it comes to ‘wh’-clauses, sententialism seems not only a viable alternative 
to the face-value theory but actually a better one. The general conclusion I reach is that the 
sentence against sententialism has been passed too quickly and that sententialism is indeed a 
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In this note a definitive procedure will be provided for catching a lion in a 
desert: Let Q be the operator that encloses a word in quotation marks. Its 
square Q2 encloses a word in double quotes. The operator clearly satisfies the 
law of indices, QmQn =Qm+n. Write down the word ‘lion’ without quotation 
marks. Apply to it the operator Q-1. Then a lion will appear on the page. It is 
advisable to enclose the page in a cage before applying the operator. 







Propositional attitude sentences, such as 
 
Olga believes that Cicero is smart 
Gabriel fears that Rose will not come to the party 
Dave knows that snow is white 
 
are generally considered to be difficult to account for in a semantic theory, since they are 
considered to raise some challenging questions and to lead to some puzzles that are apparently 
not easily answered and solved. Frege’s puzzle is exemplary: 
 
 
a=a and a=b are obviously statements of differing cognitive value; a=a holds a priori and, according 
to Kant, it is to be labelled analytic, while statements of the form a=b often contain very valuable 
extensions of our knowledge and cannot always be established a priori … Now if we were to regard 
equality as a relation between that which the names ‘a’ and ‘b’ designate, it would seem that a=b 
could not differ from a=a (i.e. provided a=b is true)… What we apparently want to state by a=b is 
that the signs or names ‘a’ and ‘b’ designate the same thing, so that those signs themselves would 
be under discussion; a relation between them would be asserted … In that case the sentence a=b 
would no longer refer to the subject matter, but only to its mode of designation; we would express 
no proper knowledge by its means (Frege 1892/1984: 157). 
 
 
The puzzle has been so much discussed (and may be spectacularly overvalued, as Predelli 2013: 13, f. 
16 maintains) that it has been solved and dissolved probably in every possible way. The general 
take on this and other puzzles is either to hold that usual denotations are in the end adequate or, 
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with Frege, to hold that denotations do not exhaust meanings, so that a=a and a=b have 
different meanings. Together with the 1892 Frege (but not with the 1884 one!), moreover, the 
general take is to hold that signs surely cannot be adequate and sententialism, according to which in 
sentences like  
 
Olga believes that Cicero is Cicero 
Olga believes that Cicero is Tully 
 
the very sentences “Cicero is Cicero” and “Cicero is Tully” are denoted, has been widely seen as 
“more of a curiosity than a contender” (Burge 1980: 57) to the so-called face-value theory. 
According to the face-value theory, in those sentences a proposition, an entity not reducible to a 
linguistic item, is denoted.  
 
My aim in this dissertation is to show that sententialism is in fact as good an option as the face-
value theory is, if not a better one.  
 
Both sententialism and the face-value theory share the following two theses: 
 
(RP) Propositional attitude predicates occurring in propositional attitude sentences designate 
relations; 
(ST) ‘That’-clauses are singular terms. 
 
These theses are so agreed upon that they are often simply implicitly endorsed without 
discussion. But they can be and have been rejected, most famously by Russell (1910), Prior 
(1963) and Quine (1960), and even though the theses are widely shared, they need defence. We 
will therefore start with discussion of these theses in Chapter 1. We will see that although we 
cannot prove that (RP) and (ST) are true, there are various good reasons why we should favour 
an account that endorses them. As is generally held, one of the main reasons for endorsing the 
theses is the validity of inferences like the following: 
 
Olga believes that Cicero is smart 
Gabriel believes everything Olga believes 
Thus, Gabriel believes that Cicero is smart.  
 
We will consider the various alternative explanations for the validity of such inferences, and we 
will conclude that while it should be recognized that endorsing the theses is not the only 
possible explanation, it seems to be the best one. There are, however, some data that seem to 
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show that the theses (RP) and (ST) cannot be correct (Prior 1971). For ‘to know’ admits of 
singular terms, as shown by the perfectly grammatical 
 
Olga knows Laura. 
 
If propositional attitude predicates are relational, and if it has been stipulated that ‘Bob’ is the 
name of a relatum in  
 
Olga knows that Cicero is smart 
 
then one would expect  
 
Olga knows Bob 
 
to be true if  
 
Olga knows that Cicero is smart 
 
is. But this is not the case: Olga may know that Cicero is smart, so that the latter sentence is 
true, but not be acquainted with Bob, be it a sentence, a proposition, a fact, Cicero, a property 
or what have you. As we will see, though, all things considered it will prove to be better to 
endorse (RP) and (ST), and to explain these data away by holding that propositional attitude 
predicates are ambiguous. The thesis that the predicates are ambiguous will, moreover, be 
shown to be independently justifiable. Putting everything together, we will conclude, in 
accordance with both sententialism and the face-value theory, that ‘that’-clauses denote one of 
the relata of the relation designated by a propositional attitude predicate.  
 
According to the face-value theory, this relatum is a proposition, and the thesis  
 
(P) ‘That’-clauses denote propositions 
 
should be added to (RP) and (ST). While there is no agreement on what propositions are, they 
are taken to be entities not reducible to sentences. To use Schiffer’s way of putting this (2003: 
47), for whatever content is, sentences are entities that have a content, while propositions are 
entities that are contents. According to the face-value theory, therefore, a sentence like 
  
Olga knows that Cicero is smart 
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expresses the holding of a relation between Olga and something not reducible to a sentence. 
According to sententialism, on the other hand, (P) should be replaced by  
 
(S) ‘That’-clauses denote sentences. 
 
According to sententialism, therefore, the relatum denoted by a ‘that’-clause is a sentence, and in 
developing a sententialist account we should start by understanding what it means to have an 
attitude to a sentence. We will tackle this issue in Chapter 2. As we will see, according to the 
sententialist account that I will develop, Olga believes the sentence “Cicero is smart” if she 
believes something which we can represent with the sentence “Cicero is smart”. In representing 
something, we use the resources available to us. Take a map. We could represent London’s 
Underground by drawing a map of it. In this case, our representational tools are lines of 
different colours and names of different stops in a 2-D space. Or take fruits. We can represent 
their shapes by using, as tools, regular polygons in a 2-D space. Among our representational 
tools is our own language. According to sententialism, just as we can employ geometrical shapes 
in order to represent the shapes of fruits, so we denote sentences to represent attitudes. But 
when is it the case that something can represent something else? A first thing to notice is that, 
clearly, adequacy depends on what we are interested in when we are representing something. 
For take again a map of London’s Underground. If we employ only straight lines between dots, 
we can represent London’s Underground. But something is missing: for example, we cannot 
represent both the real length of the journeys and the relative position of the various stops. 
Moreover, depending on what we are interested in representing, we are guided by some 
principles, and we take it to be a desideratum that the representation we end up with is in 
accordance with those principles. As I will show, considerations like these are what sententialists 
can rely on in solving Frege’s and Kripke’s (1979) notorious puzzles. From the point of view of 
the account, the puzzles are to be solved (or dissolved, or shown to be essentially puzzling) by 
relying on the fact that two sentences expressing the same thing can nonetheless be different as 
to their representational aptness. Thus, in Chapter 2 I will conclude that for what concerns the 
notorious puzzles sententialism is in the end an adequate account.  
 
Sententialism is generally considered doomed, though. The main reasons why sententialism is 
usually simply discarded are the famous Church (1950) translation argument and a problem 
raised by Schiffer (2003:47). We will consider them in Chapter 3, where I will show that these 
allegedly fatal objections do not in fact succeed in showing that sententialism is incorrect. At 
bottom, both objections rely on the idea that if we account for propositional attitude sentences 
in terms of language-dependent entities that have a content instead of language-independent 
entities that are those very contents, then contents disappear and this cannot be correct. For 
when we ascribe an attitude, the content of the attitude is what we are talking about. I will 
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suggest that sententialists may answer both criticisms on the same grounds, i.e. by exploiting the 
recognition of this simple fact: 
 
 
It is a long established habit of human beings to pluck out the meanings of phrases, whatever they 
may be, and devour them willy-nilly (Meckler 1956: 325).  
  
 
For our purposes of assessing sententialism, it will be particularly important to recognize that 
this immediate understanding also concerns expressions that are not used, but merely 
mentioned: you cannot say “ ‘Olga’ ” without saying ‘Olga’; you cannot listen to “ ‘Olga’ ” 
without listening to ‘Olga’. Moreover, I will show that sententialists may appeal to that very fact 
in dealing with another problem, of anaphoric reference, pointed out by Bach (1997). Bach’s 
problem will also allow us to consider indexicals, and we will see that, contrary to what has 
sometimes been held in the literature (Schiffer 2003: 302-309), sententialism can explain the 
behaviour of indexicals occurring in propositional attitude sentences. Putting together the 
considerations of Chapters 2 and 3, whether or not it is better than the face-value theory, we will 
conclude that sententialism is at least a viable account of sentences like  
 
Olga believes that Cicero is smart. 
 
Having thus rescued sententialism for propositional attitude sentences, in Chapter 4 we will see 
how well sententialism can deal with other attributions, i.e. the so-called wh-attributions, such as 
 
Jim knows whether Rose likes flamingos, 
 
in which the complement of the predicate is not a ‘that’-clause, but an indirect question. I will 
show that when it comes to wh-attributions, the difference between taking ‘wh’-clauses to 
denote a linguistic item or a language-independent one is tantamount to the difference between 
holding that ‘wh’-clauses denote questions or that they denote answers. We will then see that 
puzzlement attributions, such as  
 
Jim wonders what is the biggest number, 
 
cannot always be accounted for in terms of answers. For sometimes we stop wondering, when 
we finally understand that the question was somehow misplaced and that it has no answer. The 
possibility that a question lacks a correct answer will, moreover, show that actually all ‘wh’-
clauses seem to denote questions. I will then discuss some classic problems concerning wh-
10 
 
attributions – the problem as to whether their truth-conditions are essentially contextual and the 
so-called problem of convergent knowledge (Schaffer 2007; Stout 2010). I will show that while the 
problem of convergent knowledge is seriously problematic for propositionalists, from the 
sententialist point of view it is easily and very naturally solved. Thus, when it comes to ‘wh’-
clauses, sententialism seems not just a viable alternative to the face-value theory, but actually a 
better one. There is no compelling reason for treating ‘that’- and ‘wh’-clauses homogeneously. 
Nonetheless, I will show that a homogeneous treatment is natural, very plausible and 
methodologically welcome. I will then conclude that wh-attributions suggest that the version of 
sententialism for ‘that’-clauses put forward in this dissertation may indeed be not just a viable 
alternative to the face-value theory, but actually a better one. 
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Take a sentence like 
 
Dave loves Laura. 
 
If Dave loves Laura, then there is somebody, namely Laura, who is loved by Dave. 
Furthermore, if Dave loves Laura and Gabriel likes Laura, then there is somebody, namely 
Laura, whom Dave loves and Gabriel likes. In our sentence, then, the predicate seems to 
designate a relation, and the relata seem to be the denotations of ‘Dave’ and ‘Laura’.1 Now take a 
sentence like  
 
Olga believes that Cicero is smart. 
 
If Olga believes that Cicero is smart, then there is something, namely that Cicero is smart, that is 
believed by Olga. Furthermore, if Olga believes that Cicero is smart and Gabriel knows that 
Cicero is smart, then there is something, namely that Cicero is smart, that Olga believes and 
Gabriel knows. On the basis of the similarities between our two sentences, it seems obviously 
correct to conclude, firstly, that ‘to believe’, like ‘to love’, designates a relation and, secondly, 
that the relata of the relation designated by ‘to believe’ in 
                                                          
1For singular terms, I follow Donnellan 1966: 54-55, and use the term ‘denotation’ for the relation, 
whatever it is, that a singular term bears to its worldly correlate, in order to be neutral and thus to allow 
that different expressions (such as proper names and definite descriptions) may function in different ways 
while ultimately designating the same thing. For predicates, I will instead follow Liebesman 2015, and use 
‘to designate’ as the relation, whatever it is, that a predicate bears to its worldly correlate. Finally, I will use 
‘to express’ for the relation, whatever it is, that a sentence or an utterance of a sentence bears to its 
meaning. For those who prefer to see two meanings, one at the level of senses and the other at the level 
of references, denotation and designation are at the level of references, while expression should be taken 
to be the relation between a sentence and its sense. These are purely terminological choices, and should 
be taken to carry no substantive theory of what it is for a sentence to mean what it means or for a sub-
sentential bit to denote or designate what it does. In particular, a predicate will be said to designate a 
property or a relation, but this should not be intended as tantamount to holding that predicates designate 
properties and relations in the same way in which singular terms denote individuals. Moreover, for ease, 
when nothing relies on this, I will speak simply of sentences and not of pairs of sentences or clauses and 
contextual factors or indexes, or of utterances.  
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Olga believes that Cicero is smart 
 
are the denotations of ‘Olga’ and ‘that Cicero is smart’.  
 
These theses are in fact generally taken to be part of the so-called face-value theory of propositional 
attitude sentences (Bach 1997: 221-224; Bealer 2002: 86; Moltmann 2003: 12-14; Recanati 2004: 
229; Rosefeldt 2008: 301-302; Salmon 1983: 5-6; Schiffer 2003: 12-14; Wettstein 2004: 165-166). 
What does this theory amount to? The answer to this question is actually less straightforward 
than one would expect, given how this theory is named. First of all, the face-value theory is not 
actually one theory. For, as Bach (1997: 222-223) notes, different authors have phrased the 
theory in substantially different ways. Fodor (1981: 178), for example, held that propositional 
attitudes should be analysed as relations; but Fodor’s thesis concerns the attitudes, not the 
attributions of those attitudes, which is what the face-value theory is supposed to be about. 
Soames (1988: 106) argued that to believe that Cicero is smart is to believe the proposition that 
Cicero is smart, but this leaves open how we should take the is: are we talking about logical 
form, the semantic contribution of ‘that’-clauses, the truth-conditions of the sentences or what? 
Burge (1980: 55) held that propositional attitude sentences have the logical form of a relation 
between a person and something indicated by the nominal expression following the predicate. 
Similarly, but phrased in terms of truth, not of logical form, Fara (2013: 250-251) and Schiffer 
(2008: 268) maintain that according to the face-value theory, firstly, sentences of the form A 
believes that S are true just in case the referent of the ‘A’ term stands in the belief relation to the 
thing to which the ‘that’-clause term refers, and, secondly, that these ‘that’-clauses refer to 
propositions. According to Schiffer (2003: 12), the first claim implies that propositional attitude 
sentences consist of a two-place transitive predicate flanked by slots for two singular argument 
terms. But a theory composed of these theses can hardly be an account of propositional attitude 
sentences in general. Firstly,  
 
Everybody believes that Cicero is smart 
 
is a propositional attitude sentence, but there is no denotational ‘A’ term. Secondly,  
 
Olga told Gabriel that Cicero is smart 
 
is a propositional attitude sentence, but the predicate designates, if a relation at all, a three-place 
relation holding between Olga, Gabriel and something somehow connected with the ‘that’-
clause. Stalnaker (1987: 140-141) holds instead that the transitive propositional attitude predicate 
designates a relation to a proposition denoted by the sentential complement. Similarly, in 1992 
Schiffer (1992: 505) maintained that the predicate designates a relation, and a ‘that’-clause is a 
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referential singular term whose reference is a proposition and Recanati (2004: 229), Richard (1990: 
7) and King (2014a: 7) also phrase the face-value theory in these terms. It is not clear whether 
Stalnaker’s and Schiffer’s are equivalent formulations – is a sentential complement a referential 
singular term? – but it is clear that they point in the same direction. These formulations concern 
not just attitudes, but their attributions, and are not subject to the obvious problems that the 
other formulations above incur. Thus, I think we can take the following to be the best way of 
phrasing the theory: 
 
(THE ALLEGEDLY FACE-VALUE THEORY)  
(RP) Propositional attitude predicates occurring in propositional attitude sentences designate 
relations; 
(ST) ‘That’-clauses are singular terms; 
(P) ‘That’-clauses denote propositions.  
 
So, the theory tells us something about what propositional attitude predicates designate, 
something about what in the sentences provides us with one of the relata, and, furthermore, 
something about what this relatum is.  
 
In this chapter we will focus on the first two theses, (RP) and (ST). The aim is to understand 
whether there really is something face-value in them, which could support the claim that it is 
better to take them to be true.  
 
We will start with (RP), and we will find genuinely good reasons to endorse this thesis. But these 
reasons pro seem counterbalanced by some evidence contra. We will conclude that it is better to 
save (RP), and to explain the apparently conflicting data away by holding that propositional 
attitude predicates are ambiguous (§1.1).  
 
Theses (RP) and (ST) are often conflated, and the good reasons for endorsing (RP) are generally 
also taken to be good reasons for endorsing (ST). But I will show that actually these reasons 
only support (RP), and so (ST) will still have to be discussed. Singular terms are a special kind of 
syntactic unit, i.e. those that purport to denote some things, and thus in order to assess (ST) it 
should first of all be established whether ‘that’-clauses are syntactic units. We will see that we 
have good reasons to think that this is the case (§1.2.1). Putting everything together, we will 
conclude that ‘that’-clauses are syntactic units in a position open to singular objectual 
quantifiers. But this still leaves open whether ‘that’-clauses are singular terms, in accordance with  
 




or quantified phrases not reducible to singular terms. We will then see that it is in fact better to 
endorse (ST). Moreover, we will discuss some objections that can be raised against the thesis 
(ST), and we will see that they can and should be explained away (§1.2.2). 
 
The conclusion will be that there really is something face-value in theses (RP) and (ST) and that 
it is better to endorse them. Put differently, it is best to take ‘that’-clauses to be singular terms 
that denote one of the relata of the relation designated by a propositional attitude predicate. 
 
But what is this relatum denoted by a ‘that’-clause?  
 
According to the face-value theory’s final tenet, i.e.  
 
(P) ‘That’-clauses denote propositions,  
 








1.1      RELATIONAL PREDICATES 
 
Different kinds of considerations have been put forward in the literature to support  
 
(RP) Propositional attitude predicates occurring in propositional attitude sentences designate 
relations. 
 
In §§1.1.1-1.1.2 we will focus on those considerations that, under scrutiny, prove to be either 
not exploitable in a defence of the thesis or too weak. We will see that if some more forceful 
reasons can be found, they should be found in the linguistic domain and in particular in the very 
domain of propositional attitude sentences. We will see that we need a workable characterization 
of when a relational predicate occurs in a sentence, and in §1.1.3 we will provide one. By relying 
on that characterization, we will see in §§1.1.4-1.1.5 that there are indeed some good reasons 
why we should take (RP) to be true. But these reasons pro seem counterbalanced by some 
evidence contra. We will discuss this contrary evidence in §1.1.6. We will conclude that it is better 
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to save (RP), and to explain the apparently conflicting data away by holding that propositional 




1.1.1   THE ACCUSATIVE OF INTENTIONALITY 
In assessing the thesis  
 
(RP) Propositional attitude predicates occurring in propositional attitude sentences designate 
relations, 
 
a first consideration that has been discussed is the so-called accusative of intentionality (Matthews 
2007: ch. 4; Prior 1976: 21-24; Ryle 1929-1930: 92; Wettstein 2004: 164), i.e. the fact that 
propositional attitudes are intentional and, as such, always involve relations toward some things. 
Given this, one may hold that since attitudes are relational, so should the predicates be that occur 
in the attributions of those attitudes.  
 
Since the accusative of intentionality involves considerations of attitudes, not of attributions of 
attitudes, if it were a good reason, then (RP) would have been supported by some considerations 
in philosophy of mind and epistemology. Unfortunately, however, precisely because the 
accusative of intentionality concerns the attitudes and not their attributions, one might 
immediately reject it: propositional attitudes are a feature of reality whereas attributions belong 
to language, and it is not clear why we should think that there is a mirroring between the two. 
As Matthews (2007: 102) and Wettstein (2004: 164) remark, assuming this mirroring is in fact 
unwarranted: our reporting practices have evolved to serve social, communicative ends that, for 
all we know so far, do not necessarily match the nature of what they report. For example, 
drinking is always drinking something, but from the alleged accusative of drinking it does not 
follow that we should take  
 
We drank furiously 
 
as a relational sentence. The accusative of intentionality, therefore, does not seem able to 
positively support (RP). Nonetheless, I think we should still recognize some force to this 
consideration: if attitudes are relational, considerations of attitudes cannot rule out a relational 
account of predicates occurring in attributions of attitudes. Put differently, take being alive. Is it 
a relation we have to something, a property we enjoy while alive, or what? We do not know. 




I am alive. 
 
With attitudes the situation is a bit different: no matter how complex it is to account for 
attitudes, we intuitively take them to be relational (even if this is not completely uncontroversial, 
see Matthews 2007). Therefore, if we are right and attitudes are really relational, we cannot on 
the basis of considerations of what attitudes are rule out a relational account of the predicates 
occurring in the attributions of attitudes. For those considerations would perfectly match a 
relational account of the predicates. I think we should concede to the accusative of intentionality 
this conditional force. But we should also grant that this is such a limited force: holding that 
some widespread considerations in another field do not rule out considerations in semantics is 
surely not the best way to support a semantic thesis. It thus seems that if some more forceful 




1.1.2   A SIMILARITY ARGUMENT 
A first linguistic consideration that has been put forward (McFetridge 1975-1976: 137-138; 
Parsons 1993: 443) as able to support  
 
(RP) Propositional attitude predicates occurring in propositional attitude sentences designate 
relations 
 
is the following: as it occurs in sentences like   
 
Olga believes the rumour about Cicero 
The jury did not believe the witness’s testimony 
Olga believes Gabriel’s theory, 
 
‘to believe’ is clearly relational. From this datum, one can try to hold that, similarly, in 
   
Olga believes that Cicero is smart 
 
‘to believe’ should also designate a relation.  
 
Is this a good argument in favour of (RP)? As it stands, this argument does not seem a good 
one. For, as Recanati (2000: 31) and Rumfitt (forthcoming) remark, the two kinds of 
constructions – those in which ‘to believe’ is followed by a definite description and those in 
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which it is followed by a ‘that’-clause – are different and independent. It would be like arguing 
that from the fact that in  
 
Jim drank three beers 
 
‘to drink’ designates a relation between a subject of the drinking and an object of the drinking, it 
follows that in  
 
Jim drank furiously 
 
‘to drink’ designates a relation. What would the relata be? One can try to improve the argument 
by noticing that an inference like  
 
Olga believes the rumour about Cicero 
The rumour about Cicero is that Cicero is smart 
Olga believes that Cicero is smart 
 
seems to be a valid instance of the substitution of identicals and thus seems to provide a link 
between the two constructions.  
 
It certainly seems that ‘is’, as it occurs in  
 
The rumour about Cicero is that Cicero is smart, 
 
is equative, identifying what ‘the rumour about Cicero’ and ‘that Cicero is smart’ allegedly 
denote, so that the inference certainly seems an instance of substitution of identicals. 
Nonetheless, it is not clear that it really is.  
 
First of all, not all agree that there is in fact something like an equative copula (Gamut 1990: 
187-191; Lockwood 1975: 474-481). They suggest that even in   
 
Cicero is Tully 
 
‘is’ should be taken as predicative, introducing the predicate ‘Tully’, which designates something 
analogous to what ‘identical to Tully’ designates. There are some arguments in favour of the 
necessity of distinguishing the ‘is’ of identity from the ‘is’ of predication. For example, one 
argument is that only in some cases can we substitute ‘is equal to’ or ‘is identical to’ for ‘is’. 
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Those cases, one may hold, are the cases in which ‘is’ designates identity. The following 
sentences, 
 
Cicero is equal to Tully 
Cicero is identical to Tully, 
 
for example, express what 
 
Cicero is Tully 
 
expresses, but the following, 
 
Cicero is equal to white 
Cicero is identical to white, 
 
instead, if they express anything at all, clearly do not express what the following expresses: 
 
Cicero is white.  
 
But it should be admitted that arguments like this are far from conclusive. One may hold that 
the possibility or not of substituting ‘is equal to’ and ‘is identical to’ is due not to the occurrence 
of different ‘is’s, but to what follows the predicate: as Lockwood (1975: 479) urges, “it is 
tendentious to say that a substitution has been carried out upon ‘is’, as opposed to [‘Tully’]”. 
Therefore, even if there are some arguments in support of the thesis that ‘is’ can designate 
identity, these arguments are not without replies, and we cannot take it as obviously true that ‘is’ 
can designate identity.   
 
Secondly, even if ‘is’ in English can in fact designate identity, it is not obvious that it designates 
identity in something like  
 
The rumour about Cicero is that Cicero is smart.  
 
Pryor (2007), for example, holds that what we have here is an instance of the so-called 
specificational copula. As the label suggests, this copula is supposed not to identify, but to specify in 
some way or other the subject, so that ‘that Cicero is smart’ is not denoting anything, and the 
argument  
 
Olga believes the rumour about Cicero 
20 
 
The rumour about Cicero is that Cicero is smart 
Olga believes that Cicero is smart 
 
is not, in the end, an instance of substitution of identicals. Now it is not obvious that there is a 
specificational copula. Pryor remarks (2007: 237-238) that there being a specificational copula is 
supported by the fact that we may have both 
 
The man Baptiste saw was Cicero, wasn’t it? (specificational) 
The man Baptiste saw was Cicero, wasn’t he? (equative). 
 
This is clearly not a conclusive argument in favour of the specificational copula. But it should be 
recognized that there are no knockdown arguments for the copula to be equative in  
 
The rumour about Cicero is that Cicero is smart 
 
either, so that it is an open issue whether the argument above is a case of substitution of 
identicals.2 But then it is left open whether sentences like  
 
Olga believes the rumour about Cicero 
The jury did not believe the witness’s testimony 
Olga believes Gabriel’s theory 
 
can also show that ‘to believe’ is relational as it occurs in  
 
Olga believes that Cicero is smart.  
 
Thus the similarity argument is inconclusive, and constructions like 
 
Olga believes the rumour about Cicero 
 
                                                          
2 Moulton 2015: 311-312 holds that in  
The idea/myth/story/rumour/fact is that Bob is a fraud 
the predication is equative: what the description denotes, so does the ‘that’-clause. Then he holds that 
literally equating ideas and stories with propositions cannot be correct: “[s]tories can be long and boring. 
But propositions can’t be. Rumours can be mean; they can be spread by people. But you can’t spread sets 
of possible worlds, nor can worlds be mean. Myths can be old and Greek; ideas can be new and exciting. 
None of these is something that a proposition can be”. Thus he concludes that a clause does not denote a 
proposition. Without discussion, Moulton therefore concludes that clauses do not denote propositions by 
relying, together with many others (for a recent example, see Braun 2015: 151), on the claim that in 
sentences like the one he considers the predicate designates genuine identity. But this is not obviously the 
case, since one may hold that ‘is’ is an instance of the specificational copula, or that ‘is’ here is to be really 
taken as tantamount to ‘can be represented by’, ‘has the content’, etc.  
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do not seem to be good reasons in favour of either rejecting or endorsing  
 





1.1.3   A WORKABLE CHARACTERIZATION  
The discussion of the accusative of intentionality and of the similarity argument shows that we 
have two requirements on the considerations that can constitute good reasons pro  
 
(RP) Propositional attitude predicates occurring in propositional attitude sentences designate 
relations. 
 
Firstly, if some more forceful reasons can be found, they should not come from considerations 
in philosophy of mind or epistemology, but should be found in the linguistic domain. Secondly, 
those reasons should only be found in the domain of propositional attitude sentences, since 
considerations of other constructions involve other theses that open up new issues. But what 
data concerning propositional attitude sentences can show us whether (RP) is to be taken as 
true? In order to answer this question, it should first be established when a relational predicate 
occurs in a sentence. In this section, I will provide what I take to be a rough but workable 
characterization. When we have characterized sentences in which relational predicates occur, we 
will see in the next two sections that there are indeed some good reasons to take propositional 
attitude sentences to be among them. 
  
So, when is it that a relational predicate occurs in a sentence? Unfortunately, we do not have an 
obviously correct answer. One might try to dismiss the requirement of formulating an answer by 
holding that, since we are speaking about natural languages, we can rely on the intuitive grasp of 
native speakers for determining when a relational predicate occurs in a sentence of that 
language. But this move is hardly satisfactory, for at least two reasons: first of all, it is not clear 
whether speakers have this piece of intuitive knowledge; secondly, it is usually unclear why we 
should trust ourselves as speakers. Something that does not rely on the intuitions of the 
speakers would be better. Let us then start again by our fairly clear example of a sentence in 
which a relational predicate occurs: 
 




In this sentence there are two open argument positions – ( ) loves ( ). Thus, one may try to 
suggest that a predicate that designates an n-place relation occurs in a sentence iff we can detect n 
open argument positions.  
 
But, clearly, this is not enough. Take  
 
Dave is asleep and Laura is awake. 
 
We can obtain 
 
( ) and ( ), 
 
but we obviously do not want to hold that ‘and’ designates a relation. In the usual way, we can 
then try to hold that a predicate that designates an n-place relation occurs in a sentence iff we can 
detect n open argument positions into which we can substitute an English existential quantifier. 
For from     
 
Dave is asleep and Laura is awake 
 
we cannot move to  
 
*Dave is asleep and something. 
  
Of course, following Prior (1955-1956: 200-201), we can build a mixture of English and Mathematics 
in which we in fact have sentential quantifiers, such as his thether, in which we can translate the 
English  
 




If and only if anywhether then thether.  
 
Moreover, we can even hold that in fact we would be better off if we introduced such a 
quantifier (Künne 2003: 356-373). But this does not change the fact that English, as it stands, is 
not like that. As Prior himself recognizes, “the logician has no alternative to talking in this way 
so long as the natural languages suffer – as all of them do suffer – from a paucity of quantifiers” 
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(1955-1956: 200). Since we are here considering English, the fact that we could obtain something 
analogous to  
 
*Dave is asleep and something 
 
– or even that it would better if we did find a way to obtain something like this – is irrelevant. In 
English, that sentence is indeed ungrammatical. Thus the move of requiring that the open 
position can be filled by an English existential quantifier is promising, but it is still not enough.  
 
For according to this definition, ‘is’ designates a relation, given that from 
 
Dave is excellent 
 
we can detect two positions, and  
 
Dave is something, i.e. excellent 
 
is grammatical. We would like to have, so to say, the right kind of quantifiers, but distinguishing 
those we want is not easy and defining relational predicates on the basis of quantifiers of counts 
as an explanation of obscura per obscuriora. Something that does not rely on a definition of what 
quantifiers we want would be much better.  
 
Another option is the following. Take  
 
Dave is excellent, 
Dave exemplifies excellence. 
 
According to our tentative insufficient characterization, a relational predicate occurs in both, 
since we can obtain both 
 
( ) is ( ) 




Dave is something 




One way to characterize our notion of a relational predicate such that the first is excluded, as 
desired, would be to say that the first is ruled out because ‘excellent’ is not a singular term. But 
this would give us wrong results: ‘some books’ is not a singular term, but in   
 
Dave bought some books 
 
‘to buy’ intuitively designates a relation.  
 
Thus we are holding that a predicate designating an n-place relation occurs in a sentence only if 
we can detect n open argument positions into which we can substitute an existential quantifier. 
We are now looking for further conditions, and we need to rely on something different than 
quantifiers and singular terms. Something a bit less obscure is, I think, the notion of a relation 
itself. Relations do raise various kinds of metaphysical problem. Is being a friend really a property, 
or better a relation? Are there any relations? What is it that makes the relation of love between 
Dave and Laura something different from the relation of love between Laura and Dave, i.e. 
where, if anywhere, does the order come from? Are there any non-symmetric relations? In order 
to solve the different issues we would have to dig deeply into the fundamental metaphysical 
notions. But even if the metaphysics of relations is complex, there is a characteristic of relations 
that I think we can exploit here: relations are tightly connected with other relations. For 
example, if Dave loves Laura, then Laura is loved by Dave, and if Dave is as old as Gabriel, then 
Gabriel is as old as Dave. Let us then take again 
 
Dave is excellent, 
Dave exemplifies excellence. 
 
With the second, we can designate the inverse relation, as in  
 
Excellence is exemplified by Dave. 
 
But with the first we cannot: it is not even clear what sentence would purport to express that. 
The following 
 
Excellent is Dave 
 
does not express something different from what the original sentence expresses, and nothing 
else comes to mind. In natural language, the inverse of a non-symmetric relation is generally 
designated via the change in the voice from active to passive or vice-versa. With equivalence 
relations, instead, only the roles of the arguments get switched: from  
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Gabriel is as old as Dave, 
 
where the predicate is not in the passive form. The condition on the possibility of building the 
inverse rules out  
 
Dave is excellent 
 
but it allows us to consider  
 
Dave bought some books 
 
as a sentence in which a relational predicate occurs. For we can in fact build the inverse, i.e. 
 
Some books were bought by Dave. 
 
This further condition seems therefore to give us what we want. Given this, we may try to hold 
that a predicate designating an n-place relation occurs in a sentence iff we can detect n open 
argument positions into which we can quantify and we can build a sentence in which we switch 
the roles of the arguments and the truth-value of the two sentences is the same. But we are 




Dave weighs 80kgs. 
 
We can obtain 
 
( ) weighs ( ) 
Dave weighs something, 
 
in accordance with the first condition, and we can also obtain 
 




in which the roles of ‘80kgs’ and ‘Dave’ have arguably changed, so that also the second 
condition is met. But we would hardly accept that this sentence expresses the holding of a 
relation. What would the relata be? In order to rule these cases out, we can rely on the special 
connection that relational predicates have with questions and ask the questions to be, so to say, 
of the right kind.3 Let us take again our  
 
Dave loves Laura.  
 
If we put a variable in place of one of the arguments, we obtain  
 
x loves Laura;  
Dave loves y.  
 
We can build the corresponding question, which asks what the missing relatum is: 
 
Who loves Laura?  
Whom does Dave love?. 
 
Given this relation between relational predicates and questions, we can then rely on the intuitive 
idea that questions like ‘Who?’, ‘What?’, ‘Which?’ point to something different than what 
questions like ‘How?’ point to. In asking whom Dave loves, I am asking who is one of the relata 
in the relation of love. But with 
 
Dave weighs 80kgs, 
 
80kgs is, in fact, not what, who, which, whom Dave weighs, but how much he weighs. Questions like 
‘How?’ and ‘How much?’ seem then to point not to one of the relata. In fact, ‘how’ and 
cognates, but not ‘what’ and cognates, can be used also for adverbs, as shown by 
 
I read carefully 
                                                          
3 Cohen 1929: 354-359 holds that “Who, which, what, when, where, why, etc. are the variables of every-day 
speech … ‘x is mortal’, stripped of its text-book disguise, is simply the familiar question, ‘What is 
mortal?’”. According to Cohen, therefore, stripped of its text-book disguise, 
Dave loves y  
is identical to  
Whom does Dave love?. 
No matter what stripped of its text-book disguise means, in order to accept the requirement put forward in the 
main text, it is not necessary to embrace Cohen’s extreme approach according to which questions are 
identical to sentences in which free variables occur. For it is sufficient to recognize that relational 
predicates, sentences in which free variables occur, and questions, are obviously somehow related. On 
this, see also §4.3.3.  
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How did you read?, 
 
and it is obvious that ‘how’ here does not point to something that in the sentence the predicate 
‘to read’ relates to me. In order to rule out cases like 
 
Dave weighs 80kgs, 
 
we can then add the following extra requirement: all the arguments, so to say, answer questions 
like ‘Who?’, ‘Which?, ‘What?’, and not ‘How?’ or ‘How (much)?’, etc.4 
 
Putting everything together, we have the following characterization:  
 
in a sentence an n-place relational predicate occurs iff 
(RP1) We can detect n open argument positions into which we can quantify, and such that 
each argument answers a question like ‘What?’, ‘Which?’, ‘Who?’;  
(RP2) We can build a sentence in which the roles of some of the n arguments have been 
switched, and the truth-value of this and the original sentence is the same.    
 
This is not a definition of when in a sentence a relational predicate occurs, given that there is a 
pretty obvious circularity: the notion of role of an argument, for example, cannot be defined 
without relying on the notion of relational predicate. Moreover, in order to specify what are the 
questions like ‘What?’, ‘Which?’, ‘Who?’, the notion of relational predicate would surely be needed. 
But, however sloppy, however open to counterexamples, and however imprecise it is, I take it 




1.1.4   THE VALIDITY OF SOME INFERENCES   
With this characterization of when in a sentence a relational predicate occurs, let us see whether 
we can find some good reasons in favour of the thesis that we are primarily interested in, i.e. 
 
                                                          
4 Matthews 2007 has recently defended a measurement account of propositional attitude attributions, 
according to which propositional attitude sentences are in fact similar to 
Dave weights 80kgs. 
In support of his account, Matthews says that for both ‘that Cicero is smart’ and ‘80kgs’ we can “form wh‐
questions” (150). But while this is certainly the case, the kinds of questions are intuitively very different. 
Nonetheless, the account I will develop is similar in some crucial respects with Matthews’s. In the next 




(RP) Propositional attitude predicates occurring in propositional attitude sentences designate 
relations. 
 
According to (RP), as it occurs in a sentence like 
 
Olga believes that Cicero is smart 
 
‘to believe’ designates a relation. The first condition in the characterization just provided, i.e. 
that an n-place relational predicate occurs in a sentence if 
 
(RP1) We can detect n open argument positions into which we can quantify, and such that 
each argument answers a question like ‘What?’, ‘Which?’, ‘Who?’, 
 
is surely satisfied. In our attribution  
 
Olga believes that Cicero is smart 
 
we can detect more than one open argument position,  
 
( ) believes ( ), 
 
and we can quantify into both positions: 
 
Somebody believes that Cicero is smart 
Olga believes something. 
 
Moreover, Olga is who believes that, while that Cicero is smart is what she believes.  
 
Holding that in propositional attitude sentences we have more than one position into which we 
can substitute an English quantifier makes it easy to account for the validity of some inferences, 
and the validity of such inferences is actually the reason that is most commonly put forward 
(Bealer 1982: 23-25; Braun 2015: 144; Crawford 2014; King 2014a: 7; Recanati 2000: 6; 33-39; 
Richard 1996; Salmon 1983: 5-6; Schiffer 2003: 12-14) in support of the conjunction of the first 
two theses of the allegedly face-value theory, i.e. 
 
(RP) Propositional attitude predicates occurring in propositional attitude sentences designate 
relations; 
(ST) ‘That’-clauses are singular terms. 
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The inferences whose validity are relevant are those like the following:  
 
Olga believes that Cicero is smart 
Gabriel believes everything Olga believes 
Thus, Gabriel believes that Cicero is smart.  
 
For according to the conjunction of theses (RP) and (ST), the inference enjoys the following 
clearly logically valid simple pattern:  
 
B(oc) 
∀x(B(ox) → B(gx))  
∴ B(gc).  
 
Thus, if the theses are endorsed, firstly, the explanation of the validity of the inference does not 
need to go beyond the usual rules of first order classical logic. Secondly, the quantifiers can be 
interpreted as the usual objectual quantifiers. But it should be noted that even though often 
presented as such, these considerations are not really in favour of the conjunction of theses (RP) 
and (ST), but just of the first. Let us see this with an example that has nothing to do with 
propositional attitudes. Take the following two inferences 
 
Dave loves Laura  
Gabriel loves everything Dave loves  
Gabriel loves Laura; 
 
Dave loves a girl  
Gabriel loves everything Dave loves  
Gabriel loves a girl. 
 
Although the second is more complex, both inferences have a straightforward correct form, and 
we can account for the validity of both without having to go beyond first order logic with 
objectual quantifiers (in the case of the second, we would have to add premises, but the 
argument could still instantiate a valid pattern). So let us go back to our original inference  
 
Olga believes that Cicero is smart 
Gabriel believes everything Olga believes 




Its validity, and the fact that we want to account for it without going beyond usual first order 
logic with objectual quantifiers, do not establish whether the inference is similar to the first or 
the second in our example. Put differently, in order to straightforwardly account for the validity 
of our inference, the thesis  
 
(ST) ‘That’-clauses are singular terms 
 
is not needed. If we reject it and take, for example, ‘that Cicero is smart’ not as a singular term, 
but as a quantified phrase similar to ‘a girl’, everything is still explained in the way we want.5 
Thus the validity of these inferences does not show the truth of (ST), and we will have to 
discuss it separately below in §1.2. If these inferences are a reason at all, therefore, they are only 
a reason in favour of 
 
(RP) Propositional attitude predicates occurring in propositional attitude sentences designate 
relations. 
 
But is the validity of those inferences a good reason in favour of (RP)? Of course, holding (RP), 
and thus having the possibility of taking the quantifiers as objectual, is not the only way in which 
the validity of the inference can be explained. Nonetheless, it is clearly the easiest one, in 
particular considering that, differently from what some have held (Aune 1985: 63-65) the 
quantifiers occurring in that kind of inference cannot be interpreted substitutionally (Moltmann 
2003: 80). A first problem for the substitutional interpretation of quantifiers occurring in the 
context of propositional attitude attributions is the following (Hofweber forthcoming; Richard 
1996/2013: 146-148; Schiffer 1987: 288). Substitutional quantifiers need substitution instances; 
the following sentence 
 
There are objects of propositional attitudes not expressible in present day English 
 
seems true, but, given what it asserts, the quantifier in it can’t be understood as substitutional 
with sentences of present day English as a substitution class, since any instance would be an 
expressible object of attitude. But I think it is better not to rely on considerations of this kind. 
For the substitutionalist can say that the substitution instances belong to English, suitably 
                                                          
5 Obviously,  
Dave loves a girl  
Gabriel loves everything Dave loves  
Gabriel loves a girl 
also has another reading, in which Dave and Gabriel do not love the very same girl, but two different 
girls. This is irrelevant for our purposes. It is the reading we considered in the main text that shows that 
the validity of the inferences does not support   
(ST) ‘That’-clauses are singular term. 
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extended. Richard thinks that this “is cheating” (1996/2013: 147), but even though the notion of 
suitable extension is surely difficult to cash out, I think it is far from clear that there is some 
cheating going on in this move. If I am right that the substitutionalist can rely on a suitable 
extension of English, a sentence like  
 
There are objects of propositional attitudes not expressible in present day English 
 
is problematic for the substitutionalist approach only if there are objects of attitudes that are 
inexpressible in English, not just de facto, but de jure. Then, in order to maintain that the 
quantifiers occurring in something like 
 
Olga believes something 
 
are objectual, one would have to rely on the thesis that there are thoughts that cannot be put 
into words. This is surely not the easiest way to go.  
 
But there is no need to rely on the de jure inexpressible, since there is another problem for the 
substitutional interpretation of quantifiers like the one occurring in  
 
Olga believes something. 
 
For if these quantifiers were substitutional, the substituents would have to be of the right 
syntactic category; but this is not necessarily so. Take as an example the following sentence,  
 
Olga imagined something Gabriel never thought about. 
 
If what Olga imagined, and what Gabriel never thought about, is that Cicero is smart, then, 
according to a substitutional interpretation of the quantifiers, the following  
 
*Olga imagined that Cicero is smart and Gabriel never thought about that Cicero is smart 
 
would have to be grammatical; but it is not. In contrast with a substitutional interpretation of 
the quantifier, ‘something’ is acceptable even though it would require a ‘that’-clause with respect 
to ‘imagined’ but something different with respect to the preposition ‘about’. 
 




(RP) Propositional attitude predicates occurring in propositional attitude sentences designate 
relations, 
 
and thus the thesis that the quantifiers are objectual, are denied, then a third type of quantifier 
should be introduced. This is in fact exactly what Hofweber (forthcoming), Prior (1963: 117-
118); Recanati (2000: 33-39), Rumfitt (2003b; forthcoming), Rosefeldt (2008) and Schiffer (1987: 
288) suggest. Recanati and Schiffer do not explain how these quantifiers would work and what 
they mean; but their meaning should be provided. If not, to extend van Inwagen’s (1981: 282) 
protest concerning substitutional quantifiers to the present case, it is like introducing ‘to cisse’ 
alongside ‘to kiss’, and then adding nothing more than that  
 
Dave cissed Laura 
 
is true iff Dave kissed Laura but the sentence does not express what is expressed by  
 
Dave kissed Laura.  
 
Rumfitt (2003b: 462-463) in fact suggests something concerning the meaning of these 
quantifiers and argues that these quantifiers can “be Englished using the non-nominal 
quantificational forms ‘however things may be’ or ‘however things may be said or thought to 
be’”. Hofweber (forthcoming) argues instead that these quantifiers concern inferential roles: 
 
 
the quantified sentence inferentially relates to quantifier free sentences … we want to inferentially 




Rosefeldt (2008: 318-325) accounts for them within a type theoretic account.6 As these authors 
themselves admit, the way in which they characterize their quantifiers hardly constitutes a full 
account. Moreover, I think the fact that there are so many different approaches sheds some 
doubts on our having an intuitive grasp of how these quantifiers would work and thus on how 
easy defining them properly would be. So, however these quantifiers that are neither objectual 
nor substitutional are characterized, it seems indisputable that endorsing  
                                                          
6 Rosefeldt 2008: 310 observes that the quantifiers occurring in  
Dave hopes something 
Dave said something 
cannot be objectual because they cannot be restricted. But, actually, although they allow only a few 




(RP) Propositional attitude predicates occurring in propositional attitude sentences designate 
relations 
 
is a much easier way to explain the validity of some inferences involving propositional attitude 
sentences. Other things being equal, as they say, I think we should conclude that endorsing (RP) is 




1.1.5   THE PASSIVE VOICE  
As we saw in §1.1.3, an n-place relational predicate occurs in a sentence iff 
  
(RP1) We can detect n open argument positions into which we can quantify, and such that 
each argument answers a question like ‘What?’, ‘Which?’, ‘Who?’;  
(RP2) We can build a sentence in which the roles of some of the n arguments have been 
switched, and the truth-value of this and the original sentence is the same.    
 
We just saw that the first condition is met by propositional attitude sentences, and we can now 
see that they also seem to meet the second (Künne 2003: 68-69; White 1972: 80). For from our 
 
Olga believes that Cicero is smart   
 
we can move to the passive voice: 
 
That Cicero is smart is believed by Olga.  
 
Surely, the passive voice is a good strong datum in favour of taking a sentence to be one in 
which a relational predicate occurs. For in the passive transformation, we change the role of 
some relata, so that the patient(s) becomes the agent(s) and vice versa, and only if a predicate 
designates a relation among some relata do we have some relata to change the role of. Thus, it 
seems that we can easily conclude that in propositional attitude sentences, given that they meet 
both conditions (RP1) and (RP2), relational predicates occur.  
 
But things are not that easy. For one can deny that propositional attitude sentences really meet 
condition (RP2) (Harman 2003: 175; Rundle 1979: 280; 313). For example, Rundle holds that 
 




is not really the passive voice of  
 
Olga believes that Cicero is smart,   
 
but should be taken as the result of an inversion and ellipsis for ‘it’ in 
 
It is believed by Olga that Cicero is smart, 
 
which is itself tantamount to  
 
It is believed by Olga: Cicero is smart,  
 
where ‘it’ is a structural device that has no semantic import, as when it occurs in something like  
 
It is raining. 
 
Thus there seem to be other accounts of the alleged passive voice, and so the occurrence of this 
alleged passive voice is not a proof of the truth of  
 
(RP) Propositional attitude predicates occurring in propositional attitude sentences designate 
relations. 
 
But, first of all, explanations of this kind are extremely complicated and unnatural. Moreover, it 
is not clear that there really is some similarity between  
 
It is believed by Olga 
It is raining. 
 
For, as we have already seen, with the first we can ask 
 
What is believed by Olga? 
 
while we cannot ask  
 
What is raining? 
 




That Cicero is smart is believed by Olga 
 
are only apparently passive voices or, as it is also said, that the ‘that’-clauses occurring in them 
are only in apparent subject position, is often driven by ontological considerations, as in the case 
of Rundle, or by considerations regarding some general principles of this or that syntactic 
framework (Moulton 2015). But there is nothing in the sentence itself that rules out the much 
more intuitive thesis that the apparent subject position is in fact a real subject position. I think, 
therefore, that we can rather safely advance the thesis that, again other things being equal, sentences 
like 
 
That Cicero is smart is believed by Olga 
 
are genuine passive voices.  
 
But then propositional attitude sentences satisfy both conditions 
 
(RP1) we can detect n open argument positions into which we can quantify, and such that 
each argument answers a question like ‘What?’, ‘Which?’, ‘Who?’;  
(RP2) we can build a sentence in which the roles of some of the n arguments have been 
switched and the truth-value of this and the original sentence is the same. 
 
Thus, other things being equal, it seems correct to hold that relational predicates occur in 
propositional attitude sentences, in accordance with the thesis 
 
(RP) Propositional attitude predicates occurring in propositional attitude sentences designate 
relations.7 
 
Before moving on to other considerations, let us note that the datum that propositional attitude 
sentences allow the passive voice does not also imply, together with (RP), the truth of  
 
(ST) ‘That’-clauses are singular terms.  
                                                          
7 Those we saw are not the only data in support of (RP). Others concern extraposition, i.e. the fact that 
we can move from 
Olga believes that Cicero is smart 
to 
Olga believes it that Cicero is smart.  
If ‘to believe’ was not a relational predicate, then there would be, so to say, no space for ‘it’. But I think it 
is better to leave considerations of this kind out. For these constructions with the expletive ‘it’ are 
considered to be syntactically very complex, and too many different syntactic factors would have to be 
taken into consideration. Luckily, the data we have considered seem already sufficient. 
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For our ability to construct the passive voice depends merely on whether or not the predicate is 
transitive, no matter whether or not we have singular terms occurring in the original active 
sentence. Since ‘to love’ is a transitive predicate as it occurs in the following sentences,  
 
Dave loves Laura  
Dave loves girls  
Someone loves Laura  
Someone loves girls,  
 
all the sentences allow the passive voice transformation, but only in the first and third is the 




1.1.6   AN ALLEGED REASON AGAINST  
Let us take stock. We have seen some reasons that might be taken to support  
 
(RP) Propositional attitude predicates occurring in propositional attitude sentences designate 
relations. 
 
We have seen that the so-called accusative of intentionality has the weakest possible force: it only 
shows that some widespread considerations in philosophy of mind and epistemology do not 
conflict with a relational account of predicates occurring in propositional attitude reports. We 
then saw that considerations about sentences like 
 
Olga believes the rumour about Cicero 
 
seem to involve some disputable theses, so that they cannot be easily employed as reasons pro or 
contra (RP). But we also found two good reasons in favour of taking the predicates occurring in 
propositional attitude sentences as relational, i.e. the intuitive validity of certain inferences and 
the grammaticality of sentences like  
 
That Cicero is smart is believed by Olga, 
 
which are best taken as the passive voice counterparts of sentences like 
 




Neither of these considerations, nor their conjunction, constitutes a proof that (RP) is true, 
since other explanations of the data are available. Endorsing (RP) still seems, other things being 
equal, to be the best option. But, as we will see now, there are some considerations that seem to 
show that other things are not equal.8 For ‘to know’ admits of singular terms, as shown by the 
perfectly grammatical 
 
Olga knows Laura. 
 
Given this, if propositional attitude predicates occurring in propositional attitude sentences are 
relational, no matter what the semantic function of ‘that’-clauses is, if it has been stipulated that 
‘Bob’ is the name of a relatum in  
 
Olga knows that Cicero is smart 
 
then one would expect  
 
Olga knows Bob 
 
to be true if  
 
Olga knows that Cicero is smart 
 
is. Take the following example: ‘to love’ is relational as it occurs in 
 
Dave loves his wife profoundly. 
 
If the sentence is true, and if ‘Sweety’ has been postulated to be the name of one of the relata, it 
follows that  
 
Dave loves Sweety 
 
is true. But the truth of   
 
                                                          
8 These data were firstly presented by Prior 1971: 3-21, Rundle 1979: 293-298 and Vendler 1972: 101. 
More recently, they have been discussed by Asher 1993: 21-22; 31-32; 210-213; Bach 1997: 224-225; Boër 
2009; Harman 2003; Hofweber: 2006: 215-217; King 2007: 137-163; 2014b; Künne 2003: 258-263; 
McKinsey 1999: 529-531; Merricks 2009; Moffett 2003; Moltmann 2003; Pietroski 2005: 218-241; Pryor 




Olga knows that Cicero is smart 
 
does not in fact guarantee that  
 
Olga knows Bob 
 
is true. Olga may know that Cicero is smart, so that the first sentence is true, but not be 
acquainted with Bob, be it a sentence, a proposition, a fact, Cicero, a property or what have you. 
Similarly, even if we posit that ‘Tom’ is the name for one of the relata, Olga can fear that Cicero 
is smart without fearing Tom, so she can fear that Cicero is smart without instantiating an 
unusual form of phobia directed to a proposition, a fact, a sentence, a property or what have you.    
 
Now since we found some good reasons for taking our thesis 
 
(RP) Propositional attitude predicates occurring in propositional attitude sentences designate 
relations 
 
to be true, we have good reasons to try to explain the datum away, and there seem to be two 
main routes one can take here. The first strategy is pure dismissal. Schiffer (2003: 93-96), for 
example, has quickly dismissed the examples, taking them as just showing a quirk of Indo-
European languages. But, firstly, the phenomenon is pervasive: it does not concern only English 
or ‘to know’ and ‘to fear’, but many other languages and predicates as well: ‘to demand’; ‘to 
desire’; ‘to explain’; ‘to expect’ ; ‘to feel’; ‘to hear’; ‘to imagine’; ‘to indicate’; ‘to mention’; ‘to 
recommend’; ‘to remember’; ‘to request’; ‘to see’; ‘to suggest’; ‘to suspect’; ‘to understand’ (King 
2007: 154; Rosefeldt 2008: 305). Moreover, since the reasons for endorsing our thesis (RP) are 
themselves linguistic examples, and the thesis is supposed to be a semantic theory exactly of 
those Indo-European languages, then in the absence of a reason why only some examples would 
be relevant, I think we have no right to select the data we want to account for. As Cartwright 
(1962: 102) would have remarked, we cannot simply dismiss some of the data, those that do not 
fit in our theory: 
 
 
a familiar sort of objection … They will claim that this is, somehow, only a point of usage - a 
linguistic accident which could well be avoided in a language specifically designed for philosophical 
clarification. But in spite of its familiarity, this objection is not easily understood. One wonders, in 
the first place, how it could be a mere fact of usage … Usage of what? … And one wonders, in the 
second place, how to tell those points of usage which are merely that from those which are 





Furthermore, there is a criterion for establishing whether something is only a point of usage, and if 
we take the criterion as correct, our examples do not come out as mere points of usage. 
Together with Schnieder (2006), let us imagine a language in which we do not use ‘to eat’ for 
princesses, but only use ‘to dine’. In that language a sentence like 
 
The princess did not eat 
 
does not express that the princess lacks a certain property and the negation is metalinguistic. 
The sentence expresses that we do not use ‘to eat’ for princesses, and in fact we can take it to 
express something like  
 
“The Princess ate” is not in accordance with usage. 
 
If we take Schnieder’s criterion as correct, the examples we are concerned with do not come out 
as mere points of usage. For let us suppose that Olga knows that Cicero is smart. If it were a 
mere point of usage that we cannot use a proper name for one of the relata in the relation 
designated by ‘to know’, then  
 
Olga does not know Bob 
 
would express what 
 
“Olga knows Bob” is not in accordance with usage 
 
expresses. But this is clearly not the case: clearly   
 
Olga knows Bob 
 
does belong to usage, and we would use it, and it would be true, if Olga was in fact acquainted 
with the object Bob, whatever it is. Furthermore, a test for establishing whether the negation is 
metalinguistic is the impossibility of morphologically incorporated negation, so that, for 
example,  
 
Warpe did not wop up his voice, he spoke with an Italian accent 
 
comes out as having metalinguistic tones, considering that  
 
*Warpe unwopped his voice, he spoke with an Italian accent 
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is ungrammatical (Predelli 2013: 106). While, as Predelli remarks, the test is not conclusive, we 
can note that our case seems not to pass the test and thus seems to come out as not having a 
metalinguistic tone. The not identical, but still arguably relevant 
 
Bob is unknown to Olga 
 
is in fact perfectly grammatical. 
 
Thus the data are pervasive, and they do not seem reducible to mere points of usage. They 
should be accounted for. Let us then move to the second strategy.  
 
The second strategy, which is the most commonly endorsed (King 2007: 153-155; Künne 2003: 
259-260; Pietroski 2005: 217-241; Stanley 2011: 64-65), is to hold that some propositional 
attitude predicates, such as our ‘to know’, are ambiguous and have different meaning in 
constructions like 
 
Olga knows that Cicero is smart 
Olga knows Bob. 
 
Roughly, the first sentence is taken to express that Olga has a piece of knowledge which is 
characterised in some way or other by the ‘that’-clause, while the second expresses that Olga has 
Bob as one of the things she is acquainted with. This strategy is clearly successful: if the relations 
contributed by the predicates are different in the two sentences, it is to be expected that the 
truth-conditions of the sentences are different. But, as always, we want some reasons for 
thinking that it is really the case that the predicates are ambiguous. Here are the two reasons that 
are generally put forward (King 2007: 156-162; Künne 2003: 260). 
  
The first kind of evidence that has been provided is the fact that the predicates pass the usual 
zeugma test for ambiguity. According to the test, since from  
 
Olga knows that Cicero is smart 
Olga knows Bob 
 
we cannot move to  
 
Olga knows that Cicero is smart and Bob, 
 
it follows that ‘to know’ makes different contributions as it occurs in the two original sentences.  
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The idea behind the test is intuitively correct: for two occurrences of a word or a phrase, we can 
avoid repeating the word iff it is actually repetition, i.e. iff the two occurrences have the very 
same meaning. To take Ryle’s (1949: 23) famous example, while the tide is rising and hopes are 
rising, if we do not want to make a pun, we cannot say that both the tide and hopes are rising. 
Therefore, according to the test, ‘to rise’ is ambiguous. This seems plausible and pretty clear but, 
unfortunately, things are not always this clear, and the possibility of deleting one occurrence of a 
term seems to have to do with many different factors, ambiguity being only one of them. First 
of all, since from 
 
Emanuel’s dissertation is thought provoking 
Emanuel’s dissertation is yellowed with age 
 
we cannot move to 
 
Emanuel’s dissertation is thought provoking and yellowed with age, 
 
the test tells us that ‘dissertation’ is ambiguous. But when we complicate things just a little bit, as 
in  
 
Emanuel’s dissertation is still thought provoking although yellowed with age, 
 
we actually obtain a perfectly grammatical sentence (Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk 2007: 143). 
Secondly, as van Inwagen (2009: 487) remarks, the acceptability of the conjunction seems to 
depend on the relations between the conjuncts. Take another of Ryle’s examples (1949: 23): 
 
There exist public opinions and navies. 
 
Surely, this sentence sounds odd. But one may hold that the sentence is odd simply because we 
do not generally talk about these things together, and it is actually hard to think of any reason 
why we would ever find ourselves in such a situation. But if one cooks up an appropriate 
accompanying story, sentences talking about public opinion and the navy can in fact become 
fine. Here is van Inwagen’s example: 
 
The Prime Minister had a habit of ignoring the existence of things he didn’t know how to 
deal with, such as public opinion and the Navy. 
 




Olga knows that Cicero is smart and Bob, 
 
is odd, the following, 
 
I know Dave and that he loves you,  
 
is fine. These examples do not show that ‘to know’ is not ambiguous after all. For example, as 
Boër (2009: 553) remarks, one can explain  
 
I know Dave and that he loves you 
 
by holding that it is a case of syllepsis, similar to  
 
She broke her promise and my heart 
 
in which, although the predicate is ambiguous, we can avoid repetition because the two 
meanings of the predicate are somehow related. But still, the examples show that the zeugma 
test is not completely reliable, and this reason in favour of taking propositional attitude 
predicates to be ambiguous is therefore far from conclusive.   
 
The second kind of evidence in favour of the ambiguity of propositional attitude predicates is 
that they pass the usual translation test for ambiguity. The datum is that while in English both  
 
Olga knows that Cicero is smart 
Olga knows Bob 
 
are grammatical, in other languages, such as French, German and Italian, two different 
predicates should be used in the two different kinds of construction. The Italian translations of 
the two sentences, for example, are 
 
Olga sa che Cicerone è intelligente 
Olga conosce Bob, 
 
in which two distinct predicates occur. Similarly, in German there are ‘wissen’ and ‘kennen’ and 
in French ‘connaître’ and ‘savoir’.  
 
Translation is a traditional test for ambiguity. The idea is that if we translate a word with more 
than one word in other languages then the original word is ambiguous: why would the other 
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languages make a distinction out of no difference? Unfortunately, as strong as this may look as a 
test, it too can be called into question. First of all, one may raise here a general Quinean 
scepticism concerning the thesis that there is something like the translation of a sentence. 
Moreover, only ‘to know’ shows such a solid difference in translation in other languages, and, as 
we have seen, the phenomenon is instead pervasive.  
 
Thus, the reasons usually put forward in the literature are not sufficient in order to support the 
thesis that some propositional attitude predicates are ambiguous. Should we reject it, then? I 
think we should not, for two main reasons. First of all, there are cases in which the ambiguity of 
the predicates is much less controversial. Here is one example. Take a predicate that has nothing 
to do with propositional attitudes, ‘to substitute’. The predicate is clearly ambiguous:  
 
Dave substituted the painting  
 
can express both that Dave substituted something with the painting (substituens) or that Dave 
substituted the painting (substituendum) with something. The propositional attitude predicate ‘to 
explain’ seems obviously similarly ambiguous: while in  
 
Olga explained that all mathematical truths form a species of logical truth 
 
what follows the predicate has to do with the explanans, in  
 
Olga explained logicism, 
 
logicism is the explandum (Rundle 1979: 290). If Olga explained that all mathematical truths form 
a species of logical truth, we can tell Olga that she is wrong. But if Olga explained logicism, she 
explained what logicism is, without it being necessary that she thinks it is correct. In this case it 
would be inappropriate to protest that logicism is false, and Olga can well say that she is 
explaining what the theory amounts to, not that the theory is true. Thus, it seems that we can 
conclude that at least the propositional attitude predicate ‘to explain’ is genuinely ambiguous.  
 
Secondly, I think we should recognize that predicates like ‘to know’ and ‘to fear’ are already 
ambiguous before we consider ‘that’-clauses, or at least have a complex and multifarious 
meaning. We do not even need to go into the details of a conceptual analysis of knowledge, for 
it is sufficient to take a dictionary. Here are some of the different meanings The Oxford Dictionary 





- To have information, as in “The cause of the fire is not yet known”; 
- To realize, as in “She knows a bargain when she sees one”; 
- To be familiar, as in “I’ve known Olga for 31 years”; 
- To think that somebody/something is a particular type of person or thing or has particular characteristics 
as in “It’s known as the most dangerous part of the city”; 
- To give name as in “The drug is commonly known as Ecstasy”; 
- To distinguish, as in “We have taught our children to know right from wrong”; 
- To experience, as in “He has known both poverty and wealth”. 
 
The same holds for the predicate ‘to fear’ and all the others that lead to the datum we are 
concerned about. Take ‘to accept’: accepting a present or an invitation is not like accepting a 
conclusion or a theory, unless we are in quite an unusual context in which conclusions are given 
to us. These are complex predicates and this is to be expected. They concern our mental life and 
our mental life is indeed complex. Sometimes, moreover, the way in which we phrase things 
puts constraints on the available meanings. For example, ‘some bargain’ and ‘a bargain’ can be 
read as having the same meaning. But whereas in 
 
I know a bargain when I see it 
 
‘to know’ can be taken as having the recognition meaning, this is not the case with  
 
I know some bargain.9  
 
Since the predicates are at least polysemous even before ‘that’-clauses are considered, we can 
rather safely assume that they are so also when we consider ‘that’-clauses and sentences like  
 
Olga knows that Cicero is smart.  
 
Endorsing the thesis that some propositional attitude predicates, such as our ‘to know’, are 
ambiguous seems the best strategy in order to save  
 
(RP) Propositional attitude predicates occurring in propositional attitude sentences designate 
relations 
                                                          
9 On the basis of the fact that ‘that’-clauses and noun phrases belong to different syntactic categories, 
King 2007:154 argues that the ambiguity of propositional attitude predicates is best explained by arguing 
that the syntactic category of the complement of the predicate determines which relation the predicate 
contributes. But this thesis is subject to some serious objections (Boër 2009: 552-553; Moffett 2003: 82-
84; Rosefeldt 2008: 315-316) and, moreover, this sharp correlation between semantics and syntax is 
actually unmotivated and unnecessary.  
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from some evidence that seems to show that (RP) cannot be correct. The choice is between 
rejecting (RP) or endorsing the claim that some predicates are ambiguous. As we have seen, we 
have some good reasons to take (RP) as true: (RP) is the easiest way to explain the intuitive 
validity of some inferences and the possibility of obtaining sentences like  
 
That Cicero is smart is believed by Olga, 
 
from sentences like 
 
Olga believes that Cicero is smart.  
 
It is true that we do not have absolutely incontestable arguments for the ambiguity of the 
predicates. But neither do we have absolute arguments for the univocity of those predicates. 
Moreover, even though they are weak, some arguments can be put forward in support of 
ambiguity, arguments that are independent of ‘that’-clauses and propositional attitude sentences. 
I think, therefore, that we should conclude that we seem much more justified in holding that the 
predicates are ambiguous than in rejecting (RP). All things considered, we can finally conclude 
that we had better endorse  
 












(RP) Propositional attitude predicates occurring in propositional attitude sentences designate 
relations; 
(ST) ‘That’-clauses are singular terms 
 
are often conflated, and the reasons in favour of (RP) just discussed are usually taken to be 
reasons for both (RP) and (ST). But, as we saw in §§1.1.4-1.1.5, this is incorrect: both the 
validity of some inferences and the possibility of building the passive voice leave open the 
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possibility that ‘that’-clauses are not singular terms. Thus we still need to establish whether it is 
better to endorse (ST). According to (ST), ‘that’-clauses are singular terms, but what are singular 
terms? Unfortunately, we notoriously do not have an uncontroversial definition. But, whatever 
the details are and however the difficult cases are to be accommodated, we can characterize 
singular terms in the following way. The difference between syntactic units and non-syntactic 
units is the difference between names, descriptions, predicates on the one hand and something 
like ‘ ’s reason is’, ‘and nice’, ‘gave me while’ on the other. Singular terms are, roughly, those 
syntactic units that purport to denote one thing. Thus, for example, in this sense proper names 
and definite descriptions are singular terms, in that they purport to denote some thing. Singular 
terms are therefore a special kind of syntactic unit, and in order to assess (ST) it should first of 
all be established whether ‘that’-clauses are syntactic units. In §1.2.1 we will see that we had 
better hold that they are. But it will still be open whether ‘that’-clauses are singular terms, in 
accordance with (ST), or whether they are themselves quantified phrases not reducible to 
singular terms. We will then see in §1.2.2, firstly, that it is in fact better to endorse (ST) and, 




1.2.1   SYNTACTIC UNITS 
Let us start by trying to establish whether ‘that’-clauses are syntactic units. As many have 
remarked and as Künne (2003: 69) puts it, everything in syntax speaks in favour of holding that 
in carving a sentence like  
 
Olga believes that Cicero is smart 
 
at its syntactic joints, we do obtain ‘that Cicero is smart’ is a unit. For, in general, there are some 
constraints on how the passive form of a construction can be built and how we can 
grammatically rearrange the bits of a sentence. These constraints are predictably connected with 
the syntactic units that occur in the sentence. For example, in  
 
Olga likes her friends 
 
‘her friends’ is taken to be a unit because, if it were not, it would be possible to rearrange the 
different bits so that ‘her’ and ‘friends’ get separated; but this is not possible. All the following 
sentences, 
  
*Her Olga likes friends 
*Her are liked by Olga friends 
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*Are liked friends by Olga her,  
 
are ungrammatical. Cutting  
 
Olga believes that Cicero is smart 
 
so that the ‘that’-clause is not a unit violates those constraints. Let us take Prior’s account (1963) 
as an example. According to Prior, we should cut the attribution as follows: 
 
Olga / believes that / Cicero is smart.  
 
Thus ‘that Cicero is smart’ is not a unit, while ‘believes that’ is. But then why can ‘believes’ and 
‘that’ be kept apart, as shown by the grammaticality of 
 
That Cicero is smart is believed by Olga 
What Olga believes is that Cicero is smart, 
 
and actually should be so kept apart, considering that both the following sentences,  
 
*Cicero is smart is believed that by Olga 
*What Olga believes that is Cicero is smart, 
 
are ungrammatical?10  
 
Surely, as always, these problems for accounts that do not take ‘that’-clauses to be syntactic units 
are not without replies. For example, it should be recognized that in our natural languages there 
are cases in which bits of languages which are undoubtedly syntactic units can be kept apart. For 
example, we have the phenomenon of tmesis, in which, as Quine (1987: 3) puts it, there is the 
sandwiching of one word in another. As he reports, tmesis is actually possible in English: in 
                                                          
10 If we cut our sentence as 
Olga / believes / that. Cicero is smart 
as suggested by Davidson 1968: 138-140, the ‘that’-clause would have to be separable, but it is not. If we 
cut as  
Olga / believes that Cicero is smart, 
as Quine 1960: 216 and McKinsey 1999: 526-529 have suggested, then it becomes a mystery why we can 
we have something like 
Olga believes that Cicero is smart and that the Somnium Scipionis is amazing. 
If we cut it as 
Olga / believes / that Cicero / is / smart 
as in accordance with Russell 1910 and, more recently, Moltmann 2003, then it becomes a mystery why 
we can obtain 
Gabriel believes it.  
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A whole nother ball game, 
 
for example, ‘another’ is sandwiched with ‘whole’. Moreover, while in English the phenomenon 
is pretty rare, it is pervasive in some other languages, such as German, where it concerns all the 
aptly called separable verbs: the verb ‘aufmachen’, for example, typically gets split in some 
constructions, such as the following 
 
Machen Sie die Tür auf.  
 
With tmesis we have a counterexample to the thesis that syntactic units cannot be rearranged so 
as to get separated. Data on separability alone, therefore, do not seem able to settle the question 
of whether ‘that’-clauses are syntactic units. But it should also be recognized that the 
phenomenon of tmesis is probably best taken as an exception, not as the rule, so that unless we 
were confronted with serious reasons for why we should not take ‘that’-clauses to be syntactic 
units, it is better to think they are. Moreover, data on separability are not the only kinds of data 
we can rely on in assessing whether ‘that’-clauses are syntactic units. Another datum that is 
relevant here is that, for example, we can substitute singular pronouns and demonstratives, as in  
 
Olga believes it  
Olga believes that, 
 
and we can say that both Olga and Gabriel know the same thing, not the very same things. 
Certainly these are not conclusive data; but it is also the case that from  
 
Olga believes that Cicero is smart,  
 
we can obtain 
 
Olga believes something, namely that Cicero is smart 
Olga believes something, i.e. that Cicero is smart.  
 
Since there is something Olga believes, it really seems that the quantifier is singular. Furthermore, 
the quantifier seems singular, even forgetting about the fact that the predicate goes in the 
singular. Some have suggested that, forgetting about natural language, the quantifier would in 






Let's call the entities that stand in propositional attitude relations with agents propositional relata 
(taking care not to understand this as presupposing propositions) … Then the natural idea is to 
replace apparent quantification over propositions with quantification over propositional relata … 
The solution to this problem involves “plural” quantification, a phenomenon that is common in 
ordinary English but relatively unexplored in logic.  
 
 
But those sentences enter in inferences like those we have seen in §1.1.4, and, as Crawford 
(2014: 183-187) has shown, it does not seem that the validity of those inferences can be 
accounted for in terms of plural quantifiers. Let us take the following valid argument,     
 
Olga believes that Dave admires Laura 
Gabriel believes everything Olga does 
So, Gabriel believes that Dave admires Laura. 
 
If the quantifier is plural, then the second premise in the argument might be taken to have the 
following form (where xx stand for plural variables bound by a plural quantifier): 
 
∀ xx[(BEL(o, xx) → BEL(g, xx)]. 
 
But from it and  
 
Olga believes that Dave admires Laura 
 
it does not follow that Gabriel believes that Dave admires Laura: Olga and Gabriel might be 
related to the same relata, as in accordance with the second premise, and Olga might believe that 
Dave admires Laura, as in accordance with the first premise, but there is still space for it not to 
be the case that Gabriel believes that Dave admires Laura. For the second premise does not ask 
Gabriel to be related to the relata in the same way in which Olga is related, and therefore it can 
be that Gabriel believes that Laura admires Dave, without it being the case that he believes that 
Dave admires Laura back. One may try to put this constraint on order into the argument, so 
that the second premise become analogous to  
 
For any propositional relata, if Olga stands in the belief relation to them in any specific way, 
then so does Gabriel, 
 
as Jubien in fact suggests (2001: 57). But, firstly, even though we might be able to construe a logic 
of plurals in which we can take care of order, by following the path initiated by Taylor and 
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Hazen (1992: 389-390), and thus find a way to specify the connexions between the constituents, 
this is not how the natural language of plurals work. For example, suppose Laura says  
 
My first, second, and third choices are daffodils, pizza, and gnomes.  
 
While her sentence might suggest that her first choice is daffodils, it does not seem that this 
belongs to what the sentence expresses. For example, she can in fact add: 
 
Now guess which is my first choice, 
 
and if she wanted to tell us this in the first place she would probably add ‘in this order’ or 
‘respectively’, as we tend to do in these cases. Secondly, as Crawford observes, even forgetting 
about natural language, adding order is not going to make the inference valid. For in  
 
For any propositional relata, if Olga stands in the belief relation to them in any specific way, 
then so does Gabriel, 
 
we are quantifying over specific ways of being related to relata; but no reference to a way of 
believing is present in the first premise  
 
Olga believes that Dave admires Laura 
 
or in the conclusion 
 
Gabriel believes that Dave admires Laura 
 
so that the argument does not have the form  
 
A  
A→ B  
∴B 
 
which would make it valid.  
 
Thus, given the validity of the inferences in which sentences like  
 
Olga believes something 
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Gabriel believes everything Olga believes 
 
occur, the quantifiers occurring in those sentences are best taken to be singular, and not just 
because of some superficial reasons, such as the fact that the predicate goes in the singular. But 
if the quantifiers are singular, then ‘that’-clauses are syntactic units. From this, and also in 
consideration of the fact that ‘that’-clauses respect the syntactic constraints seen above, we can 




1.2.2   SINGULAR TERMS 
Putting everything together, ‘that’-clauses are syntactic units in a position open to English 
singular objectual quantifiers. But this still does not show that  
 
(ST) ‘That’-clauses are singular terms 
 
is true, because it is still open whether ‘that’-clauses are singular terms. For it is still open 
whether they are, in accordance with (ST), syntactic units purporting to denote one thing, as 
proper names and definite descriptions are, or whether they are themselves quantified phrases 
not reducible to singular terms, as, for example, ‘a girl’ as it occurs in  
 
A girl is loved by Dave 
 
is. In fact, Shier (1996), Bach (1997) and Recanati (2004) have all suggested that we should 
account for ‘that’-clauses by taking them to be existentially quantified phrases. According to 
Shier (1996: 227), ‘that Cicero is smart’, as it occurs in 
 
Olga believes that Cicero is smart, 
 
is an  
 
 
existential quantification over what might be called the “finer-grained versions” of the proposition 
encoded by the embedded sentence. The idea is that a belief ascription with a directly referential 
term in small scope is used to characterize, though not to specify, the content of the belief.  
 
 




Olga believes that Cicero is smart 
 
the ‘that’-clause does not specify which sort of that-Cicero-is-smart belief she has, though Bach 
leaves it open how this is to be developed. According to Recanati, the ‘that’-clause should be 
taken as meaning what ‘something that is true iff Cicero is smart’ means (2004: 231). While he 
does not provide us with reasons why we should accept his account, he asks us “Why not?” 
(2004: 231). Now, apart from the specific problems with these accounts,11 I think that the 
question is somehow misplaced. ‘That’-clauses do not seem to be quantified phrases. For if that 
were the case, they would behave like other quantified phrases, which they do not. In particular, 
it would be possible to make sense of the substitution of more complex existentially quantified 
phrases or of the universal quantifier for the existential quantifier. Let us take  
 
Dave loves a girl. 
 
It may well be false that Dave loves all girls, or that he loves exactly 6 girls, but we can still make 
perfect sense of it. With ‘that’-clauses the situation is rather different. Let us take again 
 
Olga believes that Cicero is smart. 
 
I cannot make sense of the substitution of the universal quantifier for the existential quantifier. 
What would it mean that Olga believes every Cicero is smart? At all times, in any way? One 
could propose that what Olga believes in this case are all sentences that are true iff Cicero is 
smart. This move seems desperate. And consider ‘to hope’: what is it for Olga to hope all Cicero 
is smart? The only thing that comes to mind is that she simply hopes that Cicero is smart. But 
then why not take ‘that Cicero is smart’ as simply a singular term for a singular entity? Thus we 
seem more justified in questioning the claim that ‘that’-clauses are quantified phrases not 
reducible to singular terms, than in questioning the claim that they are reducible to singular 
terms. Only if the alternative of taking them to be singular terms failed would we be justified in 
considering the quantificational option, and I think that taking ‘that’-clauses to be singular terms 
does not in fact fail. It is true that there are two kinds of considerations that seem to show that  
 
(ST) ‘That’-clauses are singular terms 
 
cannot be correct, but, as we will now see, they can be easily rejected.  
                                                          
11 For Shier’s account, I think the main issue is that it is not obvious what it means to say that 
propositions come in versions. As for Recanati, according to his account I believe that Cicero is smart iff I 
believe something that is true iff Cicero is smart. But then for the attribution to be true, if Cicero is smart 
(not smart), it is sufficient for me to believe something true (false). Thus if Cicero is smart, I believe that 
Cicero is smart because I believe that snow is white. This cannot be correct.   
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The first consideration is that ‘that’-clauses seem unable to grammatically flank the identity sign, 
given that  
 
That Cicero is smart is that Tully is smart 
 
is odd (Hossack 2011: 150; Moltmann 2015; Mulligan 2010: 572-573). But, first of all, as 
Hofweber (2006: 216-217) remarks, the grammaticality of a sentence depends also on merely 
syntactic factors. So it is not clear why we should take a consideration on grammaticality as able 
to show that ‘that’-clauses do not purport to denote some thing, i.e. as able to show something 
about the semantic characteristics of ‘that’-clauses. Thus, for example, as many have remarked 
(Boër 2009: 550; Geach 1972: 168-9; King 2007: 142), arguments from lack of substitutivity salva 
congruitate cannot in general work against the semantic thesis that ‘that’-clauses are singular terms. 
Even if ‘Bob’ is the name of one of the relata in 
  
Dave hopes that Laura is adorable, 
 
it should be recognized that  
 
*Dave hopes Bob 
 
is ungrammatical. Thus Rosefeld (2008: 306-309) and Sainsbury (2002: 185-188) have, for 
example, concluded that ‘to hope’ is not relational and ‘that’-clauses do not denote a relatum. But 
simply because two terms denote the same object does not mean that they have the same 
syntactic features, and syntactic features are relevant when it comes to grammaticality.  
 
When it comes to identity, however, the considerations on grammaticality can be strengthened. 
Frege famously held that identity is special, in that it is the criterion for singular terms.12 If Frege 
is right, with identity the gap between syntax and semantics is bridged, and the ungrammaticality 
of identity sentences would then be able to threaten 
 
(ST) ‘That’-clauses are singular terms. 
 
But, first of all, there are endless counterexamples to Frege’s thesis that identity is the sign of 
singular terms. As Oliver (2005: 184) notes, for example, 
                                                          
12 Relying on his distinction between objects and concepts, and on the thesis that singular terms mean 
objects while predicates mean concepts, in 1884/1953 Frege says: “Now for every object there is one type 
of sentence which must have sense, namely the recognition statement” (116). In 1892-1895/1979 he 
repeats: “[T]he relation of equality, by which I understand complete coincidence, identity, can only be 
thought of as holding between objects, not concepts” (120). 
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*Cicero is I 
 
is not grammatical, and even though 
 
Being smart is the property of being smart 
 
is fine, the following is not:  
 
*The property of being smart is being smart. 
 
Moreover, as we have already seen in §1.1.2, it is not obvious that ‘is’ is the English predicate for 
identity, and ‘that’-clauses seem perfectly able to occur grammatically in sentences in which 
identity is asserted, such as 
 
That Cicero is smart is nothing but that Tully is smart.  
 
Finally, it is not obvious that   
 
That Cicero is smart is that Tully is smart 
 
is ungrammatical. While I think it should be recognized that we would hardly use that sentence, 
it is not difficult to imagine a scenario in which we would probably be happy to employ it.13 For 
example, let us suppose that with a friend we engaged in the enterprise of counting facts. Our 
friend says that we have the fact that Cicero is smart and then the fact that Tully is smart. If we 
disagree we can shout:  
 
That Cicero is smart is (just) that Tully is smart, do not double-count!  
 
Thus the first kind of consideration against  
 
                                                          
13 Why would we hardly use those identity statements? According to the account I will develop in the next 
chapters, ‘that’-clauses denote sentences that should be taken to represent something. If we have the 
representatum, as in  
The fact that Cicero is smart is the fact that Tully is smart, 
then no problem arise. On my account, we would hardly use the identity statement in which only ‘that’-
clauses occur because it does not help much to speak about a representans without any additional bit that 
can help us understand what the representatum might be. Moreover, on the account I will develop, the fact 
that 
That Cicero is smart is true 
is fine, even though the subject is a mere ‘that’-clause, can be explained by holding that the predicate 
provides us, so to say, with enough information on what the representatum could be. On phrases like ‘the 
fact that Cicero is smart’ see also §2.1.1.  
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(ST) ‘That’-clauses are singular terms 
 
does not seem correct. Let us then move to the second.  
 
The second consideration regards the so-called inferential tests for singular terms. The tests were 
suggested first by Dummett (1981: 59-69), and then others, most recently Hale (2013: 40-46), on 
the basis of the idea that in order to identify singular terms, it is sufficient to consider their 
behaviour within language, without having to talk about the bits of the world they are somehow 
related to. Here is a version of the classic inferential tests (Hale: 2013: 42-43):  
 
‘a’ functions as a singular term in a given sentence ‘A(a)’ iff  
I. It shall be possible to infer the result of replacing ‘a’ by ‘it’ and prefixing the whole by 
‘There is something such that …’;  
II. For some sentence ‘B(a)’ it shall be possible to infer from ‘A(a)’ and ‘B(a)’ ‘There is 
something such that A(it) and B(it)’;  
III. For some sentence ‘B(a)’, the inference is valid from ‘It is true of a that A(it) or B(it)’ to 
the disjunction ‘A(a) or B(a)’. 
 
The consideration that can be derived by the tests against  
 
(ST) ‘That’-clauses are singular terms 
 
is that ‘that’-clauses do not actually pass the tests smoothly. In particular, test III cannot even be 
applied, since the premise needed to apply the test is ungrammatical: nothing of the form 
 
It is true of that Cicero is smart that A(it) or B(it) 
 
is grammatical.  
 
What are we to say about this? These tests can and have been criticised on many different 
grounds (Rumfitt 2003a: 197-207), but we do not need to enter into the details of all the 
different issues. For Hofweber’s remarks are relevant also here: why should an ungrammaticality 
show something about the meaning of ‘that’-clauses? In fact, Hale (2013: 42) himself holds that 
this is not the way in which we should interpret the tests, so we should not fuss about the 
grammatical details. But in that case ‘that’-clauses pass the tests. Let us take  
 
Olga believes that Cicero is smart 




    
I. We can obtain “There is something such that Olga believes it”; 
II. We can obtain “There is something such that Olga believes it and Gabriel said it”;  
III. The inference is valid from “It is true of that Cicero is smart that Olga believes it or 
Gabriele said it” to the disjunction “Olga believes that Cicero is smart or Gabriel said 
that Cicero is smart”.14 
  
Thus, like the first consideration seen above, neither does this second consideration seem able 
to threaten 
  
(ST) ‘That’-clauses are singular terms.  
 
Moreover, the inferential tests seem instead to threaten the thesis that ‘that’-clauses are 
quantified phrases not reducible to singular terms. In fact, the tests were developed exactly in 
order to exclude quantifiers and quantified phrases from the category of singular terms. Singular 
terms have a uniqueness, an identifying flavour, since they purport to denote exactly one thing. 
This is not the case with the quantifiers not reducible to singular terms. Let us take a not too 
controversial intuitive case of singular term, i.e. the proper name ‘Cicero’ as it occurs in  
 
Cicero is smart.  
 
In accordance with test II, from sentences like  
 
Cicero is smart  
Cicero is wise 
 
we can infer something like 
 
There is something such that he/she/it is smart and wise.  
 
This is not the case with the quantifiers, and the test is in fact able to rule ‘something’ and 
cognates out: we have no guarantee that from  
                                                          
14 Dummett 1981: 63-64 and Hale 2013: 43-44 add also another test which is more difficult to state easily. 
The idea, anyway, is the old Aristotelian thesis that a quality has a contrary but a substance does not. Put 
differently, the idea is that for any predicate there is another predicate which is true of all and only those 
objects of which the original predicate is false. But it is not the case that for any term that denotes an 
object, there is another denoting something else of which just those predicates are true which are false of 
the original object, and conversely. ‘That’-clauses pass this test, in that ‘that Cicero is smart’ is not the 
contrary of ‘that Cicero is not smart’, and in fact they are both contingent.   
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Somebody is smart  
Somebody is wise 
 
we can infer something like 
 
There is somebody such that she/he is smart and wise. 
 
Thus, if ‘that’-clauses were quantificational and not reducible to singular terms, they would fail 
test II, but they do not: as we have already seen, from   
 
Olga believes that Cicero is smart 
Gabriel said that Cicero is smart 
   
we can obtain  
 
There is something such that Olga believes it and Gabriel said it.15 
 
The only way in which the derivation would be valid on the quantificational account is if the 
existentially quantified phrase has a uniqueness clause and is therefore a definite description. But 
this means that ‘that’-clauses are in fact singular terms, as syntactic units that purport to denote 
some thing. Thus the quantificational account is in accordance with the fact that ‘that’-clauses 
pass the tests only if it is taken to be not an alternative, but actually a version of  
 
(ST) ‘That’-clauses are singular terms. 
 
Again, the tests can be criticised on several possible grounds, so that they surely do not prove 
that a quantificational account according to which ‘that’-clauses are not reducible to singular 
terms is false. Still, we really miss a reason why we should take such an account to be true. We 
do not have reasons to think that (ST) fails, and ‘that’-clauses do not behave like quantified 
phrases that are not reducible to singular terms. I think that we can finally conclude that an 






                                                          





The so-called face-value theory of propositional attitude sentences, i.e.  
 
(THE ALLEGEDLY FACE-VALUE THEORY)  
(RP) Propositional attitude predicates occurring in propositional attitude sentences designate 
relations; 
(ST) ‘That’-clauses are singular terms; 
(P) ‘That’-clauses denote propositions, 
 
is often endorsed without even discussing the plausibility of its tenets. As Schiffer (2003: 11) 
holds, the theory is “the default theory that must be defeated if it’s not to be accepted” and in 
fact he himself spends but a handful of lines discussing it. Surely, it is the default theory, 
considering that it originated more or less two thousand years ago, and since then in philosophy 
it has mostly been taken for granted (Boh 1993). But this does not make it necessarily true, and 
all alternative theories must be defeated if they are not to be accepted. In this chapter, I have tried to 
defeat the alternatives for what is at stake with theses (RP) and (ST). As we have seen, we 
cannot prove that the theses are true and that the alternatives necessarily fail, but all the 
different data that need to be accounted for can be more elegantly and more easily explained if 
the two theses are endorsed. Thus there really is something face-value in these theses, and an 
account that endorses them is to be preferred to the alternatives.  
 
If (RP) and (ST) are true, ‘that’-clauses denote one of the relata of the relation designated by a 
predicate occurring in a propositional attitude sentence. But what is this relatum? This is the topic 












As we saw in Chapter 1, it seems we had better endorse the thesis 
 
(RP) Propositional attitude predicates occurring in propositional attitude sentences 
designate relations. 
 
Thus, for example, it seems we had better hold that ‘to believe’, as it occurs in  
 
Olga believes that Cicero is smart, 
 
designates a relation. In Chapter 1 we also concluded that, even though we do not have 
conclusive reasons for it, we should favour an account according to which  
 
(ST) ‘That’-clauses are singular terms 
 
is true. If ‘that’-clauses are singular terms, then it is a quite uncontroversial move to hold that 
the ‘that’-clause provides us with the second relatum in   
 
Olga believes that Cicero is smart.  
 
But what kind of object is this second relatum? It is generally agreed that we should go 
propositionalist, i.e. that we should hold that the that-clause ‘that Cicero is smart’ purports to 
denote a proposition. Thus, although no agreement has been reached on what propositions are, 
theses (RP) and (ST) are generally combined with  
 
(P) ‘That’-clauses denote propositions. 
 
As we have already seen, together the three theses constitute the so-called face-value theory of 
propositional attitude sentences.  
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Now thesis (P) might be taken both as a non-substantive or as a substantive thesis (Crawford 
2014: 205-208). For example, Richard (1990, p. 7) suggests we use ‘proposition’ neutrally to 
simply designate whatever ‘that’-clauses in attitude ascriptions denote. But here we will be 
concerned with the substantive version of the thesis, i.e. we will be concerned with (P) as a 
thesis about what kind of things we are related to when propositional attitude sentences are true, 
and not just about how to name such relata. Traditionally, propositions are taken to be abstract: 
they are taken to have no spatial location, nor anything else that can make them a physical 
object. Secondly, they are traditionally considered to be mind- and language-independent, in two 
senses: first, their existence is taken to be independent of the existence of thinkers or speakers, 
and, second, it is taken to be possible to express the same proposition in just about any natural 
language. Thirdly, propositions are taken to have truth-conditions (Schiffer 2008: 267-269). 
Recently, some have argued that propositions do not have all these characteristics that are 
traditionally attributed to them. Some, for example, have held that propositions really are (types 
of) acts of mental predication and are therefore mind-dependent (Burge 2007; Hanks 2011; 
Soames 2010). Moreover, King (2007: 136) has suggested that propositions are not just mind-
dependent, but also somehow language-dependent. But even though in different accounts 
propositions have different characteristics, propositions are agreed to be not reducible to 
sentences. To use Schiffer’s way of putting this (2003: 47), for whatever content is, sentences are 
entities that have a content, and thus are not propositions, in that propositions are entities that 
are contents. Thus the alleged face-value theory is to be contrasted with the following account, 
which is usually called sententialism:  
 
SENTENTIALISM  
(RP) Propositional attitude predicates occurring in propositional attitude sentences 
designate relations; 
(ST) ‘That’-clauses are singular terms; 
(S) ‘That’-clauses denote sentences.  
 
Propositionalism actually finds support in a general dissatisfaction with sententialism, and the 
purpose of this chapter is to develop a sententialist account so as to establish whether 
propositionalism is really the only viable option when it comes to accounting for propositional 
attitude sentences.   
  
According to sententialism, as it occurs in  
 
Olga believes that Cicero is smart 
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‘that Cicero is smart’ denotes the very sentence “Cicero is smart”. Thus in developing a 
sententialist account, we should start by understanding what it means to have an attitude to a 
sentence. We will see that according to the account I will develop, Olga believes that Cicero is 
smart, i.e. she is related to the sentence “Cicero is smart”, if two other relations hold: firstly, a 
relation between Olga and what she believes and, secondly, a relation between this belief and the 
sentence “Cicero is smart”. Put in a more friendly and fruitful way, according to the account 
Olga believes the sentence “Cicero is smart” if she believes something which we can represent 
with the sentence “Cicero is smart” (§2.1.1). What is this some thing Olga believes? As we will 
see in §2.1.2, sententialists can and should stay neutral on this question.  
 
But sententialists cannot stay neutral on another question, i.e. the question of when it is the case 
that a sentence can represent an attitude. We will see some features that something needs to 
have in order to represent something else. As I will show, those features are what sententialists 
can rely on in accounting for propositional attitude sentences and in solving (or dissolving) the 
notorious puzzles of propositional attitudes, i.e. Frege’s and Kripke’s puzzles. In particular, we 
will see that sententialists can hold that even if a sentence expresses exactly what another 
sentence does, the two can nonetheless be different as to their representational aptness (§2.2).  
 
According to sententialism, ‘that’-clauses denote sentences. But what are sentences? I will show 
that sententialism needs to put some constraints on what a sentence is (§2.3). 
 
I will conclude that, for the data considered in this chapter, sententialism seems indeed to be a 
viable alternative to propositionalism as an account of propositional attitude sentences.  
 
Sententialism is generally, though, considered doomed. At the end of this chapter, we will have 
seen that some of the considerations on the basis of which it is so considered are due to a 
misunderstanding of what sententialism is – as we will see, for example, differently from what 
some have thought, it is not a mind- or intentions-free account. However, we will still have to 
discuss the main reasons why sententialism is usually simply discarded, i.e. the famous Church 
translation argument and a problem raised by Schiffer. We will consider these allegedly fatal 









2.1      ATTITUDES TO SENTENCES 
 
According to the account we will now start developing, i.e.   
 
SENTENTIALISM  
(RP) Propositional attitude predicates occurring in propositional attitude sentences 
designate relations; 
(ST) ‘That’-clauses are singular terms; 
(S) ‘That’-clauses denote sentences, 
 
the ‘that’-clause ‘that Cicero is smart’, as it occurs in  
 
Olga believes that Cicero is smart, 
 
denotes the sentence “Cicero is smart”. Since, moreover, according to the account the predicate 
‘to believe’ designates a relation, it follows that according to sententialism the attribution 
expresses that Olga is related to the sentence “Cicero is smart”. But this is far from a fully 
developed account, and we will start by establishing what it means to be attitudinally related to a 
sentence. As we will see, I will suggest that the most promising way to develop the account is to 
hold that we are related to a sentence if we have an attitude toward something that can be 
represented by that sentence (§2.1.1). But what is this something? As we will see in §2.1.2, 




2.1.1   TWO RELATIONS AND A DISPLAYED RELATUM  
What does it mean to be attitudinally related to a sentence? Different sententialist accounts 
differ exactly on how they answer this question, and there are three main options.  
 
The first is the one suggested by Carnap (1947: 62), according to which, roughly, Olga believes 
that Cicero is smart, i.e. stands in a relation of belief to the sentence “Cicero is smart”, iff she is 
disposed to an affirmative response to “Is Cicero smart?” or to a translation of this sentence 
that she understands. But this first option can hardly do. First of all, we have what we can call 
the toddlers and puppies objection (Marcus 1993: 242-243): my cat believes that I am her feeder, but 
she is surely not going to be disposed to say ‘yes’ or to nod when I ask her whether I am her 
feeder. Secondly, problems also arise when we limit our considerations to those subjects for 
which an affirmative response would make sense, and this even if we accept a dispositional 
account of the attitudes. For sententialism would then assign to linguistic behaviour a privileged 
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position in comparison to all the other dispositions of a subject, and this hardly seems 
justifiable. There are in fact plenty of cases in which, if we embrace a dispositional account of 
attitudes, we would intuitively count somebody as having a certain attitude, even though that 
subject would not provide an affirmative response if asked the corresponding question. As 
Carnap himself recognized a few years later, when he abandoned behaviourism, a subject might 
be confused (1954: 129), and there may be many other reasons why the subject would refrain 
from an affirmative response. We may even leave aside cases of lack of understanding of the 
question, insincerity, irony, etc., and the issue that the requirement of sincerity creates a form of 
circularity – you believe that p if you are disposed to provide a sincere affirmative response to 
“p?”, i.e. if you respond in accordance with what you believe (Chisholm 1955-1956: 141-142). 
We may leave these issues aside because a subject, having a certain attitude, might refrain from 
an affirmative response simply because she is not fully conscious of her beliefs (Marcus 1993: 
242-245). Take the following quite convincing example (Schwitzgebel 2013: 81-82): 
 
 
Compare, now, the attitude of believing that one is God’s gift to women. A man who believes this 
might not be disposed to say to himself, “I am God’s gift to women”, but he will presumably take 
for granted his attractiveness to women. He will tend to hold himself with a certain sexual 
arrogance. He will expect his advances to be favorably received. When his advances are rebuffed 
he will be prone probably not to surprise (which might render the dispositional structure unstable 
by correcting him in the long run) but rather to rationalization or quick forgetting ... The man 
might be an atheist who in some sense could not literally believe he is God’s gift to anyone – and 
yet there is some belief-like attitude attributed through this fanciful language, an attitude that is 
probably not precisely captured by any more literal-seeming attributions like “he believes that most 
women are attracted to him” or “he believes that women are lucky to receive his sexual attention”. 
 
 
And while with belief it might well be disputed that we are not aware of all our beliefs, by 
contrast it seems indisputable that there are many things we may fear and desire without being 
fully aware of them, so that we would refuse an affirmative response if asked. If we accept 
dispositionalism, the intricate net of a subject’s dispostions could make us willing to say that she 
fears something, even though she is not disposed to an affirmative response to the 
corresponding question. Thus linguistic behaviour does not seem to have a privileged role with 
respect to the overall attitudes. It follows that it is better not to understand sententialism as 
holding that you believe that p iff you are disposed to an affirmative response to “P?”.  
 
The second option is to hold that Olga believes that Cicero is smart, i.e. stands in a relation of 
belief to the sentence “Cicero is smart”, iff she believes the sentence to be true.16 But this option 
                                                          
16 Quine 1956: 185 suggests employing the predicate to-believe-true, so he might be taken to have advanced 
this second option. But it is not obvious that to-believe-true is to be taken as tantamount to to believe to be true, 
and there are in fact reasons to doubt this. Salmon 1995/2007: 265, for example, holds: “Believing‐true, 
for Quine, is evidently a relation that a subject bears to a sentence by virtue of a certain kind of match 
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also can hardly do, since there is the following obvious issue: if Olga is a monolingual speaker of 
Italian, she can believe the English sentence “Cicero is smart” to be true, for example because a 
bilingual friend she trusts told her so, so that  
 
Olga believes “Cicero is smart” to be true 
 
is true, without believing that Cicero is smart, for example because she has never heard of 
Cicero.  
 
Finally, the third option is to hold, broadly together with Davidson (1968: 140), Higginbotham 
(2006: 102-103) and Matthews (2007: 223),17 that to have an attitude to a sentence is to be 
related to something which is somehow related to the sentence. This third of the three possible 
options seems the best one, in that it does not incur obvious problems. But what does it amount 
to, exactly, i.e. what exactly is the relation that holds between our attitude and the sentence? 
When we say that Olga believes that Cicero is smart, we are trying to represent her mental life. In 
representing something, we use the resources we have. Take a map. We could represent 
London’s Underground by drawing a map of it. In this case, our representational tools are lines 
of different colours and names of different stops in a 2-D space. Or take fruits. We can 
represent their shapes by using, as tools, regular polygons in a 2-D space. Among our 
representational tools is our own language, and we can therefore hold that just as we employ 
geometrical shapes in order to represent the shapes of fruits, so we denote sentences to 
represent attitudes.  
 
I think, therefore, that sententialism is best developed as follows: according to sententialism, in 
uttering  
 
Olga believes that Cicero is smart 
 




                                                                                                                                                                    
between the subject's psychological state and some ontologically thrifty feature of the sentence – perhaps 
its associated assent‐producing and dissent‐producing stimuli (in Quine's jargon, its stimulus meaning) or 
its conventional use in communication, where this is taken as not involving the assignment of a 
proposition as semantic content ... believing‐true, for Quine, is about as semantical as True Value 
Hardware Stores or The Plain Truth magazine. It is semantical in name only”. In fact, as Salmon notes, ‘-
true’ drops out completely from the later Quine 1977, at the passages in which Quine again discusses 
sententialism.   
17 For this broadly, see below, §2.2.1. 
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Believes Represented by 
Olga     BELIEVES     “Cicero is smart” 
 
 
                                                                      
                Some thing 
 
Sententialism is sometimes described as the account according to which propositional attitude 
sentences are to be taken as on a par with direct speech reports. While maintaining that nothing 
could be more misleading and erroneous than sententialism, Prior (1971: 61) for example characterizes 
sententialism as the thesis that we should  
 
 
treat sentences containing … other sentences in quotation marks as a paradigm case to which the 




But we can now see that this is a misleading characterization. If we take quotation marks to be 
devices of pure mention, i.e. if we take a sentence within quotation marks to simply denote the 
sentence itself, it is true that according to sententialists,  
 
that Cicero is smart 
the sentence “Cicero is smart” 
“Cicero is smart” 
 
are co-denotational. But this does not mean that sententialists are forced to hold that  
 
Olga said: “Cicero is smart” 
Olga said that Cicero is smart 
 
express exactly the same thing. It is true that if the predicate contributed the same relation in 
both, the two reports would express the same thing; but, as we already know from §1.1.6, there 
are independent reasons to think that the predicate does not in fact designate the same relation 
in both. In fact, there are some data that concern specifically ‘to say’ that seem to show that it is 
ambiguous. For  
 




in which the predicate is followed by complements of different kinds, is odd. For the reasons we 
have already seen, I do not think we should be too impressed by data like this. Just to quickly 
remind ourselves why, take the following two sentences: 
 
Olga knows Emanuel 




Olga knows Emanuel and that Cicero is smart 
 
is odd. But at the same time 
 
Olga knows Emanuel and that he loves her 
 
is fine. Thus there seem to be different reasons why the zeugma is allowed, and so it is better 
not to take the oddness of some sentences as a proof of some thesis or other. Still, we do not 
have obvious data against the thesis that ‘to say’ is ambiguous, and thus it does not seem that 
sententialism can be criticised because ‘to say’ comes out ambiguous in the way seen. If, as it 
seems, the predicate ‘to say’ does not contribute the same relation in  
 
Olga said: “Cicero is smart” 
Olga said that Cicero is smart, 
 
then sententialists can hold, as is intuitively correct, that the first is true iff Olga uttered the very 
sentence “Cicero is smart”, while for the second to be true it is not necessary that Olga uttered 
those very words, it being sufficient that she put into words something that could be also put as 
“Cicero is smart” or, to put it differently, something that can be represented by “Cicero is 
smart”.18  
 
Incidentally, we can now already note some differences between sententialism and 
propositionalism. First of all, propositionalists take only some of the predicates to be 
ambiguous, since  
 
that Cicero is smart 
the proposition that Cicero is smart 
                                                          
18 For the difference in the behaviour of indexicals in direct and indirect speech reports, see §3.4.2. 
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are, according to propositionalism, co-denotational, and  
 
Olga believes that Cicero is smart 
Olga believes the proposition that Cicero is smart 
 
have the same truth-conditions. Sententialists, by contrast, take all the predicates to be 
ambiguous, since there is no predicate such that something of the form the sentence “p” can be 
substituted for something of the form that p with preservation of truth-conditions.19 This seems 
to be an advantage for sententialism over propositionalism. For the different propositional 
attitude predicates seem to behave in similar ways, and thus it seems that either they are all 
ambiguous, or none is. Secondly, according to sententialists  
 
Olga believes that Cicero is smart 
Olga believes the proposition that Cicero is smart, 
 
is not a case of substitutivity of co-denotational terms: in the first sentence we are denoting a 
sentence, in the second a proposition. So why is it that they share their truth-conditions? 
Sententialists can here hold that this is guaranteed in the same way in which what 
 
Olga believes Cicero 
 
expresses guarantees that  
 
Olga believes that Cicero is sincere  
 
is true: when Olga believes Cicero, she believes (perhaps among other things) that he is sincere. 
Similarly, when Olga believes a proposition, she believes that the proposition is true. Since the 
proposition says that Cicero is smart, when Olga believes the proposition she believes that it is 
true that Cicero is smart, i.e. that Cicero is smart.20 Moreover, there is another difference with 
                                                          
19 Prior 1971: 14-15, when discussing the substitutivity issue that we considered in §1.1.6, explicitly talks 
about the substitution of something of the form that p with something of the form the sentence ‘p’: “A man 
might perhaps in some odd mood or condition fear sentences as he fears dogs – if Robinson Crusoe had 
seen not a footstep but the inscription ‘The cat is on the mat’ written in the sand, it might have set him 
trembling – but this is quite a different matter; such a man might fear the sentence without knowing what 
it means; and even if he did, he might fear the sentence ‘The cat is on the mat’ without fearing that the cat 
is on the mat”. 
20 Sententialism is a theory of ‘that’-clauses, so that it does not necessarily lead to a particular theory of 
phrases like ‘the proposition that Cicero is smart’. In the main text, I assume that phrases like that are 
genuine definite descriptions since this is the worst case for sententialists, who need to explain why in 
substituting a ‘that’-clause denoting a sentence with a description denoting a proposition we preserve 
truth in the context of ‘to believe’. But, first of all, it is in general not obvious when something that looks 
like a definite description is in fact a genuine definite description. As Kripke (1980: 26) reminded us, for 
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propositionalism to be noticed: while propositionalists can take ‘the proposition that Cicero is 
smart’ as equivalent to ‘the proposition identical with that Cicero is smart’, according to 
sententialism the ‘that’-clause does not denote a proposition. Suppose that we represent the 
possible choices a person makes with regular polygons. For example, we could imagine that a 
square represents the choice of going to the cinema. We could then use ‘the square choice’ for 
the choice of going to the cinema, but not because the choice is the choice of the square, but 
because the choice is the choice that can be represented with a square. For sententialists ‘the 
proposition that Cicero is smart’ is similar, in that it purports to denote the proposition that we 
can represent as “Cicero is smart”.  
 
For propositionalists,  
 
that Cicero is smart 
the proposition that Cicero is smart 
 
are co-denotational. For sententialists, by contrast, if Bruno’s favourite sentence is “Cicero is 
smart”, and if ‘Tom’ is a name of the sentence “Cicero is smart”,  
 
that Cicero is smart 
Tom 
Bruno’s favourite sentence 
 
all denote the sentence “Cicero is smart” and are therefore co-denotational. But sententialists 
can nonetheless recognize a difference between these co-denotational terms. When we denote a 
piece of language, there are two very different ways to do it: we can display the linguistic item, or 
we can denote it without displaying it. The name ‘Tom’ and the description “Bruno’s favourite 
sentence” denote the sentence “Cicero is smart” but do not display it, while the ‘that’-clause 
displays the sentence it denotes. Thus sententialists cannot see a difference between the three 
                                                                                                                                                                    
example, the Holy Roman Empire was neither holy, Roman, nor an Empire, but we use the description-
looking ‘The Holy Roman Empire’ to denote that non-holy, non-Roman, not an Empire which was the 
Holy Roman Empire. Moreover, the thesis in particular that ‘the proposition that Cicero is smart’ is a 
genuine definite description that purports to denote a proposition can and has been called into question. 
According to Hofweber 2007: 25-27, for example, ‘the proposition’ is not a genuine description but a 
mere device of focus, so that it is not necessarily to be counted as a singular term. If Hofweber is right, 
then sententialists have no trouble in accounting for  
Olga believes the proposition that Cicero is smart. 
Together with Hofweber, they can hold that this is semantically tantamount to  
Olga believes that Cicero is smart 
and the addition of ‘the proposition’ should just count as a form of emphasis or sentential focus. Why 
‘the proposition’ and not ‘the sentence’, though? I think sententialists can hold that even though ‘that’-
clauses do denote sentences, we developed an emphatic use according to which we use ‘the proposition’ 
to mark the fact that the subject of the attribution does not have the sentence as the direct object of her 
belief.   
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terms in terms of denotation, but they can see a difference in terms of whether or not the bit of 
language is displayed. We will see in detail why this matters in Chapter 3, but we can roughly 
already see the point via a comparison. Imagine you want to communicate that you painted 
something which resembles Turner’s Norham Castle, Sunrise. There are various ways in which you 
can communicate this: you can say 
 
My new painting resembles Turner’s Norham Castle, Sunrise 
 
or, given that Turner’s Norham Castle, Sunrise is Bruno’s favourite painting, you can say 
 
My new painting resembles Bruno’s favourite painting. 
 
In both these cases, you have not displayed the painting that you want to show has a similarity 
with your painting. But you can also go with your interlocutor to the Tate Britain and, while 
pointing to Turner’s Norham Castle, Sunrise, utter 
  
My new painting resembles this. 
 
It is clear that this third way of communicating what you wanted to communicate is somehow 
different, because the painting is somehow there for you and your interlocutor, at your disposal, 
and you displayed it to that end. Now, however exactly the difference is to be accounted for in 
the case of the painting, sententialists can hold that the very same difference can be detected in 
the case of    
   
that Cicero is smart 
Bruno’s favourite sentence 
Tom 
 
and the case of the ‘that’-clauses is to be seen as similar to the case of when your took your 
friend to the Tate. This does not mean that sententialists are forced to hold that in uttering a 
‘that’-clause a subject is performing a pointing or that there is a hidden indexical in a ‘that’-
clause. For sententialists can hold, together with Christensen (1967: 367), that “it is time to give 
up the prejudice that we must deal in language with linguistic objects in quite the same way as 
we talk about nonlinguistic objects”. They can in fact hold that paintings and language are 
different, in that a piece of language can be part of a sentence, while the painting cannot be 
directly part of a sentence, and that is why we need some extra pointing. Actually, sententialists 
can be even more cautious and hold that maybe language is not that special after all. For 
example, take an old example by Horn (1989: 564-565, f. 14):   
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Piano student plays passage in manner µ 
Teacher: It’s not [plays passage in manner µ] —it’s [plays passage in manner µ’]. 
 
Are the passages or the manners literally part of the sentence? It is not obvious how to answer. 
But these are orthogonal questions that do not impinge on sententialism. However Horn’s case 
is to be explained, and however the displaying of the painting is to be accounted for, for our 
purposes it is sufficient to note that, no matter exactly how, there is a difference between 
denoting the painting with ‘Turner’s Norham Castle, Sunrise’ and ‘Bruno’s favourite painting’, on 
the one hand, and with ‘this’ uttered while pointing to Turner’s Norham Castle, Sunrise, on the 
other. This obvious difference is exactly the difference sententialists can recognize between 
denoting a sentence with ‘Bruno’s favourite sentence’ and ‘Tom’, on the one hand, and with 
‘that Cicero is smart’, on the other. Even though the three terms are co-denotational, only the 




2.1.2   WHAT ARE THOUGHTS? 
According to propositionalism, when 
  
Olga believes that Cicero is smart 
 
is true, Olga believes a proposition, and the ‘that’-clause, in denoting such proposition, denotes 
the object Olga believes. So propositionalists, in providing an account of the denotation of 
‘that’-clauses, also provide an account of thoughts. Their account of language about attitudes is 
therefore necessarily also an account of attitudes. It follows that within a proposition-oriented 
account of sentences about attitudes, one needs to answer some questions about attitudes 
themselves. For example, one needs to establish whether all attitudes are toward propositions, 
and many have answered this in the negative. One example is the champion of propositions, 
Frege, who held (1892/1984: 167-168) that  
 
 
for the dependent question in phrases such as ‘doubt whether’, ‘not to know what’ … words are to 
be taken to have their indirect meaning ... the meaning of the subordinate clause itself was indirect, 
i.e. not a truth value but a thought, a command, a request, a question. The subordinate clause 
could be regarded as a noun, indeed one could say: as a proper name of that thought, that 
command, etc., which it represented in the context of the sentence structure. 
 
 
Thus according to Frege some attitudes have thoughts, i.e. propositions, as objects, some 
have commands, requests or questions. Similarly, Castañeda (1974) held that intentions and 
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prescriptions cannot be reduced to attitudes toward propositions, and he coined the label 
‘practitions’ for these different objects of attitudes. According to him,  
 
Jones ought to close the door  
 
should be taken as true just in case the practition Jones to close the door, as something not reducible 
to a proposition, is justified.  
 
Moreover, many have held that some attitudes have, as objects, not propositions, but objects 
such as you and me. Montague (2007: 507-511), for example, has recently discussed sentences 
like     
 
Dave loves Laura, 
 
and advocated that they cannot be taken as tantamount to something of the form  
 
Dave loves that Laura is F.  
 
Furthermore, even within the field of propositional attitude sentences in which ‘that’-clauses 
occur, propositionalists, in offering an account of attitudes while offering an account of 
sentences about attitudes, need to establish whether all attitudes are toward propositions, i.e. 
whether all ‘that’-clauses denote propositions. Within the propositionalist tradition, the main 
stream holds that ‘that’-clauses do always denote propositions when they occur in the context of 
propositional attitude sentences; but some have instead suggested that this is not actually the 
case (Asher 1993: 27-31; 57-9; 171-212; Geach 1962; Hossack 2007; Merricks 2009; Moffett 
2003; Parsons 1993; Ryle 1929-1930: 111-114; Vendler 1972. Also King 2007: 152; 2014b: 201-
208 considers a similar account). In particular, some have suggested that facts and propositions 
are entities of different kinds, and that knowledge and belief are not homogeneous, in that in the 
context of ‘to believe’ ‘that’-clauses denote propositions, while they denote facts in the context 
of ‘to know’. 
 
From the sententialist point of view, the situation is different. For according to sententialists, we 
do not denote the objects of the attitudes in propositional attitude sentences, but a sentence that 
can represent such objects. Thus the following question – what according to sententialists is that 
some thing that we can represent as “Cicero is smart” if Olga believes that Cicero is smart? – is 
somehow misplaced, and sententialism can and should be neutral on the issue. What are 
thoughts? Are they structured? Do we think in language? Are we directly related to the world, or 
are we related to the world via an internal representation of it? Are there any singular thoughts, 
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believes Represented by knows Represented by 
or are all thoughts notional? Sententialism is neutral on these issues. Sententialism should be 
taken as holding that, no matter what the answers to those questions are and no matter what 
thoughts really are, when we say in our natural languages that Olga believes that Cicero is smart, 
we represent what she believes, whatever that is, with one of our tools of representation, i.e. our 
own language. Since sententialism is neutral on these issues it does not need, luckily, to take any 
stance on the issue of whether knowledge and beliefs are homogeneous. In fact, sententialists 
can explain the data that need to be explained both in the case in which objects of belief and 
knowledge are the same in kind and in the case in which they are essentially different. Let us 
start with the first case, i.e. the case in which with different predicates we have essentially 
different entities, so that what we can believe is not what we can know. The main linguistic 
datum against endorsing this position is that the following sentences,  
 
I always believed that you were a good friend; now I know it  
I already knew what you just told me 
I will confess something you will find hard to believe, 
 
seem all to be possibly true. Thus, it seems that what you know, believe, confess, tell are objects 
of the same kind (Crawford 2014: 190-191; Soames 2012: 214; Textor 2011: 79-80; Williamson 
2000: 43). But even if beliefs and pieces of knowledge are essentially different entities, 
sententialism can still perfectly and quite easily explain the truth of sentences like those above.21 
For according to sententialism, beliefs and pieces of knowledge are not the entities denoted by 
‘that’-clauses in propositional attitude sentences. Even if Olga is related to different entities 
when she believes that Cicero is smart and knows that Cicero is smart, still the ‘that’-clause ‘that 
Cicero is smart’ could denote the very same entity, i.e. “Cicero is smart”: 
 




                     ?                                                                        ?                        
                                                          
21 As Treanor 2013: 580-591 shows, it is not obvious that knowledge in fact divides up into pieces, and it 
might well be that this is only a figure of speech. While I will employ the idiom for ease, it is clear that 
sententialism is not committed to the idea that there are pieces of knowledge the sum of which is all we 
know. However this should be exactly cashed out, sententialists can hold, together with Grandy 1986: 
323, not that a sentence can represent a piece of knowledge, but that a sentence can be a partial 
representation of what a subject knows, whatever that thing is. Of course, defining the notion of partial 
representation is problematic. As Bach 1997 remarks, if our knowledge is something like a picture or a map, 
“there are ‘no natural ways of carving up maps at their representational joints,’ natural ways of itemizing 
what they say and correlating each item with the way they say it” (233). But this might not be in the end 
such a bad result: as we will see below, representation is contextual, and one can hold that it is exactly 
because there are no joints in nature that in different contexts we might carve differently.          
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Thus in something like  
 
I always believed that you were a good friend; now I know it  
 
the ‘it’ could still pick out the denotation of the antecedent, i.e. the sentence “You were a good 
friend”. Let us use an example to make this clearer. While when we smell a piece of Camembert, 
we smell its smell, when we taste the same piece of cheese, we do not taste its smell, but its 
taste. Thus the relations thanks to which we are related to the cheese are different in the two 
cases, not just because one is a relation of smell and the other a relation of taste, but also 
because in the smell case we are related to the smell, while in the taste case we are related to the 
taste. But this obviously does not mean that in  
 
I smelled that piece of Camembert and you tasted it 
 
the ‘it’ cannot still denote a piece of Camembert.  
 
Thus if the objects of different attitudes are different, sententialists seem to have an advantage 
over propositionalists: since according to propositionalists ‘that’-clauses denote the objects of 
the attitudes, they are forced to hold one of the following equally unpalatable theses. One 
option is to maintain that in  
 
Olga believes that Cicero is smart 
Olga knows that Cicero is smart 
 
the proposition plays a different role, by being the direct object of the attitude in one of the 
sentences and by being the indirect object in the other, so that Olga is related to that 
proposition by being related to something else somehow related to the proposition (Parsons 
1993). The second option is to hold that ‘to believe’ and ‘to know’ work differently, so that they 
designate different relations, and only one of them is such that the proposition is the direct 
relatum (Moffett 2003: 86-92). These two options seem hardly justifiable, since it does not seem 
that either ‘that’-clauses in the context of different predicates, or different predicates of 
propositional attitudes, work in such a non-homogeneous way. The third option is to hold that 
‘that’-clauses are ambiguous. But then an alternative account is needed of the examples we have 
seen, i.e.   
 
I always believed that you were a good friend; now I know it  
I already knew what you just told me 
I will confess something you will find hard to believe. 
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One may try to hold that these sentences are in fact ungrammatical (Ryle 1929-1930: 113; 
Vendler 1972: 98; 1980: 278). Ryle, for example, holds: “I think ordinary usage supports me … 
We say: ‘I don’t think, I know,’ and ‘I don’t know but I think so and so.’ ”. But this approach is 
hardly convincing. Ryle is right that those are perfectly reasonable statements, but they can be 
explained as meaning something like what the follows mean:  
 
I do not merely think that snow is white, I know it. 
 
Alternatively, one can hold that belief-knowledge examples are to be taken as similar to 
something like   
 
Dave and Laura have the same T-shirt,  
 
read as saying that Dave has his T-shirt, Laura hers, but the two are similar. Thus, one can try to 
hold that  
 
Dave knows that which Laura believes 
 
should be taken as having a more complex structure and thus ultimately as expressing that the 
two different objects of the attitudes are similar (Moltmann 2013: 19, f. 5). But when I say that 
Dave and Laura have the same T-shirt, meaning that their T-shirts are similar, then I can add  
 
Of course not the very same one, Dave has his own, Laura hers.  
 
This does not seem to make much sense with knowledge-belief examples: the following is at 
least odd 
 
There is something that Dave knows and Laura believes, but of course Dave has his piece of 
knowledge and Laura her belief.  
 
Alternatively, one can try to hold that  
 
Dave knows what Laura believes 
 
should be taken as similar to something like 
 
After drinking the bottle of rum, Smith smashed it over John’s head, 
75 
 
where the sentence can well be taken to be true even if what was drunk cannot be, literally, what 
has been smashed (Harman 2003: 177-178; Hossack 2011: 127; Parsons 1993). But while with 
the bottle and similar cases a moment’s reflection makes it clear that ‘it’ cannot denote what ‘the 
bottle of rum’ denotes, and a pedantic speaker of English might even correct us, with something 
like  
 
Dave knows what Laura believes 
 
we cannot be faulted on mere grounds of English grammar: “[t]o assume that the pedant would 
say ‘No, it is not correct to say that he knows what she believed, he knows of the fact that she 
believed’ is bizarre”(Textor 2011: 80). 
 
Thus, if objects of belief are not objects of knowledge, the cross-quantificational and anaphoric 
sentences seem to create a serious issue for propositionalists. Whether or not they can solve it, 
and even conceding that they can solve it, sententialists certainly do not have any issue to solve. 
Let us then move to the second case, i.e. that beliefs and pieces of knowledge are objects of the 
same kind. The main linguistic reason why some have suggested that this is not the case is that 
we tend to use ‘the proposition that Cicero is smart’ for what Olga believes and ‘the fact the 
Cicero is smart’ for what Olga knows. Propositionalists tend to hold that facts are propositions, 
but even if that is the case, the fact that we tend to use ‘proposition’ with some predicates and 
‘fact’ with others cries out for an explanation.  
 
I actually think that propositionalists can provide quite a good explanation of this. For they can 
hold that when we represent an attitude, we do not necessarily endorse what we are attributing, 
for two main reasons. First of all, our commitment to the truth of what we are attributing might 
be irrelevant, for example when we are considering the attitudes of a subject in order to explain 
her behaviour. Even if we also think that Camembert is lovely, that does not matter when it 
comes to explaining why Olga buys a piece of Camembert every week. Secondly, it may well be 
that we take what we are attributing to actually be false but there is still a point in making the 
attribution. Even if we think that Camembert is actually not nice, we might still want to tell 
somebody what Olga’s opinion about it is. In those cases in which we do not want to endorse 
what we are attributing, we use ‘to believe’. If facts and propositions are entities of the same 
kind, there are many more propositions than facts, since there are all those false propositions 
that, qua being false, cannot be facts. In calling the object of a belief a ‘proposition’, we 
therefore show that there is no commitment, on the side of the attributer, to the truth of what 
has been attributed. When we instead ascribe knowledge, we do endorse the truth of the object 
of the attitude: we cannot assert that a subject knows something if we think that that something 
is false. Thus since in knowledge ascriptions we are endorsing the truth of the object of the 
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attitude, we tend to say that it is a fact, and even though all facts are propositions, we do not say 
that what is known is a proposition. Why so? Because calling it a ‘proposition’ would make it 
appear that we do not know whether it is true. Thus according to this explanation, saying that 
somebody knows a proposition is somehow similar to saying that we discovered something, but 
we still wonder whether it is the case: in using ‘to discover’, we are committing ourselves to the 
truth of what we discovered, and we cannot then hold that we are still wondering about it being 
the case. Similar considerations can be put forward for other attitudes: with ‘to tell’, for example, 
we can both say that Olga told us the facts, or that she told us a story. While with the first we 
are endorsing the truth of what she told us, so that the attribution tells the interlocutor also 
something about our attitudes, with ‘story’, since stories can be false, we are not endorsing the 
truth of what has been told, and thus we do not communicate that we also think that what has 
been told provides correct information about the world.  
 
But even though this is a good explanation, propositionalists would still have to explain why we 
can say both that what we believe is true and, for example, that what we fear is not going to 
happen. Intuitively, things that are true or false are not the kind of things that do or do not 
happen. If what we have attitudes to is always a proposition, so that propositions are what we 
believe and fear, then they are a kind of monstrous entity, which have properties that are 
intuitively incompatible (Merricks 2009). I doubt that propositionalists can explain this easily, 
and Soames’s recent solution (2014: 244) of holding that  
 
 
the unreflective opinion that propositions can be neither things we do nor things that happen is 
not sacrosanct and may itself be due either to a failure to theorize, or to a tendency to do so 
incorrectly    
 
 
does not seem to everybody’s taste: was it really a systematic incorrect theorizing that led us to 
think that truth and happening cut the world orthogonally? Be this as it may, sententialists do 
not need to face this issue, since from their own point of view the situation is very different: as 
we saw above, for sententialists, while in the former of the sentences in each couple  
 
Olga believes that Cicero is smart 
Olga believes the proposition that Cicero is smart  
 
Olga knows that Cicero is smart 




a sentence is denoted, in the second a different entity is denoted, so that these are not cases of 
substitution of co-denotational terms. As we saw above, the relation between the truth-
conditions of the sentences in each couple can be explained on the basis of what it means to 
believe a proposition and what it means to know a fact, exactly as the relations in the truth-
conditions of 
 
Olga believes Cicero 
Olga believes that Cicero is sincere 
 
can be explained by relying on what it takes to believe somebody. Just as when we believe a 
proposition we believe it to be true, so when we know a fact we know it to be the case; so we 
know that Cicero is smart is the case, i.e. we know something that we can represent as “Cicero is 
smart”. As for fearing, sententialists can say that even though the objects of the different 
attitudes are homogenous, when you fear that Cicero is smart, you are also related to an 
eventuality, and that eventuality is what will or will not happen.  
 
Thus whether or not beliefs and pieces of knowledge are entities of the same kind, 
propositionalists have to explain some data that do not seem easy to account for. Sententialism, 
on the other hand, whatever is the case with the metaphysics of facts and propositions, can 
explain perfectly all the data that require explanation. Therefore sententialism is, can, and should 
be taken as essentially neutral on what thoughts are and what we are related to when we think, 







2.2      SENTENCES AS TOOLS OF REPRESENTATION 
 
According to sententialism, a sentence is denoted in a propositional attitude sentence. In the 
previous section, I suggested we combine sententialism with the thesis that the denoted 
sentence is to be taken as a representation, i.e. with the thesis that if 
 
Olga believes that Cicero is smart 
 
is true, the sentence “Cicero is smart” is an apt tool for representing what Olga believes. We 
have seen that we do not need to establish what this thing is that Olga believes. But we do need 
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to establish when an English sentence is an apt tool for representing an attitude, because this 
impinges on the truth-conditions of propositional attitude sentences. This is what we will try to 
do in this section. Clearly, the aptness of an English sentence cannot depend on whether Olga 
speaks English, for otherwise English propositional attitude sentences would be true only of 
English speakers, and this seems plainly absurd (Church 1943: 45; Speaks 2014: 12; White 1972: 
78). Thus, as Quine (1956: 186) efficaciously puts it, we should take it that sententialism   
 
 
is not, of course, intended to suggest that the subject of the propositional attitude speaks the 
language of the quotation, or any language. We may treat a mouse’s fear of a cat as his fearing ... a 
certain English sentence. This is unnatural without being therefore wrong. It is a little like 
describing a prehistoric ocean current as clockwise. 
 
 
Put differently, just as one can perfectly intelligibly and correctly report that a map says that 
Houston is further south than San Diego without implying that the map has sentences on it, so 
we can employ an English sentence to report what a subject believes, without implying either 
that she speaks English or that she speaks at all (Grandy 1986: 323). 
 
But what does the representational aptness depend on, then? In order to understand this, we 
might start with some general, and pretty uncontroversial, remarks on when something is an apt 
tool for representing something else. A first thing to notice is that, clearly, adequacy depends on 
our purposes, i.e. on what we are interested in when we represent something. Take for example 
a map of London’s Underground. If we employ only straight lines between dots, we can 
represent London’s Underground, but something is missing: for example, we cannot represent 
both the real length of the journeys and the real relative position of the various stops. If we care 
just about the lengths, then we can take straight lines as adequate tools, but if we instead care 
about both the positions and the lengths, we have to count the straight lines as inadequate. 
Moreover, we should also notice that in building our representation, depending on what we are 
interested in representing, we are guided by some principles, and we take it to be a desideratum 
that the representation we end up with is in accordance with those principles. Imagine we want 
to represent the preferences of a subject. Quite intuitively, we take it to be a principle of 
rationality that a rational subject does not have cycled preferences, i.e. if you prefer a to b, you 
should not end up also preferring b to a. Now let us suppose that we want to represent Olga’s 
preferences concerning the shapes of fruits. If we have at our disposal only regular polygons up 
to the dodecahedron, we would end up with many fruits having the same shape. If we are using 
the most similar polygon, for example, while bananas will be the only ones assigned to the 
triangle, oranges, apples, mangos, watermelons and grapefruits would all end up being assigned 
to the dodecahedron. Now Olga’s preferences are as follows: she prefers the shape of apples to 
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the shape of bananas and the shape of bananas to the shape of oranges. She even has good 
reasons for that: she likes the curvy top of apples very much, and even though she finds bananas 
to have a pleasant bowed body, she still prefers the curvy top of the apples and so the shape of 
apples in general. Oranges have neither the curvy top nor the bowed body, so she prefers the 
shapes both of bananas and of apples to the shape of oranges. But if we represent our shapes as 
above, Olga ends up preferring the dodecahedron to the triangle and the triangle to the 
dodecahedron. Would we then conclude that Olga is in fact irrational in her preferences? Of 
course not. We would conclude instead that our representation of the shapes with the most 
similar regular polygon up to the dodecahedron is inadequate for representing Olga’s rational 
preferences.   
 
Let us go back to propositional attitude sentences. As we will see in §2.2.1, in taking ‘that’-
clauses to denote not the object of the attitude, but something able to represent such an object, 
sententialists can quite easily explain, without any need to introduce a de re/de dicto distinction or 
anything similar, why the truth-value of the very same propositional attitude sentence seems to 
change from context to context. In §2.2.2 and §2.2.3 we will move to Frege’s and Kripke’s 
notorious puzzles. As we will see, from the point of view of sententialism the puzzles are 
essentially concerned with when a representation is to be taken as adequate, so that discussing 
the puzzles will allow us to see better the notion of representation. As we will see, moreover, by 
relying on the considerations just made concerning representation in general, sententialists can 





2.2.1   TWO CASES 
Let us suppose that Olga believes that Cicero is smart. Does Olga also believe that Tully is 
smart? From the point of view of propositionalism, the question can be puzzling. For if names 
are directly referential, so that they refer directly without the mediation of a Fregean Sinn, it 
follows that since ‘Cicero’ and ‘Tully’ are co-denotational, 
 
Cicero is smart 
Tully is smart 
 
express the same proposition. Since, moreover, according to propositionalism, in  
 
Olga believes that Cicero is smart 
Olga believes that Tully is smart 
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the ‘that’-clauses denote that proposition, as the thing Olga believes, it follows that the two 
attributions are either both true or both false. But it seems that the truth-conditions of the two 
attributions are different.  
 
As we have seen, according to sententialism a ‘that’-clause does not provide us with what Olga 
believes, but with a sentence that can represent that. Thus from the sententialist perspective, 
supposing that Olga believes that Cicero is smart is tantamount to supposing that “Cicero is 
smart” represents what Olga believes, and the puzzling question   
 
Does Olga also believe that Tully is smart?  
 
is tantamount to asking the following: 
 
Does “Tully is smart” also represent what Olga believes?   
 
Now the sentences “Cicero is smart” and “Tully is smart” are indeed different. If, moreover, we 
take names not to be directly referential, then the two sentences express something different, 
and thus there is no guarantee that “Tully is smart” can represent what “Cicero is smart” can 
represent. But what if proper names are directly referential, as I will assume, this being the 
difficult case? Clearly, if it is only what the sentences express that is relevant in establishing 
whether they represent an attitude, it would follow that if names are directly referential, and we 
can represent Olga’s attitude with “Cicero is smart”, we could also represent Olga’s attitude with 
“Tully is smart”. Thus for the sententialist what needs to be established, in order to see whether 
“Tully is smart” also represents what Olga believes, is whether sentences that express the same 
have the same representational power.  
 
When do two tools of representation have the same representational power? As we saw above, 
this really depends on what we care about in representing something. As we have already seen in 
§2.1.2, we ascribe attitudes for two main purposes: firstly, we might want to provide, either for 
ourselves or for somebody else, some information about the world or about a subject’s attitudes; 
secondly, we might want to explain the behaviour of the subject of the attitude. When we care 
about gaining or communicating new information about the world, we generally do not need to 
take into consideration other attitudes of that very subject. When, by contrast, we are interested 
in understanding the behaviour of a subject, we usually do need to consider more than one of 
her attitudes. Quite intuitively, the more we have to represent, the harder it is for our 
representation to be adequate. Let us see this point with an example. Suppose that Bruno told us 
that Tully wrote the Somnium Scipionis. We want to read the book, and we go to a bookshop to 
buy a copy. We cannot find the book, but we find the section labelled Cicero and, even if we did 
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not know that Tully wrote that book, we know of Tully and we also remember from school that 
Cicero is Tully. The shop assistant understands that we cannot find what we are looking for and 
comes to help us. She asks 
 
What book by Cicero are you looking for? 
 
In this scenario, we would probably find it correct to indirectly answer something like  
 
I was told that Cicero wrote the Somnium Scipionis 
 
and we would take our report as true. Given our purposes, in this case, therefore, we would take 
both “Cicero wrote the Somnium Scipionis” and “Tully wrote the Somnium Scipionis” as adequate 
ways to report what we have been told. Because, moreover, we are in front of the label Cicero,  
 
I was told that Cicero wrote the Somnium Scipionis 
 
is the sentence that more naturally comes to mind in order to represent what we wanted to 
represent. Now why is this the case? It is because we are here concerned not with understanding 
Bruno’s attitudes and behaviour, but with what he told us just insofar as it carries information 
about a book we want to read and its author. Thus the other attitudes of Bruno are irrelevant, 
and “Cicero wrote the Somnium Scipionis” and “Tully wrote the Somnium Scipionis” have, given our 
purposes, the same representational power.22  
 
But now let us instead imagine the following different case. Rose says that she does not know 
who wrote the Somnium Scipionis but that from now on she wants just to read writings by 
whoever this author is. Bruno tells Rose that Tully wrote the Somnium Scipionis, and Rose writes 
down ‘Tully’ in her diary. Rose goes to the bookshop and realizes that she forgot the diary. She 
decides to solve the embarrassing situation by asking for a copy of the Somnium Scipionis and any 
other book by the same author. The shop assistant comes back, and on the front pages of all the 
different books there is only a ‘Cicero’. Rose goes home, finds the note and reads ‘Tully’. The 
day after she sees Bruno and shouts: “You, liar, it was Cicero who wrote the Somnium Scipionis”. 
                                                          
22 Crimmins 1995: 475-476 and Recanati 2012: 189-192, quoting Crimmins, hold that it may be doubted 
that there are uses of a propositional attitude sentence like 
Bruno told us that Tully wrote the Somnium Scipionis 
in which the way in which the subject of the attitude thinks about Tully is irrelevant. The reason 
Crimmins put forward for doubting this is that the attribution “would serve the genuine conversational 
point of introducing a representation in the dialogue”. I agree that denoting “Tully wrote the Somnium 
Scipionis” rather than “Cicero wrote the Somnium Scipionis” may also serve some representational purposes 
connected with the further aim of representing a subject’s mental life. But as the example just given 
shows, sometimes we simply do not have this further aim, being interested only in the information about 
the world that the attitude permits us to gain. 
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A friend sees that Bruno is offended and asks us what Rose said to him. We tell the friend that 
Rose called Bruno a liar. The friend asks us why Rose thinks that Bruno is a liar. The following 
answer would probably do: Bruno told Rose that Tully wrote the Somnium Scipionis, and she is 
complaining that Bruno is a liar because she thinks that it was Cicero who wrote it. But the 
following answer would clearly not do: Bruno told Rose that Cicero wrote the Somnium Scipionis, 
and she is complaining that he is a liar because she thinks it was Cicero who wrote the book. 
This second alleged explanation is actually an explanandum, not an explanans, and the friend 
would still have to work out what is going on. So in this case we would not take “Cicero wrote 
the Somnium Scipionis” and “Tully wrote the Somnium Scipionis” as equally adequate ways to report 
what Bruno told Rose. Why so? Because in this case we want to explain Bruno’s and Rose’s 
behaviours, and their other attitudes are relevant. So if we want to explain behaviour, we need to 
distinguish the representational power of sentences that indeed express the same, such as  
 
Cicero wrote the Somnium Scipionis  
Tully wrote the Somnium Scipionis. 
 
For even though for some purposes the two would represent the same attitude, for other 
purposes the representation might need to take other attitudes into consideration, besides the 
one that the two sentences are supposed to represent. Thus when we represent the attitudes of a 
subject, we might have to make up a distinction out of no real difference, even assuming that there is no 
real difference, in order to represent how another subject takes the world to be. But this is 
something that should not puzzle us, and it is typical of representation. Take the following 
different example of representation. There are two lotteries. A rational subject has £1 and wants 
to buy a ticket only on the condition that it is better to buy a ticket for that lottery than for the 
other. The jackpot is the same and the number of tickets is the same. In fact the probability that 
he will win is equal, so that, objectively, the two choices are on a par. But the subject thinks that 
for the first lottery there are higher chances for his ticket to be selected. Given that the prize is 
the same, he concludes that the first lottery is better than the other, and so chooses it. Now 
since we know that objectively the two are exactly on a par, from our perspective the subject 
would have to adopt a Buridan’s ass attitude and not buy any ticket. But in fact we can make 
sense of his choice. Exactly because we can make sense of his and similar choices, we 
introduced the notion of subjective probability, and if we want to represent his perfectly coherent 
behaviour, we should employ the subjective probability and thus distinguish the subjective 
expected utility of the two lotteries, even though we know that the two lotteries really have the 
same expected utility for him. Similarly, even though we know that 
  
Cicero wrote the Somnium Scipionis  
Tully wrote the Somnium Scipionis 
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express the same, we might need to differentiate them.  
 
We should note that according to sententialism the difference or identity in representational 
power between sentences like those above has nothing primarily to do with there being proper 
names occurring in the sentences. Sententialists would in fact account similarly for the 
representational power of sentences in which no proper name occurs. To see this, we can 
borrow the following example from Joseph Moore (1999: 7-8):  
 
 
Suppose that after pondering the evidence for several days detective Columbo snaps his fingers 
and mutters to himself:  
Aha! It is not the case both that the clock was working properly and that there was not a 
blackout.  
Columbo’s utterance was meant for his own ears only, but it is overheard by snooping beat 
reporter Smith, who rushes back to the newsroom. The headline of that evening’s paper reads: 
Busted Clock or Blackout 
And the lead article begins: 
Marking a significant breakthrough in the sleeping secretary scandal, detective Columbo said 
today that either the secretary’s clock was not working properly or there was a blackout on the 
morning the secretary of state failed to show at the peace negotiations. If Columbo’s belief can 
be supported with solid evidence, then perhaps the enemy will finally come to see that they have 




Now consider a second scenario. Suppose Columbo’s utterance is overheard by Jones, a spy hired 
by the munitions manufacturers who successfully perpetuated the war and their sales by 
sabotaging the secretary’s alarm clock. Hearing Columbo’s remark, Jones rushes back to company 
headquarters and makes the following report to her boss: 
I just overheard detective Columbo say that it is not the case both that the clock was working 
properly and there was not a blackout. Detective Columbo is notorious for eventually getting to 
the bottom of matters, but lucky for us he is meticulously slow in his deliberations and in his 
deductions. Right now he believes that it is not the case both that the clock was working 
properly and there was not a blackout, but it will be several hours until he infers that either the 
clock was not working properly or there was a blackout. Only when he comes to this second 
belief will he begin to make inquiries at the power plant and the clock company. Quick! Let’s 
blow up the clock factory before he gets there.  
 
 
From the point of view of sententialism, Moore’s case shows that the aptness of a sentence as a 
way to represent an attitude depends not just on what proper name occurs in it, but also on the 
general form of the sentences themselves. When we care about representing Columbo’s 
reasoning, as in the second case, we care about using a sentence which somehow mimics the 
form of his own train of thought. But clearly this is not always what we care about. Sometimes 
we just want information about the world, as in the first of Moore’s scenarios, and then two 
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logically equivalent sentences of the different forms Not (A and not B) and Not A or B would 
equally do.23  
 
The Somnium Scipionis cases show that if proper names are directly referential, it might happen 
that we should distinguish the representational power of two sentences even though they 
express the same. Moore’s scenarios show that sentences expressing the same might need to be 
distinguished, and this even though proper names are not, in the end, directly referential. 
Moreover, if names are in the end directly referential, sententialists solve in similar fashion cases 
in which proper names occur and cases in which they do not. This seems welcome, since the 
Somnium Scipionis and Moore’s cases seem indeed to cry out for a similar explanation.  
 
Before moving to other cases, we may pause to note something on the notion of representation. 
As we have seen, according to sententialism, as it is developed here, if a propositional attitude 
sentence is true, then a subject is related to a sentence, and she is so related if two other 
relations hold: an attitudinal relation between a subject and what she has an attitude to, and a 
relation between what she has an attitude to and a sentence. As we saw above, this is also 
Davidson’s (1968: 140), Higginbotham’s (2006: 102-103) and Matthews’ (2007: 223) idea. But 
we should now notice that the relation of representation here advanced can hardly be seen as the 
relations of samesaying or matching in content that Davidson and Higgibotham suggest. For, as we 
saw with Moore’s scenarios and the Somnium Scipionis ones, we should distinguish the 
representational power of two sentences even though they do match in content. According to 
the account suggested here,   
 
Cicero wrote the Somnium Scipionis  
Tully wrote the Somnium Scipionis  
                                                          
23 Sententialists explain in similar fashion what happens in the so-called Mates’s puzzle. Here is the puzzle 
(Mates 1952: 125): Let ‘D’ and ‘D1’ be abbreviations for two synonymous sentences. Then the following 
sentences are also synonymous: 
Whoever believes that D, believes that D. 
Whoever believes that D, believes that D1 
But  
Nobody doubts that whoever believes that D believes that D.  
Nobody doubts that whoever believes that D believes that D1 
seem to have different truth-conditions.  
According to sententialism, if nobody doubts that whoever believes that D believes that D, then 
“Whoever believes that D believes that D” does not represent a doubt that anyone has, while if nobody 
doubts that whoever believes that D believes that D1, then “Whoever believes that D believes that D1” 
likewise does not represent a doubt that anyone has. While the two sentences   
Whoever believes that D, believes that D. 
Whoever believes that D, believes that D1 
express the same, they have different forms. Difference in form, as we have seen, renders the sentences 
potentially different in their representational power. Thus, while in some contexts the two would be 
counted as equally apt to represent an attitude, there might be contexts in which that is not the case, given 
the overall attitudes of the subjects and what we care about in our representation.  
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can be seen as matching in content. But if  
 
Bruno told us that Cicero wrote the Somnium Scipionis  
 
were true when Bruno told us something that matches in content with “Cicero wrote the 
Somnium Scipionis”, then we could not distinguish between this attribution and  
 
Bruno told us that Tully wrote the Somnium Scipionis, 
 
while we have seen that we might have to distinguish them.24 When we consider sentences as 
tools of representation, they are different not just because they say something different, but also 
because they have different forms, exactly as we distinguish polygons not because of what they 
say, but because of their shapes, and it is their shapes that makes a difference as to what they 




2.2.2   FREGE’S PUZZLE 
What can sententialists say about sentences like   
 
Cicero is Cicero 
Cicero is Tully 
 
? As we have seen, the form of a sentence is relevant in establishing its representational power. 
Thus sententialists can rely on the fact that while  
 
Cicero is Cicero 
 
has the form a is a, 
 
Cicero is Tully 
                                                          
24 For another difference between the account suggested here and Higginbotham’s that also regards the 
notion of matching in content, see §3.3. I use representation to follow Matthew’s terminology, which seems to 
me to be the most intuitive. But it should be noted that according to Matthews “Smith’s belief that Tully 
is bald has as its representative [what is] designated by an utterance of the that‐clause ‘that Tully is bald’, 
and this [representative] specifies the state of affairs to which Smith is related behaviorally in the way 
characteristic of beliefs.” (233) While it is not clear what to be behaviourally related to the state of affairs means, 
in the end I think that Matthews’s account leads to conclusions similar to those Higgibotham’s and 
Davidson’s accounts lead to. For I do not see how the states of affairs denoted by ‘that Cicero wrote the 
Somnium Scipionis’ and ‘that Tully wrote the Somnium Scipionis’ can be different, and, given this, I do not see 
how a subject can be differently behaviourally related to the very same state of affairs.  
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has the form a is b. Carnap (1947: 56-57) famously suggested that two sentences are synonymous 
only if they are built in the same way. Putnam (1954: 118-119) suggested a more sophisticated 
version of the Carnapian idea, according to which two sentences having different logical forms are 
not synonymous. A more sophisticated version of Putnam’s suggestion has been advanced by 
Taschek (1995: 81-93), who, in the same spirit as what we have seen the sententialist can say, 
holds that what counts is not only the local structure, i.e. the structures of the two sentences 
themselves, but the global structure, i.e. also the structures of other sentences beyond those being 
evaluated as synonymous or not. Fine (2007) has more recently suggested something along the 
same lines, by holding that the meaning of a sentence also depends on whether the terms 
occurring in the sentence are coordinated. But, as we already know, sententialists do not need to 
go that way and can deny that a difference in the form of two sentences implies a difference in 
what those sentences express. For they can well take  
 
Cicero is Cicero 
Cicero is Tully 
 
to be identical as to what they express, and still be different in their representational aptness. 
Sententialists can then take cases like 
  
Olga knows that Cicero is Cicero 
Olga knows that Cicero is Tully  
 
as similar to the ones already considered: depending on what we are interested in, in 
representing an attitude, the difference in form might make one sentence more apt, as a tool of 
representation, than another. Take the example of Rose again, who was told by Bruno that Tully 
wrote the Somnium Scipionis and complained that he was a liar since on all her books only the 
name ‘Cicero’ appears on the front page. Imagine that Rose then comes to realize her mistake 
and therefore goes to apologize to Bruno. It would not make much sense to say that it is 
because Rose realized that she was wrong in thinking that Cicero is not Cicero that she also 
realized that Bruno was correct in holding that Tully wrote the book. Thus since we are 
interested in understanding Rose’s behaviour, we need to distinguish the representational 
aptness of two identity sentences that express the same. 
 
So far so good. But identity statements have been considered to raise some special problems, 





a=a and a=b are obviously statements of differing cognitive value; a=a holds a priori and, according 
to Kant, it is to be labelled analytic, while statements of the form a=b often contain very valuable 
extensions of our knowledge and cannot always be established a priori (Frege 1892/1984: 157). 
The words ‘morning start’ and ‘evening star’ designate the same planet Venus; but to recognise 
this a special act of recognition is required; it cannot simply be inferred from the principle of 
identity (Frege 1902/1980: 152). 
 
 
The puzzle has been so much discussed (and may be spectacularly overvalued, as Predelli 2013: 13, f. 
16, maintains) that it has been solved and dissolved probably in every possible way. What can 
sententialists say about it? First of all, it should be noted that sententialists can stay neutral on 
what thoughts are, so that they should not say what this act of recognition is supposed to be and 
what the fact that this act of recognition is required tells us about how the mind is structured. 
Similarly, sententialism is not a theory of how we know that a sentence is true, so sententialists 
are not forced to take any position on the alleged a priority of sentences of the form a is a. Thus, 
given that the puzzle is primarily a puzzle in thought and not in the language about thought, 
sententialists luckily do not need to worry. Still, sententialists can say something about identity 
sentences which is relevant to understanding how the representation of attitudes with sentences 
works in natural languages.  
 
The first thing to notice to this end is that there are sentences of the form a is not a which are 
true. For example, my cat Cicero is not Cicero the Roman orator, and then there is a reading of  
 
Cicero is Cicero 
 
that makes it false. Thus, sentences of the form a is a can somehow contain very valuable extensions 
of knowledge. Of course, there is always a reading of  
 
Cicero is Cicero 
 
that makes it true and that reading does not extend what we already knew thanks to our 
knowledge of the principle of identity. But becoming aware that there is no reading of the 
sentence that makes it false, for example, would extend my knowledge. For even though this is 
probably not the most common way to gain new knowledge, knowing that there is no reading of 
“Cicero is Cicero” that makes it false is one of the ways in which I would then become aware 
that my cat is in fact the orator. In scenarios like this, a special act of recognition would then be 
required, and we all found ourselves in situations in which this recognition “comes as quite a 
shock” (Strawson 1979: 155). So there are cases in which  
 
Cicero is Cicero 
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is on a par with 
 
Cicero is Tully. 
 
Furthermore, suppose that we came to know that the following,  
 
Cicero wrote the Somnium Scipionis, 
 
is true. Later we also came to know that the following, 
 
Cicero wrote the Epistulae, 
 
is true. Knowing that there is no reading of “Cicero is Cicero” that makes it false, and hence 
that there is only one Cicero, allows us to know that we are justified in moving to   
 
Somebody wrote both the Somnium Scipionis and the Epistulae. 
 
If we instead thought that there are two uses of the name “Cicero”, and those two uses were in 
play in the two premises, then the inference would be “no more justified than the corresponding 
inference from the truth of ‘Cicero is Roman’ and ‘Tully is an orator’”(Fine 2007: 81). 
 
Thus the mere form of the sentences 
  
Cicero is Cicero 
Cicero is Tully 
 
does not make them different as to whether they lead to new knowledge or whether a special act 
of recognition is needed or not. This in fact is what Frege himself (1892/1984: 157-158) urges:  
 
 
If the sign ‘a’ is distinguished from the sign ‘b’ only as an object (here, by means of its shape), not 
as a sign (i.e. not by the manner in which it designates something), the cognitive value of a=a 
becomes essentially equal to that of a=b, provided a=b is true. 
 
 
But still, is it not true that it is only when we say that Olga knows that Cicero is Cicero that we 
have a feeling of having said that she knows a platitude? Do we not usually say things like “Of 
course she knows that Cicero is Cicero, how could she not know such a triviality?”. Moreover, is 
it not true that we tend not to attribute knowledge with sentences of the form a is a? I think 
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sententialists can provide an explanation of why things are so with our practice of attributing 
attitudes with identity statements by relying on two considerations. The first consideration is 
that while for sentences of the form a is a there is always a reading that makes them true, a 
reading that we might suppose any subject is aware of, this is not in general true of sentences of 
the form a is b. It follows that using a sentence of the form a is a to represent an attitude would 
leave it open whether we are ascribing knowledge of a trivial instance of the principle of identity 
or not. Why would we leave it open when we can use a sentence of the form a is b that makes it 
much clearer that we are ascribing a piece of knowledge that required a special act of recognition? 
The second consideration is that not only does a sentence of the form a is a leave it open 
whether we are ascribing knowledge of a platitude or knowledge due to recognition, it is also the 
case that a sentence of the form a is a is generally interpreted as conveying the first kind of 
knowledge, due to how we use names. For, normally, the unqualified re-use of a proper name is 
one in which it is intended that the name will be re-used in the very same way as in previous 
uses, and in fact one who wishes to re-use the name differently “would be best advised to insert 
some qualifications” if she wants the audience to understand this (Sainsbury 2004: 210). Because 
of this, “Cicero is Cicero” is normally taken to be a case of a trivial truth, a trivial instance of the 
principle of identity. Since “Cicero is Cicero” leaves it open what kind of knowledge is ascribed 
and is usually taken to ascribe trivial knowledge, we tend to use it, in the absence of further 
reasons, for trivial knowledge and things like “Cicero is Tully” for those cases in which a special 
act of recognition was needed. This, I think, moreover, explains why, when it comes to 
attributing knowledge in order to gain new information about the world, we tend to use 
sentences like “Cicero is Tully”. We do not discard “Cicero is Cicero” because it expresses 
something different, but because it is taken to be so trivially true that “Cicero is Tully” is the 
only one we think we and our audience might be interested in.25 
                                                          
25 From the sententialist point of view, Frege’s puzzle is not essentially due to there occurring two co-
denotational proper names, so that sententialists would account similarly, for example, for Russell’s (1905: 
485) example of Scott/the author of Waverley. But it is still worth observing that if names are, differently 
from what we assumed in the main text, somehow indexicals, sententialists can then follow Burge 1977: 
355. According to Burge, sentences like 
Cicero is Cicero 
are similar to sentences like 
This is this. 
As Burge remarks: “We would find boring a claim of the form ‘this = this’, where ‘this’ is twice used to 
refer to some object under the same circumstances (cf. ‘this is self-identical’). But we might be surprised 
by a claim of the form ‘this = this’, where the first ‘this’ is used with a nod toward a picture of the Hope 
diamond, and the second with a gesture to a dirty stone. A similar point holds for proper names. If Alfie 
knows someone in two different walks of life by ‘Bertie’, but thinks he knows two Berties, he will be 
interested if we tell him that Bertie (pointing to the person, or picture of him, in one guise) is identical 
with Bertie (indicating him in another)”.  
Moreover, sententialists can add that in normal uses names are such that their denotation somehow 
depends on other occurrences of the same name that precede them. In this way, sententialists would be 
able to explain why “Cicero is Cicero” is similar to “This is self-identical”. If sententialists would then 
suggest that two occurrences of a proper name should be taken as anaphorically linked (Textor 2004: 206-
207), or as semantically coordinated (Fine 2007), then the account would be similar to that of the tradition 
initiated by Carnap (1947) that we have seen at the beginning of this section. But this seems unnecessary. 
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2.2.3   KRIPKE’S PUZZLES  
Although in the end they will be treated in the same way by sententialists, there are two of 
Kripke’s puzzles (1979) and we will start by quickly presenting them both. We will then see what 
sententialists can say concerning them. Let us start with the London/Londres case. Pierre is a 
rational agent and a monolingual speaker of French. He has never been to London, but on the 
basis of what he has read he is disposed to assent reflectively and sincerely to the French 
sentence 
 
Londres est jolie.    
 
Then Pierre moves to a miserable part of London. All his neighbours call the city ‘London’ but 
he never realizes that ‘London’ and ‘Londres’ are two names of the same city. After a while, 
Pierre has learnt English from his neighbours, but he is unable to translate English into French 
or vice versa. Since he moved to a miserable part of London, he is disposed to assent sincerely 
and reflectively to the English sentence 
 
London is not pretty 
 
and he is not disposed to assent to the English sentence  
 
London is pretty.  
 
Finally, let us also imagine that, while in London, Pierre did not change any of the beliefs he 
ended up having in his French past. Now, although we are obviously perfectly able to describe 
the situation, here is the puzzling question:  
 
Does Pierre believe, or does he not, that London is pretty?  
 
Before seeing the sententialist (non)answer to this question, let us see the second puzzle. Peter is 
a rational agent and a competent speaker of English. One day he comes to know that there was 
a man called ‘Paderewski’ who was a brilliant pianist. He then became disposed to accept   
 
Paderewski had musical talent. 
 
After a bit, Peter also comes to know that there was a man called ‘Paderewski’ who was a 
famous politician. The politician and the pianist are in fact the same man, but Peter does not 
                                                                                                                                                                    
For sententialists can hold that these links between various occurrences of the same names are not 
semantic. On this, see §3.4.1.   
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realize this. He thinks that politicians are not good at music, and, while retaining all his previous 
beliefs, he becomes disposed to accept 
  
Paderewski did not have musical talent. 
 
In this case as well the situation is clear, but here is a puzzling question:  
 
Does Peter believe, or does he not, that Paderewski had musical talent?  
 
Let us see what sententialists can, and I think should, say about these two puzzling questions. 
The first thing to notice is that the puzzles are puzzling only if we assume that Pierre and Peter 
are rational and if we assume that, in order for a subject S to be rational, it cannot be the case 
that two sentences of the form 
 
S believes that p 
S believes that not p 
 
are both true. For if Pierre (or Peter) could still be rational even if sentences of that kind were 
true of them, we could simply hold that, yes, he believes that London is pretty and also that 
London is not pretty. Is this assumption on rationality true? As Crawford (2004: 184) remarks, 
the principle “is often assumed to be beyond question ... on the other hand, many philosophers 
think it is equally obvious that the rationality assumption is false”. But, if so, why is the option 
of holding that Pierre believes both that London is pretty and that London is not pretty so 
unpalatable, even though it is not obvious that the assumption on rationality is true? I think that 
sententialists can answer this question by holding that what the puzzles really show is that we 
take that assumption (be it true or false) to guide our representation, i.e. that when we use 
propositional attitude sentences to represent the attitudes of a rational agent, we take one of the 
desiderata to be that in the representation the subject does not end up believing that p and believing 
that not-p. The reason seems clear: even if the assumption is false, so that a subject can be 
rational while believing that p and that not p, attributing to a rational subject something of that 
forms still leaves it open that she is irrational, and it is better to rule this possibility out, given 
that we are representing the attitudes of a rational subject and rationality is something that we 
usually care about when it comes to attributing attitudes. Now according to sententialism the 
tools we use to represent attitudes is language itself. So from the point of view of sententialism 
the questions  
 
Does Pierre believe, or does he not, that London is pretty?  
Does Peter believe, or does he not, that Paderewski had musical talent?  
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ask us whether “London is pretty” represents one of Pierre’s beliefs and whether “Paderewski 
had musical talent” represents one of Peter’s beliefs. According to sententialism, in both 
questions it is presupposed that the sentences “London is pretty” and “Paderewski had musical 
talent” are representational tools for what Pierre and Peter do or do not believe. Are the 
presuppositions fulfilled? Let us see with Pierre and “London is pretty”. If the presupposition is 
fulfilled, then we have every reason to think that Pierre does have a belief which we can 
represent with “London is pretty”. Similarly, we also have every reason to think that “London is 
not pretty” represents another of his beliefs. But it follows that if our representational tools 
were adequate, we would end up with Pierre believing both that London is pretty and that 
London is not pretty. But Pierre is rational and we do not want to end up with a rational subject 
believing both something of the form that p and something of the form that not-p. If the 
assumption on rationality is true, that is something that rational Pierre cannot believe. But even 
if the assumption is false, there are still two reasons for why something of this form could be 
believed: either because the subject is irrational, or because she is mistaken. So if we represent 
Pierre’s attitudes in that way, we either imply, or at least leave it open, that he is irrational, and it 
is better to rule that out. Thus “London is pretty” is not an apt tool for representing what Pierre 
does and does not believe, exactly as regular polygons up to the dodecahedron are not apt tools 
for representing Olga’s preferences. Hence the presupposition – namely, that “London is 
pretty” is an adequate representational tool for what Pierre does or does not believe – is not 
fulfilled. It follows that the question 
 
Does Pierre believe, or does he not, that London is pretty?,  
 
since it relies on an unfulfilled presupposition, cannot be answered.  
 
It is easy to see that the Paderewski puzzle is similar. If “Paderewski had musical talent” is an 
adequate representational tool for what Peter believes or does not believe, then we have every 
reason to think that both “Paderewski had musical talent” and “Paderewski did not have 
musical talent” represent two attitudes of Peter’s. We would thereby either imply, or at least 
leave it open, that Peter is irrational, since he would believe both that p and that not p. But we 
know that Peter is rational, and we take it to be pretty important to represent that he is not 
irrational. It follows that the question 
 
Does Peter believe, or does he not, that Paderewski had musical talent?, 
 
since it relies on the false presupposition that “Paderesky had musical talent” is an adequate 




From the point of view of sententialism, therefore, the situation with the puzzling questions 
above is similar to when we are asked what is the greatest number. Since there is no greatest 
number, the question, in relying on the false presupposition that there is a greatest number, does 
not have a correct answer. The puzzles are essentially puzzles, in that the puzzling questions 
really do not have correct answers. 
 
Before moving to another topic, we can see what according to sententialism the lessons are that 
we can learn from the puzzles. A first lesson is that the sentences a subject is disposed to accept 
are not necessarily sentences we can use to represent her attitudes. According to the (weak) 
disquotational principle for English, roughly, if a normal English speaker, on reflection, sincerely 
assents to ‘p’, then she believes that p (Kripke 1979: 439). From the point of view of 
sententialism, the principle is tantamount to holding that if a subject assents to a sentence, then 
we can use that sentence to represent what she believes. But according to sententialism the 
principle is not always true. For there are cases in which the principle provides us with attitudes 
that conflict with the guiding principle seen above. In particular, in the case of Peter, given his 
overall attitudes, the sentences he assents to are not sentences we can use to represent his 
attitudes. Other cases in which the principle is false are those, as Kripke remarks, which concern 
sentences in which indexicals occur. For even if Pierre were disposed to assent to an utterance 
of  
 
I am wise 
 
uttered by John, still we could not ourselves denote “I am wise” to represent what Pierre 
believes, given that he can well believe that John is wise but that we are foolish.26 Now, pace 
Burge, who takes the disquotational principle to be absurd (1982: 288), one seems justified in 
wondering whether it even makes sense to say that the disquotational principle is false also for 
non-indexical sentences. Being sincere means to assert and assent only in accordance with what 
one believes. Then is it not the case that if a subject assents to something sincerely, she believes 
it, and therefore she believes what she assented to? According to sententialism, this is not the 
correct way of putting the principle. For according to sententialism the relation between belief, 
assent and representation is more complex than it might seem at first glance: it is not that we 
assent to something which is what we believe in the corresponding propositional attitude 
sentence. According to sententialism, in a propositional attitude sentence we do not denote that 
which is believed, but we denote a sentence as a representational tool in order to represent what 
a subject believes. While the subject of the assent assents to a sentence on the basis of what she 
thinks is the case with the world, we denote a sentence as a representational tool on the basis of 
                                                          
26 On this, see also §3.4.2. 
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what we think is the case with her overall attitudes. If the attitudes are those of Pierre or Peter, 
even if they sincerely assent to some sentences, we cannot denote those very sentences to 
represent those attitudes. Thus the situation is puzzling indeed. 
  
The puzzles, moreover, show something we have already seen above, i.e. that the more we have 
to represent, the harder it is for our representation to be adequate. For before Pierre moved to 
London, it seems we could answer  
  
Does Pierre believe, or does he not, that London is pretty? 
 
by answering that Pierre does believe that London is pretty. For we would not end up with an 
irrationality or with it being left open whether Pierre is irrational, and in that case “London is 
pretty” would then be an apt tool for representing what Pierre believes. But this does not mean, 
as it might seem, that Pierre does not retain, in London, all his previous beliefs. It simply means, 
from the sententialist point of view, that now that he has moved to London we cannot any 
longer represent his unchanged beliefs in the same way. Let us go back to the map of the tube. 
If we are representing only Waterloo and Southwark, straight lines between stops can represent 
both the real length of the journeys and the real relative position of the stops properly, so that 
for Waterloo and Southwark straight lines between dots are an apt representational tool both for 
the journeys and the positions. But when we add other stops, we see that this is not the case 
anymore. Thus, quite obviously, representations that were adequate for representing fewer 
things can become inadequate when we also want to represent other objects. This is exactly 
what happens with Pierre and Peter. Now that Pierre has moved to London, our previously 
adequate system of representation breaks down because we cannot now ignore the new belief 
acquired in London, and what we can say a subject believes depends on what else we can say she 
believes. Thus among the things shown by the puzzle is that while assent is an entirely local 
matter, involving each sentence separately, belief is not (Santambrogio 2002: 632).   
 
There is nothing strange in the tube, or in Pierre and Peter, and in fact, as Kripke remarks, there 
are many alternative ways in which we can describe Pierre’s and Peter’s attitudes, exactly as there 
is a perfectly adequate map of the tube, i.e. the one that uses curved lines. One way to represent 
what Pierre and Peter believe is to employ two different names for London and for Paderewski. 
For if we denote “London is pretty” and “London* is not pretty”, we can say that Pierre 
believes that London is pretty and that London* is not pretty without implying, or leaving it 
open, that Peter is irrational. Thus the puzzles also show that having more synonymous 
expressions enriches the representational power of our language, and so enriches our 
representational abilities. Therefore according to sententialism, having more synonymous words 
is not, as Church (1954: 71) urged, a dispensable linguistic luxury. According to Salmon (2012: 438), 
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who agrees with Church, the thesis that having more synonyms increases the expressive capacity 
of a language is seriously implausible. In particular, it might be taken as implausible considering 
that, as Kripke himself remarks (1979: 264), the view cannot plausibly be restricted to proper 
names of individuals, but must be extended, for example, at least to ‘rabbits’ and ‘beeches’. But 
in understanding the role of ‘that’-clauses in propositional attitude sentences, the prima-facie 
implausibility should, I think, fade away. Certainly, more synonymous expressions do not mean 
more meanings, but when we attribute attitudes we do not denote meanings, but expressions. 
Quite clearly, the more objects with different features we have for representing something, the 
easier it is for the representation to be adequate: if we could use all regular polygons and not just 
those up to the dodecahedron, for example, we could probably represent Olga’s preferences 







2.3      SOME CONSTRAINTS ON WHAT SENTENCES ARE 
 
According to sententialism, ‘that’-clauses, as they occur in propositional attitude sentences, 
denote sentences. But what are sentences? Sententialism is a theory about the semantics of 
propositional attitude sentences and not a metaphysics, so sententialists can be partially neutral 
on the issue. Nonetheless, as many have remarked, there are some constraints that sententialism 
is forced to put on what sentences are (Cresswell 1980: 17-19; Lewy 1976: 48-58; George Moore 
1925-6: 142; Putnam 1954: 114; Schiffer 1990: 245). In order to see what constraints, we may 
start with the following questions:   
 
In worlds in which ‘2’ denotes 3, would 2 still be 2? 
In worlds in which ‘2’ denotes 3, would ‘2’ still denote 2? 
 
The first question, in which the second ‘2’ is used, intuitively has a positive answer that is not 
too difficult to establish: in the question we are using our ‘2’, and we are therefore not speaking 
about a numeral, but about the number 2, and its identity with itself does not change in other 
scenarios simply because a sign has changed meaning.27 
                                                          
27 In passing, we should note that there is in fact a way in which it can be denied that in 
In worlds in which ‘2’ denotes 3, would 2 still be 2? 
the used ‘2’ denotes the number 2. One might in fact apply to numerals what Predelli 2001: 154-155 has 
called the hyper-indexical view, and therefore maintain that the denotation of a numeral with respect to a 
context c is the object denoted by relevant uses of that numeral in c. According to this account, the used 
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As for the second question, i.e. 
 
In worlds in which ‘2’ denotes 3, would ‘2’ still denote 2?, 
 
in it ‘2’ is only mentioned, and we are thus asking about a numeral, a linguistic item. Now, is the 
‘2’ of this scenario and the ‘2’s of other scenarios the same entity that has different meanings, so 
that ‘2’ changes meaning just as Cicero changes properties from one scenario to another, or are 
they different homographic entities that have different meanings? Let us start with the 
assumption that they are the same entity. Then if, as it seems, it is possible that that entity 
changes meaning from this scenario to another, as stated in the antecedent, the answer to 
 
In worlds in which ‘2’ denotes 3, would ‘2’ still denote 2? 
 
is no. If instead the ‘2’s of the different scenarios are different entities, then the second ‘2’ in the 
question is ambiguous, in that it can denote the various different ‘2’s of the various different 
scenarios. The question will have different answers depending on whether we are asking about 
ours or another scenario’s ‘2’. If we are asking about another scenario’s ‘2’, that linguistic object 
does not denote 2 but 3, and the answer to our question is therefore again no: the ‘2’s of the 
worlds under consideration denote 3. If we are asking about the actual ‘2’, there are two further 
cases to distinguish. The first option is that the object does not exist in the other scenario, and 
then the question is similar to when we ask about Cicero concerning a world in which he does 
not exist: in a world in which Cicero does not exist, is he handsome? No, he would not be 
handsome, and so our scenario’s ‘2’ would not denote 2. The answer to our question is thus 
again no. The second option is that our ‘2’ also exists in the other scenarios. In this case, if we 
ask about our ‘2’ and our ‘2’ exists also in the other scenario, the answer to our question 
 
In worlds in which ‘2’ denotes 3, would ‘2’ still denote 2? 
 
is no if our ‘2’ could change meaning in some other scenario, and yes if it could not. Thus the 
answer to our question is yes only if our ‘2’ necessarily exists also in the other scenarios and 
necessarily means what it means here. 
  
Now take this question: 
                                                                                                                                                                    
‘2’ denotes 3 and 3 is not 2. But, as Predelli remarks, the view is independently untenable. For let us 
consider a context c in which no language is spoken at all. According to the view, ‘2’ has no denotation 
with respect to c, and thus the sentence  
2 is a number 
would presumably come out false. Thus according to the view, implausibly, the truth-value of sentences 
about numbers depends on there being subjects using numerals and not on the properties of numbers.  
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In worlds exactly like ours for what concerns Olga’s mental life and in which ‘Cicero is 
smart’ means that Cicero is dull, would Olga still believe that Cicero is smart? 
 
Intuitively, the answer is yes: how can the change in meaning of a word change what Olga 
believes? In accordance with propositionalism, the answer is in fact yes because ‘that Cicero is 
smart’ denotes a proposition, not a linguistic item, so that the question is similar to  
 
In worlds in which ‘2’ denotes 3, would 2 still be 2? 
 
and not to  
 
In worlds in which ‘2’ denotes 3, would ‘2’ still denote 2? 
 
When we ask what Olga believes in the other scenario, we are considering a non-linguistic 
object, and what the bits of the language of that scenario mean is irrelevant. According to 
sententialism, by contrast, in  
 
Olga believes that Cicero is smart 
 
‘that Cicero is smart’ denotes a sentence, a linguistic item. Therefore from the point of view of 
sententialism the question 
 
In worlds exactly like ours for what concerns Olga’s mental life and in which ‘Cicero is 
smart’ means that Cicero is dull, would Olga still believe that Cicero is smart? 
 
is not similar to  
 
In worlds in which ‘2’ denotes 3, would 2 still be 2? 
 
but to  
 
In worlds in which ‘2’ denotes 3, would ‘2’ still denote 2? 
 
Since sententialists should end up with the answer to the question being yes, that means that 
sententialists have to put constraints on what a language and its bits are. As we saw with ‘2’, the 
only way in which the answer to  
 
In worlds in which ‘2’ denotes 3, would ‘2’ still denote 2? 
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is yes is the one in which, firstly, the ‘2’ of this scenario and the ‘2’ of the other scenarios are 
different entities; secondly, that ‘2’ is disambiguated between denoting our ‘2’ and another 
scenario’s ‘2’ so that it denotes ours; thirdly, that our ‘2’ exists also in the other scenarios and, 
finally, that our ‘2’ has the meaning it has necessarily. Therefore, sententialists can come up with 
the right answer by holding all the following theses: firstly, that there are two “Cicero is smart”s 
(Geach 1957:86; Richard 1996/2013: 149) so that linguistic items are not individuated merely in 
terms of the form, or otherwise the two “Cicero is smart”s belonging to our or the other 
scenarios would be the same entity; secondly, that in the question what we are asking about is 
our actual sentence; thirdly, that our sentence “Cicero is smart” exists also in the other 
scenarios; finally, that our “Cicero is smart” has the meaning it has necessarily. Put differently, 
using Church’s words (1950: 99), a language can be taken as something like the language which 
was current in Great Britain and the United States in 1949 A.D. – an accidental entity, which 
could well not exist and whose words could well have different meanings – or as something like 
the language for which such and such semantical rules hold – a necessary entity whose meanings 
are fixed. The modal considerations above show that, as Church remarks, for sententialists it is 
better to opt for the second way of understanding what languages are.28    
 
A thing to notice is that the second of the four claims above, according to which in questions 
like  
 
In worlds exactly like ours for what concerns Olga’s mental life and in which ‘Cicero is 
smart’ meant that Cicero is dull, would Olga still believe that Cicero is smart? 
 
what we are asking about is our actual sentence, is not a metaphysical claim, and sententialists 
can actually defend it by merely relying on linguistic considerations. For even though, according 
to sententialism, ‘that’-clauses and marks of pure quotation are both devices for denoting 
sentences, sententialists can also recognize that they are different devices. In particular, 
quotation marks as devices of pure quotation are such that in an English sentence we may 
equally easily quote an English and an Italian sentence, as happens, for example, in  
 
Olga said: “Cicerone è intelligente”. 
                                                          
28 Thomason 1975: 234-235 suggests using sentences like  
If ‘red’ meant what ‘white’ means, it would be true that snow is red 
as a test for determining whether use or mention is involved, and holds: “I find this plausible enough that 
I am willing to give the test some weight as a criterion for the absence of quotation, as well as its 
presence. I mention this because of its application to belief contexts. Since  
If ‘red’ meant what ‘white’ means, I would believe that snow is red 
is false, the test indicates that the complement of believe does not involve reference to linguistic 
expressions.” But, as shown in the main text, and as he himself recognizes, “[t]his conclusion is based 
only on prima facie evidence; it is defeasible.” 
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Complement clauses, by contrast, typically belong to the very language of the whole sentence 
they occur in, and sentences in which the ‘that’-clause is in another language would typically be 
taken to be hideous linguistic jumbles (Higginbotham 2006: 112). Thus, typically, the ‘that’ triggers 
the interpretation of the denoted sentence as belonging to the very language of the full 
attribution, as required by the second of the claims above.  
 
But it should be observed that, although unusual, the phenomenon of code-switching is a real 
linguistic phenomenon, so that it seems possible to use sentences like  
 
Olga believes that Cicero is intelligente  
Olga believes that Cicerone è intelligente. 
 
Nonetheless, I think the phenomenon should not be taken as able to show that sententialists 
cannot defend the thesis that in  
 
In worlds exactly like ours for what concerns Olga’s mental life and in which ‘Cicero is 
smart’ meant that Cicero is dull, would Olga still believe that Cicero is smart? 
 
what we are asking about is our actual sentence. First of all, it is not obvious that sentences like  
 
Olga believes that Cicero is intelligente  
Olga believes that Cicerone è intelligente 
 
show that the ‘that’-clause can belong to a different language with regard to the language of the 
whole attribution. For all here depends on what language these attributions belong to. Since, 
typically, sentences like these would be used by bilingual speakers in front of a bilingual 
audience, sententialists may here hold that these sentences really belong to the language of the 
speakers involved in the conversation, which is not English, but an enriched version of English, 
to which also some or all Italian words belong. If this is the case, then the ‘that’-clauses in fact 
belong to the language of the attributions they occur in.  
 
Secondly, I think it is clear that cases like these should be taken as deviations from the norm. 
For imagine that ‘intelligente’ also belonged to English, in which it meant what ‘attractive’ 
means. With the desire to communicate that Olga believes that Cicero is attractive, we would 
probably simply utter 
 




But if we wanted instead to communicate that Olga believes that Cicero is smart, even though 
we were in front on an audience that we know is competent in Italian, we would probably not 
utter the unqualified   
 
Olga believes that Cicero is intelligente. 
 
We would probably choose something along the following lines   
       
Olga believes that Cicero is, as we say in Italian, intelligente 
Olga believes that Cicero is intelligente, I mean, not in the English sense.  
 
This, I think, shows that the norm is that the words are intended and taken to belong to the very 
language of the attribution. Surely, spoken languages are very flexible, and, depending on who 
are the speakers, what is common knowledge among them, etc., different sentences would be 
chosen and the same sentences would be taken differently. If we all know, for example, that my 
English lexicon is very poor, and that I typically use Italian words with the hope of being 
somehow understood, you would probably not expect me to know the recherché scientific 
English word ‘ananas’. If you know that ‘ananas’ is the common word in Italian for pineapples, 
you might well take my unqualified  
 
Olga believes that ananas is very summery 
 
as involving in fact an Italian word. But again this seems an extremely unusual case of deviation 
from the norm.  
 
The reasons sententialists can detect behind this norm will become clear in the next chapter. 
Before seeing this, we should note that, by relying on this observation about the constraints on 
which language the ‘that’-clauses belong to, sententialists can also solve another problem that 
has been raised: the problem is that since there are sentences which belong to more than one 
language, sententialists introduce an ambiguity that does not seem to be present in propositional 
attitude sentences. For example, as Davidson remarks (1968: 135), the sounds “Empedokles 
liebt” do fairly well as a German or an English sentence, in one case saying that Empedokles 
loved and in the other telling us what he did from the top of Etna. Similarly, the string  
 




can work both as a Latin and as an Italian sentence. In Latin it means Go Vitellio to the sound of the 
war of the Roman Gods, while in Italian it means Roman calves are nice. The prima-facie problem is 
that while a sentence like  
 
Dave believes that Empedokles liebt 
 
cannot express that Dave believes that Empedocles loved, according to sententialists the 
sentence “Empedokles liebt” is denoted, and, therefore, depending on what language it belongs 
to, it seems that it can actually express that Dave believes that Empedokles loved. Because of 
this issue, in 1956 Quine (1956: 186) held that the relativity to the language should be made 
explicit, and sententialists should hold that in a sentence like  
 
Olga believes that Cicero is smart     
 
we are somehow denoting the English language. This is surely unappealing but, as we just saw 
and as Quine himself recognizes in 1970 (1970: 14), luckily there is no real need to go that way. 
Since the norm with propositional attitude sentences is that the denoted sentence belongs to the 
very language of the full attribution, it follows that even if no reference to English is made, 
“Empedockles liebt” is to be taken, other things be equal, as belonging to English, no matter 
whether those sounds can work in German as well. Moreover, the fact that sententialism allows 
that the norm might not be followed, and so that  
   
Dave believes that Empedokles liebt 
 
might be taken to express that Dave believes that Empedokles loved, is actually to be welcomed. 
For the following, although unusual, seems an attribution we might be happy to make:   
 
Dave believes that, well I do not know how to say it in English, that Empedokles liebt, you 
understand it, right?  
Dave believes that Empedokles liebt, as they say in Berlin. 29  
 
Having seen that inter-linguistic ambiguity does not seem to threaten sententialism, we can now 
see that intra-linguistic ambiguity seems equally unproblematic. Schiffer (1987: 120) holds that 
ambiguity is a serious issue for sententialists:  
 
                                                          
29 These sentences might, moreover, be taken as cases in which the speaker is performing a form of 
mimics. On this, see §3.4.2.  
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A sequence of mark and sounds can have more than one meaning and truth conditions even 
within a language, as we can see from the sentence ‘visiting relatives can be boring’. The fact that 
the sentence may have different meanings … is a problem for the classic sententialist theory for 
the following reason ... the truth conditions of a belief are just those of the sentence believed. 
Thus the belief ascribed in a belief ascription would, unacceptably, have as many truth conditions 
as the sentence contained in the ‘that’-clause.  
 
 
But, firstly, it is not obvious that sentences are mere sequences of mark and sounds and, as we 
have seen, sententialists had better deny this. Secondly, and more importantly, on the account 
here suggested the belief is not the sentence denoted by a ‘that’-clause; rather,  
 
Olga believes that visiting relatives can be boring 
 
expresses that Olga believes something that we can represent with the sentence “Visiting 
relatives can be boring”. Of course, many things can be represented by this sentence, and the 
representans does not individuate the thing believed, but this does not make Olga’s belief such as 
to “have as many truth conditions as the sentence contained in the ‘that’-clause”. Put differently, 
the sentence is not what Olga believes, and so Olga’s belief might be absolutely unambiguous. 
Thus this ambiguity objection does not really seem to hit sententialism, at least in the version 









Sententialism has generally been suggested as an account of propositional attitude sentences 
within a logic or language of science. With the aim in view of building at liberty a language, Carnap 
and Quine suggested sententialism, for they thought it had two main advantages over 
propositionalism. First of all, sententialism has been suggested because it can be easily combined 
with a behaviouristic approach to the mind. The reason is that it seems easy to move from 
believing a sentence to accepting it, i.e. from belief to linguistic behaviour. Secondly, Carnap and 
Quine thought that sentences are much better than propositions, because they are concrete 
material objects for which we have clear identity criteria which do not involve opaque notions. 
The sententialist account developed in this chapter has none of the alleged advantages Carnap 
and Quine found in a sententialist logic. First of all, we have seen that sententialism as an 
account of natural language cannot free itself from considerations of intentions and of the mind 
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as an extra-behavioural entity. As we saw while discussing Kripke’s puzzles, sententialism is not 
an account of attitudes in terms of linguistic behaviour, so much so that it seems that 
sometimes, even if a subject assents to a sentence, we cannot use that very sentence to represent 
one of her beliefs. Secondly, as we have just seen, sententialists need to hold that sentences are 
necessary entities that have their meanings necessarily. Thus propositionalism, and the 
sententialist account here developed, seem on a par both ontologically and methodologically.  
 
Moreover, given the way sententialism has been developed in this chapter, one might wonder 
whether in fact it makes much of a difference if one chooses propositionalism or sententialism. 
While according to the propositionalist, the ‘that’-clause in  
 
Olga believes that Cicero is smart 
 
denotes what Olga believes, according to the sententialist it denotes a sentence that represents 
what Olga believes. The difference between propositionalism and sententialism is therefore the 
following: according to propositionalism, we are directly denoting the object of the attitude, 
while according to sententialism we are denoting something that represents the object of the 
attitude. Is there much of a difference between the two accounts? At first glance it seems that 
one would have some advantages and the other others, so that both can count as viable options.  
 
Some have actually tried to combine the two accounts. For example, it has been suggested (King 
2007) that the syntactic structure of a sentence is part of the proposition expressed by the 
sentence, or that ‘that’-clauses denote interpreted logical forms (Larson & Ludlow 1993). Moreover, 
it has been argued (Santambrogio 2015: 297-299) that propositions are structured entities, 
composed of classes of co-denotational names and co-designational predicates. For example, 
given that in English there are two names for Cicero, i.e. ‘Cicero’ and ‘Tully’, the proposition 
expressed by  
 
Cicero is Tully 
 
can be represented as  
 
<{‘Cicero’, ‘Tully’}, {‘=’}, {‘Cicero’, ‘Tully’}>. 
  
It has, moreover, been suggested (Richard 1990: 137-141) that the objects of the attitudes are 
Russellian annotated matrixes, i.e. sentences together with the meanings of the words occurring in 
them. It has been argued that in uttering a propositional attitude sentence we are somehow 
talking about both a sentence and a proposition (Field 1978: 12; Fiengo & May 2006). Some 
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(Forbes 1993; Loar 1972; Recanati 2000: 132-134; 149-158) have advanced the idea that in 
propositional attitude sentences some linguistic items are somehow denoted, just as according to 
some the name ‘Giorgione’ is somehow denoted in  
 
Giorgione was so-called because of his size.  
 
Some, moreover, have found an important role for linguistic bits also within a Russellian view of 
propositional attitudes, according to which propositional attitude sentences express the holding 
of a three-place relation between a subject, a Russellian proposition, and a mode of presentation. 
Some have in fact suggested that Russellian accounts of this kind may profitably hold that even 
though ‘that’-clauses denote Russellian propositions, names occurring in ‘that’-clauses can help 
to nonreferentially determine the mode(s) of presentation somehow salient in the context of 
utterance (Crimmins 1992: 144-145; Kaplan 1989: 599; Predelli 2000: 461-465). Furthermore, 
others (Armour-Garb & Woodbridge 2012) suggest that language about attitudes is similar to a 
pretense-involving fictional talk. Thus a sentence like 
 
Olga believes that Cicero is smart 
 
is to be taken as similar to something like  
 
Olga stole a pie from the oven 
 
uttered during a mud-pie game. ‘That’-clauses, they suggest, denote propositions only in the 
fictional context of the pretense game, while of course they do not really denote propositions, as 
a piece of mud is a pie only in the game. But what is the mud, in the case of the pretence of 
propositions? They suggest going somehow sententialist since they hold that it is “something 
sentence-like” (2012: 660).  
 
But even if hybrid accounts are considered to possibly be correct and are among the options on 
the philosophical market, it is generally agreed that full-hearted sententialism, according to 
which ‘that’-clauses simply denote sentences, not interpreted sentences or also sentences, is 
doomed. The opinion is so widespread that sententialism is often not even taken into 
consideration, or is simply quickly dismissed and the reasons why sententialism is considered 
doomed are two objections we still need to discuss, i.e. the famous Church translation argument 












In Chapter 1 we saw that it seems we had better endorse the theses 
 
(RP) Propositional attitude predicates occurring in propositional attitude sentences 
designate relations; 
(ST) ‘That’-clauses are singular terms. 
 
In Chapter 2 we developed an account that combined these theses with  
 
(S) ‘That’-clauses denote sentences. 
 
According to the account, when we utter  
 
Olga believes that Cicero is smart 
 
we denote a sentence that represents what Olga believes, and we have seen that there are 
some reasons to take this sententialist account to be a viable alternative to the traditional 
propositionalist account, according to which in place of (S) we should maintain 
 
(P) ‘That’-clauses denote propositions. 
 
As we have seen, sententialism seems able to deal with the notorious puzzles, seems to provide 
us with an interesting account of the contextual variations in the truth-value of propositional 
attitude sentences, and allows us to stay neutral on some difficult questions concerning what 
thoughts are.  
 
Sententialism is generally considered to be doomed, though. The main reasons are the famous 
Church translation argument and a problem raised by Schiffer. Church thought that his 
argument may be an insuperable objection (1950: 97; 1951: 5); Schiffer urged that his problem 
shows that no sententialist account can be correct (1987: 111; 1990: 244) or, more mildly later 
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on, he maintained that he seriously doubts that his problem is surmountable (2003: 47), and this 
is the way in which the two criticisms are usually taken. Moreover, Church and Schiffer argue 
that their criticisms are directed against any sententialist account. Therefore, they are directed 
against the sententialist core thesis, i.e.  
 
(S) ‘That’-clauses denote sentences, 
 
and not against other theses that can be held together with it. Thus any sententialist account 
needs to face the objections, and we cannot claim to have shown that the account suggested in 
the previous chapter is a viable account until we have shown that sententialists can survive these 
allegedly fatal objections. Showing that these objections do not in fact succeed in dooming 
sententialism is the aim of this chapter.  
 
I will suggest that sententialists may answer both criticisms on the same grounds, i.e. by 
exploiting the recognition of what is simply an observation about language, and we will start 
from this observation. As we will see, the observation is simply that there is an obvious 
difference between the experience of listening to a sentence we understand and to a sentence we 
do not understand (§3.1). We will then see that if sententialists take the observation on board, 
they can reject Church’s argument (§3.2) and solve Schiffer’s problem (§3.3). 
 
Moreover, I will show that sententialists may appeal to that very observation also in order to 
answer another problem, pointed out by Bach (§3.4.1). Bach’s problem will allow us to consider 
indexicals, and we will see that, contrary to what has been sometimes held in the literature, 
sententialism can perfectly explain the behaviour of indexicals occurring in propositional 
attitude sentences (§3.4.2).  
   
Having thus rescued sententialism for propositional attitude sentences like 
 
Olga believes that Cicero is smart,  
 
in the next chapter we will see how well sententialism can deal with other attributions, i.e. the 
so-called wh-attributions, such as 
 






3.1      AN IMPECCABLE OBSERVATION 
 
Listening to a sentence we understand is different from listening to a sentence we do not 
understand. The difference is not just that when a subject listens to a sentence she understands, 
she understands it. It is also that, in normal cases, the subject cannot but immediately 
understand it. As Meckler (1956: 325) suggestively puts it,   
 
 
It is a long established habit of human beings to pluck out the meanings of phrases, whatever they 
may be, and devour them willy-nilly.  
 
 
Recently, this observation has been the starting point of a debate connected with the question: 
do subjects hear meanings, i.e. is understanding a sentence part of the very auditory experience 
of hearing it? (O’ Callaghan 2011). For the purpose of discussing Church’s and Schiffer’s 
objections, nothing as strong as a positive answer to the question is needed. What is needed is 
not an explanation of what happens, but simply recognizing that this is what happens. The 
observation that this is what happens is, as Smith puts it, “impeccable” (2009: 183): it simply 
reports a fact, i.e. the fact that we understand a sentence, if we can.  
 
For our purposes, it is particularly important to recognize that this immediate understanding of 
expressions we can understand concerns also merely quoted expressions. However they work, it 
is clear that pure quotation marks are a linguistic tool with which we may speak about language 
itself. Nonetheless, they cannot block our understanding of what is within them, provided that 
we understand it. It is not just that quotation marks are such that we can work out what they 
quote and then understand it; it is that quotation marks are iconic (Recanati 2000: 14) in that the 
quoted material is displayed and so ready to be understood: you cannot say “ ‘Mary’ ” without 
saying ‘Mary’, you cannot listen to “ ‘Mary’ ” without listening to ‘Mary’. Thus quotation is 
different from other mentioning devices that enable us to work out what the quoted item is, but 
in a non-straightforward way. Take for example the device recently discussed by Gaskin and Hill 
(2013: 206): letters are replaced by numbers, so that the letter ‘a’ is replaced by the numeral ‘1’, 
the letter ‘b’ by the numeral ‘2’, and so on; numerals are concatenated by the symbol ‘*’, so that 
the name of the name ‘Mary’ is ‘13*1*18*25’. In a community in which this convention is 
shared, speakers are able to recover the name ‘Mary’ from ‘13*1*18*25’, but this takes quite a bit 
of work. With usual quotation, on the other hand, the quoted material is displayed, and so is 
already there for the hearer to understand what it means, exactly as when it is used. For hearers 
listening to a quoted bit of language there is then some extra free lunch, and they usually cannot 
but devour it. That is why, for example, we tend not to quote rude words. For politeness, we tend 
to prefer something like ‘F***’, ‘F_ _k’ or ‘the F word’ and ‘the four-letter word’, or even ‘cattle 
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truck’, i.e. non-straightforward mention, to an explicit quotation (Predelli 2013: 83; Saka 1998: 
121-126).30 But for any rude word x, “ ‘x’ ” is not rude, but a non-rude name of a rude word. 
Nonetheless, as in the present context, we avoid saying or writing it, because we know that 
speakers of English will immediately understand what is within quotes. That is why, moreover, 
in reading the title of this very chapter, “ ‘ In Defence of Sententialism ’ ”, you in fact thought 
that you were going to read something about a defence, even if ‘defence’ occurs merely quoted 
in it. One might be tempted to hold here that quoted words are also used, and that is why we 
pluck out their meanings. But it should be noted that our tendency to devour meanings is so 
strong that, as Predelli (2013: 83, f. 6) and Hughes (1991: 19) remark, not even quotation is 
required, and thus it is irrelevant whether quotation prevents use. Accidental occurrence or 
strong similarity seem in fact to be enough. For example, Hughes (1991: 19) reports that 
‘donkey’ appeared mysteriously when “[t]he time-honoured accepted synonym, ass, started to fall 
into disrepute through uncomfortable phonetic proximity to arse”.  
 
If sententialists are right in holding that ‘that’-clauses denote sentences, it is clear that, as we 
have already seen in §2.1.1, ‘that’-clauses are iconic too and thus display the sentences they 
denote. For hearers listening to a ‘that’-clause there is then again some extra free lunch, and they 
usually cannot but devour it. As I will show below, this tendency of ours to devour meanings 
willy-nilly is all a sententialist needs to appeal to in order to answer both Church’s translation 







3.2      ON CHURCH’S TRANSLATION ARGUMENT 
 
Church (1950; 1956a: 62; 1956b: 10-11; 1973: 365) presents his argument as primarily directed 
                                                          
30 A real case that shows this practice is reported by Davis 1989: in 1987 The Independent printed an article 
which referred to a complaint made by the editor of The Sun, who was disconcerted by an article that The 
Independent had previously published that referred to a confrontation on the cricket field between the 
captain of England’s cricket team and the Pakistani umpire. This incident culminated in the former 
allegedly calling the latter a ‘fucking cheating cunt’. At the Press Council hearing, the editor of The Sun 
submitted that The Independent should have printed ‘c...’ instead of ‘cunt’. As Davis 1989: 2 remarks, this 
real case “makes an interesting contrast with that of Sir William Emrys Williams in the Lady Chatterley 
trial. As a witness in his capacity both as a literary expert and a director of the defendant company, he 
claimed that to substitute asterisks for the four-letter words in D. H. Lawrence’s novel ‘would make the 
thing just a dirty book’ ”. The expert’s opinion shows again that the iconic aspect of quotations makes a 
difference as to when we find it appropriate to use them, and exactly as people disagree on whether it is 
more vulgar to cover with a fig-leaf the nudities of statues or to leave them uncovered, so people disagree 
on whether it is more rude to display or to not display a rude word.     
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against Carnap’s proposal (1934; 1947: 54-62). As we saw in §2.1.1, according to Carnap, 
roughly, Dave believes that snow is white, i.e. he is related to the sentence “Snow is white” iff 
he is disposed to an affirmative response to “Is snow white?” or to a translation of the question 
that he understands. As we have seen, this account incurs some objections, and we preferred a 
different sententialist account. But the account I suggested also needs to face the objection 
since, as Church himself remarks, his argument is directed against any kind of sententialism. 
Leaving aside any reference to Carnap’s version of sententialism, Church’s translation argument 
goes as follows:31  
 
(CHURCH’S TRANSLATION ARGUMENT) 
 
(C1)  
According to sententialism,  
Dave believes that snow is white 
is to be analysed along the following lines, 
Dave believes “Snow is white”,32 
where quotation marks are to be taken as devices of pure quotation; 
 
(C2)  
The Italian translations of the two English sentences are, respectively,  
Dave crede che la neve è bianca 
Dave crede “Snow is white”; 
 
(C3)  
According to sententialists, the two Italian sentences are thus translations of sentences that 
stand in the analysis relation. If sententialists were right, the two Italian sentences would then 
have to convey the same meaning; 
 
(DATUM)  
But the two Italian sentences would obviously convey different meanings to a monolingual 
speaker of Italian; 
 
                                                          
31 I follow the literature in attributing the objection to Church and in calling it the translation argument. But, 
first of all, as Baldwin 1990: 197 remarks, the translation argument would probably have to be more 
appropriately called Moore’s translation argument (See his unpublished 1924-5 in 1966: 132-149). Secondly, as 
it has been remarked (Salmon 1995/2007: 356) and as it will become clear soon, the argument is not really 
about translation.  
32 We saw in §2.1.1 that this cannot be a correct analysis, since propositional attitude predicates are 
ambiguous and they have different meanings when followed by a ‘that’-clause and a sentence in quotation 




Therefore, contrary to sententialism,  
Dave believes “Snow is white” 
cannot be a semantic analysis of  
Dave believes that snow is white. 
 
Church merely outlines his argument. He provides neither a definition of meaning, nor of adequate 
translation or analysis. He does not say what it is for a sentence, or, better, for an utterance of a 
sentence, to convey a meaning, just as he does not justify the thesis that the translation of  
 
Dave believes “Snow is white” 
 
in Italian is  
 
Dave crede “Snow is white” 
 
and not, for example,  
 
Dave crede “La neve è bianca”,  
 
in which what occurs within quotes also undergoes translation. In restating the argument in a 
different context, Church (1951: 6) also introduces the notion of synonymy, arguing that if 
sententialism were correct, the two Italian sentences  
 
Dave crede che la neve è bianca 
Dave crede “Snow is white” 
 
would have to be synonymous. He maintains that synonymy is “to be tested by considering the 
information which each will convey” to monolingual speakers. But information is, again, an 
undefined notion. 
 
The argument has been widely discussed, so widely that, arguably, all the logical space 
concerning these theses about translations and analyses has been filled by some paper or other.33 
                                                          
33 The main different positions on the argument and on some reactions to it can be found in Anderson 
1998: 138-143; Bealer 2002: 86; Burge 1978a; Carnap 1954; Cresswell 1980; Davidson 1963: 344-346; 
1968: 135-136; Dummett 1981: 93-94; Field 2001: 160-162; Geach 1957: 87-92; 1972: 167-169; 
Higginbotham 1995: 123-125; 2006: 107-110; Kripke 1979: 277, f. 25; 2008: 185-186; Leeds 1979; Lewy 
1976: 64-66; Ludwig & Ray 1998: 144-147; Meckler 1956: 325; Putnam 1954: 114-117; Quine 1956: 187; 
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But I will not attempt to establish whether there is such a thing as the correct translation of 
sentences like  
 
Dave believes that snow is white 
Dave believes “Snow is white” 
 
or whether  
 
Dave crede “Snow is white” 
 
is a correct translation of  
 
Dave believes “Snow is white”, 
 
nor will I take any stance on the criteria for an adequate analysis. For when we take on board the 
impeccable observation that speakers can immediately understand denoted sentences as a free 
lunch, I think there is no need to engage in such a discussion in order to answer the argument. 
Perhaps Church is wrong about translation and analysis. But, no matter how these notions have 
to be spelt out, and thus even if Church is right about them, there is a step in his argument that 
should be called into question.  
 
Church in his argument remarks that 
 
Dave crede che la neve è bianca 
Dave crede “Snow is white” 
 
would obviously convey different meanings to a monolingual speaker of Italian. He does not 
clarify what ‘to convey’ means here.34 We may nonetheless accept his terminology and the 
intuitive idea behind it. What Church points out, just like our impeccable observation, is simply 
a datum, a fact about speakers and, as such, cannot be disputed. But from this Church 
concludes that, therefore, contrary to sententialism,  
                                                                                                                                                                    
1960: 213-218; Rescher 1960: 93-94; Richard 1990: 162-173; Salmon 1995/2007: 264-267; 2001; Scheffler 
1954: 84-90. 
34 At least for historical reasons, it would clearly be wrong to take Church as meaning, by what is conveyed, 
the rich pragmatic notion we are used to nowadays, according to which, for example, the so-called 
implicatures are part of what a sentence conveys. According to my response, Church mistakenly conflates 
what is semantically encoded in a sentence and what the sentence conveys. Thus, the richer the notion of 
what is conveyed, the easier is the sententialist way out. In the main text, in relying on a poorer notion 
which is more faithful to what Church should have had in mind, I am therefore discussing the worst-case 
scenario for sententialists.  
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Dave believes “Snow is white”, 
 
in which the quotation marks should be taken as devices of pure quotation, cannot be a 
semantic analysis of  
 
Dave believes that snow is white. 
 
Sententialism being the thesis that in both  
 
Dave believes that snow is white  
Dave believes “Snow is white” 
 
the sentence “Snow is white” is denoted, Church concludes that while in the second a sentence 
is denoted, this is not the case with the first. But, as we have seen, when it comes to quotation 
there is a difference between the denotations and what is conveyed. Take the following example: 
suppose that there are two perfectly competent speakers of English, and suppose they both 
listen to an utterance of  
 
Dave said: “La neve è bianca”.  
 
They are competent, so they both understand the sentence. But let us suppose that only one of 
them is also a speaker of Italian. I think it should be admitted that the two speakers would have 
something different conveyed to them: only the bilingual speaker would understand the 
sentence quoted and thus know the content of what Dave said. In this case, obviously, the 
difference in what is conveyed cannot be due to some semantic characteristics of some 
sentences, because there is only one utterance of one sentence involved and the two speakers 
both perfectly understand it, being competent in English. Thus it should be recognized, and not 
just by sententialists but by everybody, Church included, that pure quotation creates cases, like 
the one just imagined, in which the difference in what is conveyed is due not to a difference in 
denotations, but also to the subjects understanding or not understanding the words quoted. 
What happens with the imagined case, a sententialist may well respond to Church, is what 
happens also with the sentences involved in his argument, since in them too some free lunch 
understanding is involved. This is, I think, the key idea a sententialist may employ in successfully 
replying to Church.35 So let us see the details.  
                                                          
35 Even if with different intentions and conclusions, since in the end he rejects both sententialism and 
propositionalism, this is also Meckler’s 1956: 325 solution to Church’s argument. To the best of my 
knowledge, Meckler is a forgotten hero, to whom no reference can be found in the discussions of 
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There are four sentences involved in the argument, i.e. 
 
Dave believes that snow is white 
Dave believes “Snow is white” 
Dave crede che la neve è bianca 
Dave crede “Snow is white”. 
 
Leaving aside the notions of analysis and translation, but taking on board our impeccable 
observation, the following are the relevant relations a sententialist takes these sentences to stand 
in with each other. For what concerns 
 
Dave believes that snow is white 
Dave believes “Snow is white” 
 
sententialism is the thesis that in both the very same English sentence “Snow is white” is 
denoted. So, according to sententialism, in neither is the content of Dave’s belief denoted, but a 
speaker of English listening to an utterance of the English quoted sentence will immediately 
understand what it means and have the content immediately conveyed to her. As for 
 
Dave believes that snow is white 




Dave crede che la neve è bianca, 
 
the first two and the third obviously belong to different languages. According to sententialism, 
in the former English sentences an English sentence is denoted, while in the Italian sentence an 
Italian sentence is denoted. Even if the content of Dave’s belief is not denoted in any of the 
sentences, an utterance of each sentence conveys such a content to the speakers of the language 
the sentence belongs to. In the English sentences an English sentence is quoted, and English 
speakers understand it, while in the Italian sentence an Italian sentence is quoted, and Italian 
speakers understand it. The sentences 
  
Dave believes that snow is white 
Dave believes “Snow is white” 
                                                                                                                                                                    
sententialism and propositionalism. Also Leeds 1979: 46, although with different conclusions, suggests 





Dave crede “Snow is white” 
 
again belong to different languages, but in all the English sentence “Snow is white” is denoted. 
Since in the English sentences an English sentence is denoted, English speakers listening to an 
utterance of either of the two will understand the English sentence, and will immediately have 
conveyed to them the content of Dave’s belief. This is not what happens with monolingual 
speakers of Italian listening to an utterance of the Italian sentence: since an English sentence is 
denoted, a monolingual speaker of Italian will not understand it, and there will therefore be no 
additional free lunch understanding. These two triplets of sentences show that when two 
languages and quotation are involved, given that we understand a quoted sentence if, but only if, 
we can, there is a trade-off between preservation of denotations and preservation of what is 
conveyed: if denotations are preserved, as in the second triplet, there is a loss of what is 
conveyed; if, on the other hand, what is conveyed is preserved, denotations have to change.  
 
In passing, it should be noted that the trade-off between denotations and what is conveyed that 
we have in the case of quotation is not completely sui generis. Another is the trade-off between 
denotations and self-reference that we have in the case of self-referential sentences (Burge 
1978a; Hart 1970): take 
 
This very utterance is true 
 
as uttered at time t. At time t’, we may have two utterances: 
 
The utterance made at t is true 
 
which preserves the denotation to the utterance made at t, but is not self-referential, and 
 
This very utterance is true 
 
which preserves the self-referential aspect of the original utterance, but in which the utterance 
made at t’ is denoted, and not the utterance made at t. 36  
 
                                                          
36 Burge 1978a relies on the trade-off between denotation and self-reference in his answer to Church’s 
argument and in fact holds that propositional attitude sentences are self-referential. Since with quotation 
there is in any event a trade-off between preservation of denotations and preservation of what is 
conveyed, holding that the sentence is self-referential is redundant. This seems an advantage, also 
considering that propositional attitude sentences really do not look self-referential. 
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Now to the two sentences directly involved in one of the steps of Church’s argument, i.e. 
 
(DATUM)  
But the two Italian sentences  
Dave crede che la neve è bianca 
Dave crede “Snow is white” 
would obviously convey different meanings to a monolingual speaker of Italian. 
 
For sententialists, while in the first the Italian sentence “La neve è bianca” is denoted, in the 
second the English sentence “Snow is white” is denoted. Thus for sententialists there is a 
semantic difference between the two sentences. Moreover, utterances of the two sentences are 
different also concerning what they convey to the monolingual speakers of Italian: even if in the 
first the content of Dave’s belief is not denoted, a monolingual speaker of Italian listening to an 
utterance of it will willy-nilly understand the quoted sentence, and thus have that content 
immediately conveyed to her. With the second sentence, on the other hand, since an English 
sentence is denoted, a monolingual speaker of Italian will not understand the quoted sentence 
and thus will have no idea what Dave believes. Thus sententialists, with Church, recognize the 
datum that the two Italian sentences would obviously convey different meanings to a 
monolingual speaker of Italian. Sententialists cannot deny this. Like ours, this also is an 
impeccable observation, simply a fact about speakers. But here is where sententialists may and 
should disagree with Church. From the datum, Church concludes: 
 
(CONCLUSION)  
Therefore, contrary to sententialism,  
Dave believes “Snow is white” 
cannot be a semantic analysis of  
Dave believes that snow is white. 
 
Leaving out again the notion of analysis, what Church concludes is that sententialism cannot be 
correct. Sententialism is the thesis that in both  
 
Dave believes that snow is white 
Dave believes “Snow is white” 
 
the sentence “Snow is white” is denoted. Thus, from what two utterances of two sentences 
convey, Church concludes what the denotations of the two other sentences are. Church’s argument 
has the following structure. There are two sentences whose utterances convey the same. 
Suppose these two sentences have the same denotations. Then take a third sentence whose 
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utterances convey the same as the first, and a fourth having the same denotations as the second. 
Since the third and the fourth are different in what their utterances convey, the first and the 
second sentences should have different denotations. But this, as we just saw, is a non sequitur. 
When it comes to quoted sentences, preservation of denotations and preservation of what is 
conveyed by uttering the sentences do not go together, as Church holds, but there is instead a 
trade-off: if you pick the denotation-preserving sentence, you pick one whose utterances convey 
something different, and vice versa. In picking the third and fourth sentences, as Church does, 
we end up with a sentence preserving denotations but whose utterances convey something 
different from the original ones, and a sentence whose utterances preserve what is conveyed by 
utterances of the original ones but having different denotations. It is therefore in accordance 
with, and not in opposition to, sententialism that these two sentences are such that their 
utterances convey something different, as they obviously do. Therefore the fact that  
 
Dave crede che la neve è bianca 
Dave crede “Snow is white” 
 
differ as to what their utterances convey does not show, contrary to what Church urges, that  
 
Dave believes that snow is white 
Dave believes “Snow is white” 
 
differ in their denotations. Instead, it is in perfect accordance with sententialists, who take on 
board the impeccable observation and so the claim that if denotations are preserved, what is 
conveyed is not. Therefore, in taking the impeccable observation into account, I think 
sententialists may well conclude, pace Church, that his argument is not, after all, a fatal objection.  
 
Before moving to Schiffer’s problem, we can note that in discussing, and defending, Church’s 
argument, Salmon (2001: 363-364. See also Salmon 1995/2007: 264-267) holds: 
 
 
the main point of the Church Translation Argument is ... The ‘that’-clause in English expressions 
like  
 
Chris believes that the earth is round  
 
... carries with it a special way of conceptualizing the content of the sentence following ‘that’, an 
identifying way of thinking of the proposition which constitutes acquaintance rather than mere 





It is not clear what ‘acquaintance’ should be taken to mean here. But, apart from this, 
sententialists in fact have the resources to hold that, however acquaintance is exactly to be 
defined, it is also the case that a hearer of a propositional attitude sentence gets acquainted with 
the content of the attitude. For as we saw in §2.3, even though, according to sententialism, 
‘that’-clauses and marks of pure quotation are both devices for denoting sentences, sententialists 
can recognize that they are different devices. In particular, a complement clause typically cannot 
be in a language different from the language of the whole sentence. Thus typically in English, 
after the ‘that’ we have an English sentence. Even if according to sententialism ‘that’-clauses 
denote sentences and not contents, that denoted sentence therefore belongs to a language 
known to the hearer of the English attribution. The content is always there as a free lunch for 
the hearer, a lunch that is usually immediately devoured, willy-nilly. Thus, contrary to what 
Salmon holds, sententialists can hold that ‘that’-clauses carry with them a special way of conceptualizing 
the content of the sentence following ‘that’, in that they always make such a content available to be 
devoured. As we will see, these considerations will be relevant also in discussing Schiffer’s 







3.3      ON SCHIFFER’S PROBLEM 
 
Schiffer’s (1987: 133-135; 1990: 245; 2003: 47; 2008: 289) primary polemical target is Davidson’s 
paratactic account (1968). The account suggested here does not endorse the paratactic aspect of 
Davidson’s account. For while according to the account suggested here, it follows from 
 
(ST) ‘That’-clauses are singular terms, 
 




sentences in indirect discourse, as it happens, wear their logical form on their sleeves (except for 
one small point). They consist of an expression referring to a speaker, the two-place predicate 
‘said’, and a demonstrative referring to an utterance. Period. What follows gives the content of the 





Thus according to Davidson 
 
Dave believes that snow is white 
 
is to be taken as tantamount to 
 
Dave believes that. Snow is white. 
 
This account is obviously subject to the objections seen in §1.2.1, and we have concluded that, if 
possible, it is better not to endorse an account like this.  
 
But like Church, Schiffer also explicitly considers his problem as able to infect any kind of 
sententialism (2008: 289), so the account suggested here also needs to face it. Setting aside any 
reference to the paratactic aspect of Davidson’s proposal, the problem we now need to face 





According to sententialism, in both  
Dave believes that snow is white 
Dave believes “Snow is white” 
the sentence “Snow is white” is denoted, and in both it is said that Dave believes it. Thus for 
sententialists knowing what the first asserts can require nothing more and nothing less than 
knowing what the second asserts;  
 
(S2)  
Sententialists are then forced to hold that if 
Zoltan knows that Dave believes “Snow is white” 
is true, so is 
Zoltan knows that Dave believes that snow is white; 
 
(S3)  
If Zoltan is a monolingual speaker of Hungarian and is only told that Dave believes the 
English sentence “Snow is white”,  
Zoltan knows that Dave believes “Snow is white” 
is true. According to sententialism so is 




Zoltan does not understand the English sentence, thus according to sententialism  
Zoltan knows that Dave believes that snow is white 
can be true even if Zoltan does not know what Dave believes, the content of his belief; 
 
(DATUM)  
One cannot know the assertion made, the truth stated, by  
Dave believes that snow is white 
without knowing what Dave believes, the content of his belief; 
  
(CONCLUSION)  
Sententialism is false, since it is in conflict with the datum. 
 
Before presenting what I think is the best solution sententialists can offer for the problem, we 
should note that when presenting his problem, Schiffer always phrases his datum in the way just 
seen (1987: 133; 1990: 245; 2003: 47; 2008: 289): one cannot know the assertion made, the truth 
stated, by  
 
Dave believes that snow is white 
 
without knowing what Dave believes, the content of his belief. I think it should be recognized that 
it is far from obvious what this convoluted sentence means and how to rephrase it in a less 
convoluted way. For example, it is not obvious what knowing the content means. Sainsbury (2002: 
189), for example, holds that knowledge of meaning is a form of knowledge-how and is 
tantamount to being able to answer to the question “What does it mean?”. One might hold that 
knowing what Dave believes is being able to answer the question “What does he believe?”, and 
Schiffer does not show what an adequate answer would be; but this is obviously crucially at 
stake in the problem. For Zoltan is able to provide the following answer: 
 
Dave believes something that we can represent with “Snow is white”. 
 
Why is this inadequate, as an answer? Schiffer does not say. Moreover, there is a worry that in 
spelling it out differently, the datum would make the problem question-begging: is Schiffer 
holding that in asserting  
 




the content of Dave’s belief is denoted? If this is the case, then the problem is assuming what it 
is trying to show: the problem is in fact designed to show that sententialism, according to which 
content is not denoted, is false. Another less convoluted formulation of something similar to 
Schiffer’s datum can be found in Recanati (2000: 10): “One cannot entertain the thought that 
John believes that grass is green without entertaining the thought that grass is green”. Baldwin 
(1990: 198) also holds something that goes in the same direction: “Anyone who understands the 
sentence ‘Brutus believes that Caesar is dead’ must understand the sentence ‘Caesar is dead’”. Is 
Schiffer holding what Recanati or Baldwin hold? I do not think it is clear. These seem to me 
serious issues for the problem, but I will leave them aside. Since it is the worst case for 
sententialists, I will assume that Schiffer’s problem is not question-begging and that the datum it 
relies on is not to be simply dismissed.  
 
So how can sententialists solve the problem, without calling the datum into question? Clearly, 
Church’s argument and Schiffer’s problem are tightly connected. Nevertheless, they rely on 
different assumptions and so answering the two criticisms amounts to discussing different 
theses. Still, I suggest, sententialists may also answer this problem by exploiting the observation 
seen above about language and speakers. Nonetheless, while sententialists are able to simply 
deny that in Church’s argument the conclusion follows from the premises, for Schiffer’s 
problem, as we will immediately see, sententialists need instead to build a more sophisticated 
answer, which is composed of of various steps. We will see each in detail below, but let us start 
with a sketch. Schiffer takes the monolingual speaker of Hungarian, Zoltan, to show that 
according to sententialism it is possible to know that Dave believes that snow is white without 
knowing the content of Dave’s belief. I think that full-hearted sententialists are forced to admit 
that Schiffer is right on this. Sententialists can nonetheless show that, contrary to what Schiffer 
thinks, this is a surmountable problem. First of all, in fact, they can show that it is an exotic case, 
which has no bearing on the usual sentences we use, in the various natural languages, to speak 
about other subjects’ attitudes. But this is still not a fully satisfactory answer. For whatever 
happens with natural languages, one may still take Zoltan as showing that holding that 
propositions are denoted in propositional attitude sentences is better off than holding that 
sentences are denoted. But sententialists have a reply here as well. They may show that either 
propositionalists also fall victim to Schiffer’s problem, or they need to face, so to say, their own 
problematic case, i.e. the ignorant of particle physics but enthusiastic Luisa. And then 
sententialists may well say that propositionalism does not look such a better option than 








Sententialists are forced to hold that if 
Zoltan knows that Dave believes “Snow is white” 
is true, so is 
Zoltan knows that Dave believes that snow is white, 
 
sententialists are forced to hold that the sentences  
 
Zoltan knows that Dave believes that snow is white  
Zoltan knows that Dave believes “Snow is white” 
 
have the same truth-conditions. From this, as Schiffer shows with his case of the Hungarian 
monolingual Zoltan, it follows that sententialism is in conflict with the following datum  
 
(DATUM)  
One cannot know the assertion made, the truth stated, by  
Dave believes that snow is white 
without knowing what Dave believes, the content of his belief 
 
A sententialist may then try to deny that she is forced to hold that  
 
Zoltan knows that Dave believes that snow is white  
Zoltan knows that Dave believes “Snow is white” 
 
have the same truth-conditions, and this is in fact exactly what Higginbotham (2006) suggested. 
But I think that solving the problem in this way constitutes a departure from sententialism, and 
not a defence of it. According to Higginbotham, 
  
Zoltan knows that Dave believes that snow is white  
 
is true iff there is something Zoltan knows which matches in content with  
 








is true iff there is something Zoltan knows which matches in content with  
 
Dave believes “Snow is white”.  
 
Thus, he maintains, in order for the two attributions concerning Zoltan to have the same truth-
conditions,  
 
Dave believes that snow is white 
Dave believes “Snow is white” 
 
should match in content, but, he argues, they do not, “because the relation of content-matching 
intervenes, and distinguishes (as it should)” (2006: 111). Higginbotham does not define the 
relation of matching in content, but it seems to me that any definition according to which the two 
sentences do not match in content counts as a departure from sententialism. As Schiffer remarks,  
 
(S1)  
According to sententialism, in both  
Dave believes that snow is white 
Dave believes “Snow is white” 
the sentence “Snow is white” is denoted, and in both it is said that Dave believes it. Thus for 
sententialists knowing what the first asserts can require nothing more and nothing less than 
knowing what the second asserts. 
 
Thus full-hearted sententialists are forced to say that knowing what  
 
Dave believes that snow is white 
 
asserts can require nothing more and nothing less than knowing what  
 
Dave believes “Snow is white” 
 
asserts.37 Full-hearted sententialists should then agree with Schiffer on (S1) and then on  
                                                          
37 Ludwig 2014 has similarly recently suggested a non-full-hearted sententialism: he remarks that “[‘that 
snow is white’] refers to a sentence but its semantic function is not exhausted by the fact that it refers to 
[‘Snow is white’] as in the case of the classical account of quotation names” (2014: 744). I instead consider 
sententialism as the thesis that, semantically, the that-clause ‘that snow is white’ simply denotes the 
sentence “Snow is white”. I think this is an advantage. What would the semantic difference be? Ludwig 
only remarks that “[o]ne can understand a quotation name without understanding the expression it 
names. However, one cannot understand the noun phrase [‘that snow is white’] unless one understands 




Zoltan does not understand the English sentence, thus according to sententialism  
Zoltan knows that Dave believes that snow is white 
can be true even if Zoltan does not know what Dave believes, the content of his belief. 
 
Schiffer urged that his problem shows that no sententialist account can be correct (1987: 111; 
1990: 244) or, more mildly later on, he maintained that he seriously doubts that his problem is 
surmountable (2003: 47). But sententialists can show that they may surmount it in the following 
way.  
 
Propositional attitude sentences belonging to the various natural languages are used by the 
speakers of those languages in order to speak about attitudes and the contents of those attitudes. 
This certainly seems a datum. But this datum is perfectly accounted for by sententialists, as soon 
as we take on board the impeccable observation that speakers of a language, or plain people, as 
Schiffer call them (1987: 137), typically understand its sentences. According to propositionalism, 
when provided with utterances of sentences like 
  
Dave believes that snow is white  
Zoltan knows that Dave believes that snow is white  
 
English speakers know the contents of the ascribed attitudes because those contents are 
denoted. According to sententialists, instead, those contents are conveyed without being 
denoted. The denoted sentences are understood because they belong to the very language of the 
reports, thus to the language known to the speaker. This, as we have already seen, is what 
typically happens with propositional attitude sentences belonging to our natural languages: 
typically, a complement clause belongs to the language of the whole sentence. Thus typically we 
speak about a subject’s attitude in a way that allows the free lunch understanding of the content of 
that attitude. Sententialism is a theory about the semantics of English, in whose propositional 
attitude sentences, typically, English ‘that’-clauses occur. Thus sententialists may take Schiffer’s 
problem as not a serious one in that it concerns an exotic case, which has no bearing on what 
happens with the usual sentences we use in English to speak about other subjects’ attitudes.   
 
But this defence may not be enough. A propositionalist would still be unsatisfied. According to 
propositionalism, if we know the truth stated by  
                                                                                                                                                                    
semantically that the denotation should be understood. Of course, given our impeccable observation, more 
may be conveyed to her. But this is exactly what happens also with pure quotation: English speakers 




Dave believes that snow is white  
  
we always know the content of Dave’s belief. Thus, even if the usual natural language sentences 
do not lead to a conflict between sententialism and knowledge of the content of the attitude, 
still Zoltan shows, however exotic a case it is, that in this case sententialism does indeed lead to 
a conflict. So propositionalists may still claim, given Zoltan, to have a better account.  
 
I think that here sententialists should react as follows. Obviously, Schiffer’s problem can 
support the claim that propositionalism is a better account only if propositionalism does not 
itself fall victim to a similar problem. But then propositionalists need to put some constraints on 
the notion of grasping a proposition. Propositionalists take  
 
Dave believes that snow is white  
 
as denoting the proposition that snow is white. For them, propositions are contents, and in 
knowing the truth stated by the sentence we know the content of Dave’s belief, i.e., as 
propositionalists usually put it, we grasp that proposition. Unfortunately, Schiffer does not develop 
these notions, limiting himself to stating that knowing what Dave believes includes, firstly, 
knowing that he has a belief that is true if, and only if, snow is white and, secondly, knowing 
that it is about snow and whiteness (1987: 133; 2008: 289). This does not help much: what is it 
for a content to be about something?  
 
But, luckily, there is no need to spell all these notions out. For it suffices to notice that with the 
aim in view of claiming that propositionalism is better than sententialism, propositionalism 
cannot be combined with so-called consumerism. According to consumerism, as Kaplan (1989: 
603-604) puts it, 
 
 
we can acquire meanings through the instrument of language ... we succeed in thinking about things 
in the world not only through the mental residue of that which we ourselves experience, but also 
vicariously, through the symbolic resources that come to us through our language. It is the latter – 
vocabulary power – that gives us our apprehensive advantage over the nonlinguistic animals. My dog, 
being color-blind, cannot entertain the thought that I am wearing a red shirt. But my color-blind 
colleague can entertain even the thought that Aristotle wore a red shirt. 
  
 





It is even possible, indeed it is common, to have a substance concept entirely through the medium 
of language, that is, in the absence of any ability to recognize the substance in the flesh. For most 
of us, that is how we have a concept of Aristotle, of molybdenum, and, say, of African dormice. 
There, I just handed you a concept of African dormice, in case you had none before. 
 
 
Now imagine this scenario: Luisa is an English speaker and, like many of us, has no idea what 
particle physics is. She is now listening to a conference delivered by Professor Higgs. Higgs has 
just said the following: 
 
The Standard Model of particle physics rests on the existence of the Higgs boson.  
 
According to consumerism, Luisa may, although vicariously, grasp the proposition that the 
Standard Model of particle physics rests on the existence of the Higgs boson. But, if that is so, why cannot 
the English sentence “Snow is white” do the same job for Zoltan, the monolingual speaker of 
Hungarian, as what Higgs just said does for Luisa? There seem to be no good reasons why we 
can vicariously grasp a proposition only if the symbols belong to a language we generally 
understand, but not when it comes to the relevant symbols (Mercier 1994: 504-506). Thus if 
Higgs’s utterance can work for Luisa, the English sentence can work for Zoltan too. Therefore, 
if consumerism is endorsed, even according to propositionalism Zoltan, in knowing that Dave 
believes the proposition expressed by the sentence “Snow is white” can, even if vicariously, 
grasp the proposition that snow is white and thus know what Dave believes. Zoltan is therefore 
a point in favour of propositionalism only if propositionalists discard consumerism.  
 
May propositionalists simply reject consumerism? There is no need to establish here whether 
consumerism is correct. For it seems that even if consumerism is rejected, propositionalism is 
not in a better position than sententialism. For let us see what happens if consumerism is 
rejected. If consumerism is rejected, Luisa cannot grasp the proposition that the Standard Model of 
particle physics rests on the existence of the Higgs boson vicariously. But there seems to be no other way 
in which she can grasp it. She does not know anything about particle physics, and for her 
Higgs’s words are but empty placeholders. However the notion of grasping a proposition is to be 
exactly cashed out, if consumerism is rejected Luisa does not grasp the proposition expressed by 
Higgs’s words. But then the following sentence uttered by Luisa herself, 
 
Luisa: I think that Higgs believes that the Standard Model of particle physics rests on the 
existence of the Higgs boson, 
 
becomes problematic. Luisa is listening to Higgs, and she takes him as sincere and so thinks that 
Higgs believes what he said. He said that the Standard Model of particle physics rests on the 
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existence of the Higgs boson, and thus the self-attribution seems true.38 But Luisa cannot grasp 
the proposition that Higgs believes that the Standard Model of particle physics rests on the existence of the 
Higgs boson, because, if consumerism is rejected, she does not grasp it, in that she does not grasp 
the proposition that the Standard Model of particle physics rests on the existence of the Higgs boson. If 
propositionalists here say that it is possible to grasp a proposition about another proposition 
without grasping the latter, then Zoltan looms again: even if Zoltan does not grasp the 
proposition that snow is white, he can grasp the proposition that Dave believes that snow is white and 
thereby know what Dave believes. So, if propositionalists avoid Zoltan, the following 
 
Luisa: I think that Higgs believes that the Standard Model of particle physics rests on the 
existence of the Higgs boson  
 
comes out false.  
 
What is Luisa thinking, then? A propositionalist may say that since Luisa does not grasp the 
proposition, Luisa’s belief is a case of metalinguistic thought (Donnellan 1993: 165-168; Sperber 
1985: 49-59), i.e. that her true self-attribution is actually tantamount to something like  
 
Luisa: I think that Higgs believes that “the Standard Model of particle physics rests on the 
existence of the Higgs boson”.  
 
But if propositionalists allow for some ascriptions to be metalinguistic, there seem to be other 
difficulties: what exactly is the relation between a metalinguistic belief and the corresponding 
non-metalinguistic one? Take Luisa again. During the conference, she is intrigued by what Higgs 
says. She wants to discover herself whether Higgs is right, and so she decides to study physics. 
                                                          
38 This example relies on what Luisa can think Higgs believes, not on what Luisa believes about the 
Standard Model of particle physics. But one can venture even further by relying on the notion of knowledge 
by testimony. For example, Pap 1949: 53, f. 1 asks “Why could I not … ‘know’ that the various analyses 
contained in a dictionary are correct, viz. by inference from the semantic erudition of the dictionary 
maker?”. The example I employ is weaker, since one can hold that Luisa can think that Higgs believes that 
the Standard Model of particle physics rests on the existence of the Higgs boson, while holding that for 
her to believe something about particle physics something else that what she heard is needed.  
In discussing Schiffer’s problem, Lepore & Lower 1989 suggest a solution along the following lines: 
taking an utterance of a sentence like 
Higgs believes that the Standard Model of particle physics rests on the existence of the Higgs boson 
as uttered by Luisa, they say that “[t]here seems to us to be nothing preventing all of [Luisa]’s utterances 
from being true, contrary to the assumption that underlies the objection” (351-352). Even if their answer 
to the problem may be taken to go in same direction as the answer suggested here, there is a crucial 
difference: they argue that Luisa’s report can be true even if she does not know the content of the belief. 
Thus according to them Schiffer’s objection relies on the thesis that a report cannot be true if the reporter 
does not know the content of the attitude reported. This is not how I interpret Schiffer. I think the thesis 
they discuss is too obviously false – what Luisa knows makes no difference to what Higgs believes! – to 
take Schiffer to rely on it. I take Schiffer as holding the much more plausible thesis that the truth stated by 
a report cannot be known by a subject if she does not know the content of the attitude reported. 
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Now years have passed since Higgs’s conference, and Luisa is now an expert on particle physics. 
Sententialism can explain what happened as follows: at the conference, Luisa takes “The 
Standard Model of particle physics rests on the existence of the Higgs boson” as a 
representation of a belief of Higgs’s. According to sententialism, this is nothing but for her to be 
in a position to say  
 
Luisa: I think that Higgs believes that the Standard Model of particle physics rests on the 
existence of the Higgs boson 
 
so that the self-attribution is true.39 Surely, at the conference, “The Standard Model of particle 
physics rests on the existence of the Higgs boson” conveyed virtually nothing to Luisa. But 
since that time she had more conveyed to her, and now that sentence perfectly conveys to her 
the content of Higgs’s belief. She thus spent her career in understanding the sentence better and 
better, and the more she understood, the better she knew what Higgs believes.  
 
Propositionalists who reject consumerism need to explain what happened to Luisa differently. 
According to them, it seems, Luisa at the conference formed a metalinguistic thought. But she is 
now an expert on bosons so that she now presumably has a full grasp of the proposition that the 
Standard Model of particle physics rests on the existence of the Higgs boson. So there are two beliefs, one 
metalinguistic and the other propositional, and Luisa moved from the one to the other. But 
when exactly did that happen, when did she acquire the propositional belief? It seems 
impossible to find any non-arbitrary answer (Recanati 2000: 270-285). This lack of a candidate 
for the point at which the new belief is acquired seems a strong signal that Luisa did not actually 
change attitude at all, but formed a thought at the conference, and kept on simply retaining it, 
while understanding things better and better. In fact, she would probably say  
 
Luisa: Since that conference I have thought that Higgs believes that the Standard Model of 
particle physics rests on the existence of the Higgs boson. That was actually the reason why I 
decided to become a physicist 
 
and we would take her as correct. That the attitude was always the same can be held by both 
sententialists and consumerists, but not by propositionalists who reject consumerism. Thus, if 
propositionalists are safe from Zoltan, they are not safe from Luisa. 
                                                          
39 One can even add that also our attribution 
Luisa thinks that Higgs believes that the Standard Model of particle physics rests on the existence of the 
Higgs boson 
is true, but that would require us to be able to use “Higgs believes that the Standard Model of particle 
physics rests on the existence of the Higgs boson” to represent a belief of Luisa, and that is less obvious. 




Propositionalism, therefore, does not seem to be in a better position than the one sententialism 
is in. It is true that sententialists need to face Zoltan, but having Zoltan who knows nothing 
about what a subject believes allows us to explain what gradually happened to Luisa. This seems 
welcome, especially considering that sentences like those Luisa would utter belong to the way in 
which we usually speak, in our natural languages, about what we believe. There is also another 
reason for why the case of Luisa does not seem exotic at all: for all of us there are so many 
territories in which we are just like her.  
 
This is, I think, a fully adequate answer to Schiffer’s problem.40 Also in this answer, a crucial role 
is played by the impeccable observation that speakers understand the sentences they can 
understand, even if not used. As I will immediately show, this impeccable observation is a useful 







3.4      BACH’S MYSTERY AND INDEXICALS 
 
So far, we have not considered the behaviour of indexicals and pronouns in propositional 
attitude sentences, and so we still need to assess two problems that these bits of language are 
taken to create for a sententialist account: the problem, pointed out by Bach (1997:218), that if 
we embrace sententialism it becomes mysterious how the denotations of some anaphoric 
pronouns are secured, and, second, the problem that indexicals seem to show that words 
occurring in ‘that’-clauses are used, contrary to sententialism. Let us start from Bach’s mystery.    
   
 
 
                                                          
40 Ludwig 2014 likewise suggests we answer Schiffer’s problem by showing that propositionalism is no 
better off. Ludwig holds that propositionalists also have to face Zoltan because according to them if  
Zoltan knows that Pierre believes Dthat the proposition expressed by “Snow is white” 
is true, so is  
Zoltan knows that Pierre believes that snow is white. 
But a propositionalist may answer that the two terms that follow ‘believes’, although co-denotational, do 
not make the same contribution in the propositions expressed by what follow ‘knows’, so that in the two 
Zoltan is related to different propositions, and he may well know one but not the other. The easiest way 
of holding this is to go Fregean: propositions are made of senses, not references, and the senses are 
different. Unfortunately, Ludwig 2014: 749 admits that he does not have knockdown arguments against 
this propositionalist account. I think that, in order to discard the possibility that propositionalism is better 
than sententialism, we should also rely, as I do in my answer, on the case of Luisa, which seems 
problematic for propositionalists, no matter whether senses or other propositionalist strategies solve 
Zoltan.    
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3.4.1   ON BACH’S MYSTERY 
According to Bach (1997: 218), sentences like 
 
Immediately after Emanuel realized that Laura was not at home, she arrived 
 
create a problem for sententialism, because how the denotation of ‘she’ is secured becomes 
“something of a mystery” (1997: 218). Making all the assumptions explicit, the problem raised 





The pronoun ‘she’ occurring in  
Immediately after Emanuel realized that Laura was not at home, she arrived 
is anaphoric for ‘Laura’: it denotes what ‘Laura’ denotes 
 
(B2)  
According to sententialism, ‘Laura’ does not denote Laura  
 
(CONCLUSION)  
Sententialism makes it mysterious how ‘she’ can denote Laura.  
 
I think that sententialists may simply dismiss this problem. They have a very cheap answer. They 
may start by saying that in general it is not clear what anaphora is. Anaphora may be 
characterized as the phenomenon whereby “an occurrence of an expression has its referent 
supplied by an occurrence of some other expression” (King 2013). Although this 
characterization may provide us with an intuitive grasp of the phenomenon, it is clear that at a 
closer look it is at best just a rough characterization: what is it for an occurrence of one term to 
supply reference for the occurrence of another term? Allowing themselves to use this sloppy 
terminology for the sake of argument, sententialists may say that if anaphora is so characterized, 
then it is not sententialism that is responsible for the mystery, for there are endless other cases 
similar in the relevant respect which do not involve propositional attitude sentences (Sainsbury 
2005: 128). One case of what is usually called sloppy anaphora is the following:  
 
A mosquito is buzzing around our room. In fact there are hundreds of them. They are annoying. 
 
Even if ‘a mosquito’, ‘them’ and ‘they’ are not, and indeed cannot, be co-denotational, it is 
nonetheless clear that ‘a mosquito’ may be taken to supply reference for ‘they’, or, as Lewis (1979: 
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350) puts it, to pave the way for referring expressions that follow, and this is all the anaphoric 
phenomenon is supposed to be about. How it works that ‘they’ has denotation so supplied is no 
less mysterious than how in 
  
Immediately after Emanuel realized that Laura was not at home, she arrived 
 
‘she’ may denote Laura even if ‘Laura’ and ‘she’ are not co-denotational.  
 
I take this as a proper answer to Bach’s mystery. But I also think that sententialists may provide 
a more engaging answer, in which they do not limit themselves to showing other mysteries, but 
try to make the mystery a bit less esoteric. Bach’s problem may be rephrased as follows, with the 
help of a comparison: whatever exactly anaphora is, in both the following sentences, 
 
Immediately after Emanuel realized that Laura was not at home, she arrived,  
When Baptiste woke up, Laura was not at home, but she arrived immediately after 
 
‘she’ seems to denote Laura on the basis of the same mechanism. The most intuitive way to 
explain how ‘she’ denotes Laura is to hold, in accordance with 
 
(B1)  
The pronoun ‘she’ occurring in  
Immediately after Emanuel realized that Laura was not at home, she arrived 
is anaphoric for ‘Laura’: it denotes what ‘Laura’ denotes, 
  
that in both sentences the following mechanism is at work: ‘she’ denotes Laura because it is 
somehow semantically encoded in the sentences that the pronoun denotes whatever the name 
‘Laura’ denotes; ‘Laura’ denotes Laura, and this is why ‘she’ denotes Laura as well. As Bach 
notices in  
 
(B2)  
According to sententialism, ‘Laura’ does not denote Laura,  
 
this homogeneous explanation is clearly not available to sententialists. For they cannot maintain 
that in  
 




‘Laura’ denotes Laura, since denying that is part of what sententialism amounts to. Thus 
sententialists need to provide a different explanation. This is what I think the alternative 
sententialist explanation may look like. Sententialists may again appeal to the impeccable 
observation that speakers of a language typically understand words and sentences of that 
language, and hold that the fact that Laura is the denotation of ‘she’ in  
 
Immediately after Emanuel realized that Laura was not at home, she arrived 
 
should be explained in the same way in which the denotation of an obviously non-anaphoric 
occurrence of ‘she’ is usually explained. Leaving aside problematic cases, such as those in which 
no female or too many females are salient, in a usual case of a non-anaphoric ‘she’, the pronoun 




uttered in isolation in a context in which Laura has been pointed to, the context provides us 
with the denotation of the pronoun: ‘she’ denotes Laura because she is the salient woman in the 
context. For a sententialist this is also what happens with 
 
Immediately after Emanuel realized that Laura was not at home, she arrived. 
 
The pronoun ‘she’ semantically denotes, as usual, the salient woman in the context. Things are 
salient in a context for many different reasons. A speaker may point to something, something 
may simply be the only thing around of the right kind. Also what has been said has a role here. 




to denote her again, and the hearer will, in the normal cases, understand this. But denoting is 
actually not necessary: even if the speaker merely mentions the name ‘Laura’, she may 
nonetheless take for granted that for a hearer this is not just a cluster of meaningless sounds. 




to denote Laura, even if Laura has not been previously denoted. When the hearer listens to the 




Immediately after Emanuel realized that Laura was not at home, she arrived, 
 
she has already listened to the sentence “Laura was not at home”. Since she immediately 
understood the sentence, she understood the name ‘Laura’ as if it were used. For her, whoever 
the name ‘Laura’ would have denoted in isolation is salient.41 Since ‘she’, as usual, semantically 
denotes the salient female in the context, for the hearer it therefore denotes whoever ‘Laura’ 
would denote in isolation, i.e. Laura.  
 
This is of course the simplest case. Things get more complicated when more than one female is 
salient, for different reasons. But it should be noted that with 
 
Immediately after Emanuel realized that Laura was not at home, she arrived, 
 
the salience of the woman called ‘Laura’ is always there, because the name ‘Laura’ occurs in that 
very sentence. Put differently, on this account there is no guarantee that ‘she’ denotes Laura, 
but, even so, according to this account ‘she’ can always denote Laura.42  
 
According to an answer like the one just sketched, the mechanisms by which ‘she’ denotes 
Laura in  
 
Immediately after Emanuel realized that Laura was not at home, she arrived 
When Baptiste woke up, Laura was not at home, but she arrived immediately after 
 
are different, since in the latter ‘Laura’ clearly does not occur as mentioned. But sententialists 
may provide an explanation of why, even if the mechanism is different, it may look as if the 
mechanism is the same. Even if ‘she’ is taken to behave similarly in  
                                                          
41 We may, moreover, note that exactly as the pure mention of a name may render the bearer of the name 
salient, so the use of a word may render the word salient. For example, if a speaker utters  
There are fewer rhinoceroses these days, 
the interlocutor may comment 
That is a difficult word to spell 
thereby referring to one of the words uttered by the speaker (Predelli 2005: 107).   
42 I think that sententialists can allow that ‘she’ might remain free to roam its surrounding in search of a target 
(Predelli 2013: 156), so that it can always denote some other girl other than Laura in every use of  
Immediately after Emanuel realized that Laura was not at home, she arrived, 
and can explain the difference between this example and 
She arrived 
uttered in isolation while pointing to Laura in term of the distinction between the information provided 
by the linguistic and the extra-linguistic aspects of the contexts. Nonetheless, it should be noted that 
sententialists may go a step further. They can hold that ‘she’, as it occurs in the example, is a pure 
indexical, but an obstinate one (Predelli 2013: 159-160) in that even though ‘she’ is not anaphoric, in every 
use of the sentence ‘Laura’ puts constraints on who is the (most) salient girl, and thereby puts constraints 
on the denotation of ‘she’. Given that every time it is used ‘Laura’ is understood even though quoted, it 
constrains ‘she’ to denote Laura, even though there is no semantic link between the two.        
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Immediately after Emanuel realized that Laura was not at home, she arrived 
She arrived 
 
uttered in isolation while pointing to Laura, an important difference is to be recognized: in the 
first sentence, as we have seen, it is what occurs explicitly in the sentence, and not some feature 
of the extra linguistic context, that makes the hearer understand what ‘she’ denotes. Thus there 
is a difference between  
 
Immediately after Emanuel realized that Laura was not at home, she arrived, 
When Baptiste woke up, Laura was not at home, but she arrived immediately after, 
 
because in the first there is no semantic or syntactic link between ‘Laura’ and ‘she’. But it is 
nonetheless still true, on the sententialist answer, that also in the first sentence ‘she’ usually 
depends for its denotation on ‘Laura’.  
 
I also think that this more engaging sententialist approach to Bach’s mystery should count as an 
adequate sententialist answer. But it is surely just a sketchy answer. Much more needs to be said 
about what context exactly is, and what it means for something to be salient. But it should be 
noted that these notions are complex and problematic in themselves, and the sententialist 
cannot be blamed because she did not spell them out in detail. Furthermore, if she is so blamed, 
she may well switch back to the dismissive answer, and explain that she will solve Bach’s 
problem when she is first provided with exact notions and a solution to all the other mysteries. 
As Bach (1997: 217) and Loar (1972: 49) remark, Fregeans also would have to face their 
counterpart of Bach’s mystery: if in  
 
Immediately after Emanuel realized that Laura was not at home, she arrived  
 
‘Laura’ denotes a sense, then how can ‘she’ denote Laura, and not a sense? Thus Bach’s 
anaphoric pronouns are a problem not just for sententialists, but also for some propositionalists. 
Moreover, a similar problem arises for any propositionalist that holds that only propositions are 
denoted in propositional attitude sentences. For how can we then account for something like  
 
Baptiste said that Laura was not at home, in so many words 
 
if words have not been previously denoted? Sententialists may then conclude that, however 
these and other mysterious examples are to be explained,  
 
Immediately after Emanuel realized that Laura was not at home, she arrived 
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3.4.2   INDEXICALS AND THE INTENDED DENOTATION 
According to the sententialist account developed in the previous chapter, in propositional 
attitude sentences a sentence is denoted and something like 
 
Olga believes that Cicero is smart 
 
is true if Olga believes something that we can represent with the sentence “Cicero is smart”. As 
we have seen, what a sentence can represent depends on what we are interested in representing, 
and therefore a sentence that is an apt tool for representation in one context may be an 
inadequate tool in another. Indexicals show very clearly another way in which aptness of 
representation depends on context. Take for example  
 
Olga believes that he is nice. 
 
According to the sententialist account we are suggesting, when I utter that Olga believes that he 
is nice, I am denoting a sentence in order to represent what Olga believes. Since a pronoun 
occurs in “He is nice”, the sentence in isolation expresses that the most salient man in the 
context is nice. Even though the sentence is denoted according to sententialism, and not used, it 
is still the case that what it expresses in isolation is conveyed, and this conveyed content clearly 
plays a role in establishing whether a sentence is an apt tool of representation. In the previous 
chapter, while discussing Frege’s and Kripke’s puzzles, we saw that what a sentence expresses is 
not all that matters when it comes to what the sentence can represent. But this does not mean 
that what the sentence would express in isolation does not matter at all. Thus a change of 
context, and therefore change of the salient man, implies a change in the representational 
aptness of  
 
He is nice. 
 
                                                          
43 For those who take quoted sentences as only mentioned, other mysteries are some old examples by 
Partee 1973: 412, such as 
Immediately after Emanuel shouted “Laura is not at home”, she arrived. 
Some might take these examples as able to show that quoted sentences are both mentioned and used. But, 
as I show in the main text, given the various mysteries of anaphoric denotation, and given that other 
explanations are available, it seems better not to take anaphora as a reliable guide to what and how many 
things are denoted by the antecedents of some pronouns. 
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All this seems straightforward, but in the literature it is possible to find objections to 




An account of truth for utterances that doesn’t see indexical reference as dependent on speaker’s 
reference can’t possibly provide an adequate basis for exploiting the speaker as a source of 
information about the states of affairs constituting the truth conditions of his utterances. But the 
sententialist can’t appeal to referring, since that relation essentially involves propositional attitudes, 
most notably intending. 
 
 
Schiffer holds that sententialists cannot rely on intentions. Then, he urges, according to 
sententialists a sentence like  
 
Olga believes that he is nice 
 
cannot be taken to provide us with the information that Olga believes something about, let us 
say, Baptiste. For the conveyed information that ‘he’ stands for Baptiste depends on the relevant 
intentions that ‘he’ be so taken. For sententialists, then, the attribution does not provide us with 
such information about Olga’s belief being about Baptiste, and therefore they lose some 
information about the states of affairs constituting the truth conditions of his utterances. Thus, Schiffer 
concludes, since it loses some information that we take propositional attitude sentences to 
provide us with, sententialism cannot be correct.  
 
I think that this objection might constitute a serious issue for a sententialist logic that is put 
forward with the aim of getting rid of the mind and of the intentions of the subjects. But, as we 
have seen, sententialism as an account of natural language is not necessarily combined with such 
a goal, and in fact it is much better for it to not be so combined. Thus, as Higginbotham (2006: 
113) observes, the objection “appears to burden sententialism with a program to which there is 
no commitment; namely, the program of doing away at a stroke with all that is non-sentential”. 
As we have seen, we in fact did not commit to such a programme, and there is every reason not 
to do so, apart from indexicals. As we saw when discussing Kripke’s puzzles, the account here 
suggested should not be seen as a reductive project, reducing intentions and the mind to mere 
bits of language, but should instead be seen as an account according to which words are also 
relevant in representing those minds and intentions.   
 
This objection dismissed, something still needs to be discussed that has to do with sententialism 
and indexicals. As we have already seen in §2.1.1, sententialists have the resources to see a 
difference between  
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Olga said: “Cicero is smart” 
Olga said that Cicero is smart. 
 
For they can hold, as is intuitively correct, that the first is true iff Olga uttered the very sentence 
“Cicero is smart”, which is then the direct object of saying, while for the second to be true it is 
not necessary that Olga uttered those very words, it being sufficient that she put into words 
something that can be represented by “Cicero is smart”. As we will see now, by relying on the idea 
that a sentence denoted by a ‘that’-clause should be taken to represent an attitude, sententialists 
can also explain the difference in the behaviour of indexicals in direct and indirect speech 
reports. Kaplan observes (1977: 510-511):  
 
 
There is a way to control an indexical, to keep it from taking primary scope, and even to refer it to 
another context (this amounts to changing its character). Use quotation marks. If we mention the 
indexical rather than use it, we can, of course, operate directly on it. Carnap once pointed out to me 
how important the difference between direct and indirect quotation is in  
 
Otto said “I am a fool” 
Otto said that I am a fool. 
 
 
According to sententialism, indexicals occurring within ‘that’-clauses are mentioned. Thus, in 
accordance with Kaplan, according to sententialism it would have to be possible for me to utter 
a propositional attitude sentence like  
 
Otto said that I am a fool, 
 
and not to denote myself. But in fact, even though according to sententialism ‘I’ does not 
denote either me or Otto, since it is merely quoted, still the attribution conveys that Otto said 
something about me, not about Otto. Why so? It seems that sententialists really need to come 
up with an explanation, because the worry here is that one might take the difference in the two 
sentences as able to show, in contrast with what sententialism claims, that in the second 
sentence indexicals (and so everything else) are used.  
 
Now, Quine (1960: 218) held that  
 
 
in indirect quotation we project ourselves into what, from his remarks and other indications, we 
imagine the speaker’s state of mind to have been, and then we say what, in our language, is natural 
and relevant for us in the state thus feigned ... Correspondingly for the other propositional 
attitudes, for all of them can be thought of as involving something like quotation of one’s own 
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imagined verbal response to an imagined situation. Casting our real selves thus in unreal roles, we 
do not generally know how much reality to hold constant. Quandaries arise.  
 
 
If Quine is right, quandaries arise indeed. Why is it that if I utter 
 
Otto said that I am a fool 
 
the attribution is systematically taken to convey something about my real self and not Otto, i.e. 
the subject we are dramatically taking the unreal role of? If I am an actor and I utter  
 
After the ghost of my father appears to me, I resolve to avenge his death, 
 
you may well take my utterance to be such that I am denoting not myself, but the character I am 
playing (Nunberg 1993: 21). Similarly, if I am lecturing on the Nicomachean Ethics in an 
introductory class and I utter  
 
I argued at length that one lives the best life by exercising both moral and intellectual virtues. 
And now I am suddenly advocating a rather different position, namely that the good life 
must be devoted solely to theoretical activity. Do you see a way out of this apparent 
inconsistency?, 
 
it seems hard to deny that you can take my utterance as a case of pretending to be Aristotle, and 
so take ‘I’ to denote not me, but Aristotle (Predelli 1998: 408). Again similarly, suppose that you 
insisted on fixing my car. You make a disaster and I comment 
 
Sure, I can do it! I can fix anything! And now, look what you’ve done! 
 
You can take my utterance of “I can do it! I can fix anything!” as a case of pretending to be you, 
and then ‘I’ does not denote me, but you (Predelli 1998: 408). 
 
Thus indexicals show that in uttering propositional attitude sentences we are not putting 
ourselves in somebody’s shoes, because something like 
 
Otto said that I am a fool 
 
always conveys that Otto said something about me, not Otto, and the shoes are then always 
mine. But in fact the sententialist account suggested here does not endorse Quine’s take on the 
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issue, and it can provide a good explanation of why I am intended to be the conveyed 
denotation of ‘I’ in  
 
Otto said that I am a fool. 
 
There are some cases in which, even if I utter ‘I’ and use it, it does not seem to denote me (and 
similar considerations hold for ‘here’ and ‘now’ for that matter). First of all, we have the cases of 
the actor, Aristotle and the fake car fixer seen above. Secondly, there is 
   
Condemned prisoner: I am traditionally allowed to order whatever I like for my last meal 
 
in which ‘I’ cannot denote me because the sentence seems true, but I am not traditionally 
allowed anything (Nunberg 1993: 20). Similarly, we have  
 
So Jane wants a puppy and they buy her this nice terrier. Now, if I have a dog, I should 
take good care of it, right? Well, now that she’s got one, Jane seems to be entirely 
uninterested in that poor thing.  
 
The sentence  
 
If I have a dog, I should take good care of it 
 
does not seem to express something about what I should do, but seems to express that, 
typically, someone who has a dog ought to take good care of it (Predelli 2004: 17). Then we 
have a version of the so-called answering machine paradox that involves ‘I’: let us suppose 
that you use a tape of me reading a message on your answer-phone. Clearly, it does not seem 
that every time the answering machine goes on it is said that I am not in your house 
(Corazza, Fish, Gorvett 2002: 12-13). Furthermore we have the following post-it case: 
suppose you are not in your office one day, and I notice that a number of students keep 
approaching your door and knocking. I then decide to write  
 
I am not here today 
 
on a post-it and attach it on your door. As Corazza, Fish and Gorvett (2002: 5) note, it seems 
strange to deny that ‘I’ denotes you, not me. Finally, we also have an array of other cases, which 
are less obviously cases in which ‘I’, as used by me, does not denote me. For example, we have 
 
I am parked out back 
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uttered to express that my car is parked out back,  
 
President: The Founders invested me with sole responsibility for appointing Supreme Court 
justices 
 
uttered to express that The Founders invested the president with sole responsibility for 
appointing Supreme Court justices, and the following verse from an old music-hall song about 
an elf, 
 
I'm quite as big for me, he said, as you are big for you, 
 
where ‘me’ seems to contribute not the utterer, i.e. the elf, but the property of being an elf 
(Nunberg 1993: 20-21).  
 
At least some of these examples seem uncontroversially cases in which I utter ‘I’ and still the 
denotation is not me. Now, however these cases have to be explained, it is clear that these cases 
are, although important, surely deviations from the norm (Predelli 2003: 131). They are marginal 
and isolated cases (Recanati 2000: 174), and it goes without saying that in most of the cases the 
contextual agent is the writer or speaker (Corazza, Fish, Gorvett 2002, 14). Moreover, as well as 
being marginal, there is also a reason why in these examples we should depart from the norm. 
As Predelli (2004: 15) remarks, there is an undeniable supremacy of the parameters in the 
context of utterance in normal situations, so that strong motivations are required in order to 
raise to salience a context distinct from the context of utterance. In order to depart from the 
norm that ‘I’ as used by me denotes me, we need something that makes it worth it.  
 
Let us then go back to  
 
Otto said “I am a fool” 
Otto said that I am a fool. 
 
According to sententialism, a sentence is denoted in both; and thus in both ‘I’ denotes ‘I’, a 
linguistic item, and the character of ‘I’ is therefore constant. Thus from the sententialist point of 
view, no shift in the parameters with respect to which the sentence is to be evaluated needs to 
be posited. But still, at the level of what is conveyed, the first conveys that Otto said something 
about himself, while the second conveys something about me. Why so? In  
 




the sentence denoted is the direct object of his saying. When we use a direct speech report, we 
do indeed talk as surrogate-speakers, and we put ourselves into Otto’s shoes and repeat what he 
said (Burge 1978b:146-147). We can even mimic the accent, the typical pose, the distinctive tone 
of voice. He uttered ‘I’, we repeat, and we utter ‘I’. We have no liberty with direct speech reports 
– we can only repeat. If he uttered the words “I am a fool”, he uttered something about himself, 
so ‘I’ is intended to convey Otto, not me. Here the shift at the level of what is conveyed is 
worth making: we want to repeat the exact words. But with  
 
Otto said that I am a fool 
 
we do not try to repeat Otto’s words, we do not pretend to be Otto, but we try to represent his 
attitudes. We have some liberty here in choosing our representative sentence, and there is no 
reason, at the level of what is conveyed, why we should shift the parameters with regard to 
which the sentence is to be evaluated. Since we are not trying to mimic Otto, the point of view 
that counts can still be ours, ours the shoes we are wearing. Since in the typical cases ‘I’ in my 
mouth denotes me, and since, moreover, we have no reason to depart from the norm, i.e. we 
have the liberty of not departing from the norm, we can use a sentence in which ‘I’ occurs to 
convey that the attitude is about me, and this will be understood by the hearer. To put this 
differently, of course we can imagine a language in which we use sentences in which ‘I’ occurs in 
order to represent what Olga believes about herself, or you, or bananas, for example, but this is 
not the way English works. Why is it the case that we do not denote a sentence in which ‘I’ 
occurs for beliefs about Olga, you or bananas? Simply because there is no need. Surely, in 
something like  
 
I think that I am usually allowed to order what I want for my last meal, 
 
the second ‘I’ might not convey me, but this has nothing to do with ‘to think’, and this is not the 
general case. According to sententialism, the general case is a case in which there is no departure 
from the norm either at the level of denotation or of what is conveyed: if I utter ‘I’, that ‘I’ 
denotes ‘I’ and conveys, in perfect accordance with the norm, me.44  
                                                          
44 Another departure from the norm concerning not ‘I’ but temporals is reported by Schlenker 2003: 64:  
John has told me repeatedly over the years that he was sick two days ago. 
According to Schlenker, ‘two days ago’ can be evaluated with respect to the context of the reported 
speech act but can also be interpreted with respect to the actual speech act. Schlenker holds, contrary to 
sententialism, that what occurs in those contexts is used and concludes from this and other examples that 
what occurs in those context systematically deviates from the norm. The other examples come from other 
languages, and in particular there is an example of the first person pronoun coming from Amharic. As 
Schlenker 2003: 31; 68-69 remarks, if the situation to be reported is 
John says: “I am a hero”. 
while in English we would use 
John says that he is a hero 
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Thus, sententialists can well hold that ‘I’ is mentioned even when it occurs in a ‘that’-clause, so 
that the denotation of ‘I’ is the same in   
 
Otto said “I am a fool” 
Otto said that I am a fool. 
 
And sententialists can still explain why what we have conveyed by the two sentences is different, 
i.e. why the first conveys that Otto said something about himself, while the second conveys that 
he said something about me. Sententialists can make room for cases in the middle, between 
direct and indirect reports, such as typical cases of parody (Sperber & Wilson 1981: 111). For 
example, exactly as you can say ironically,  
 
Sententialism is correct, 
 
mocking my tone of voice and my Italian accent, likewise you can say, ironically, again maybe 
while using my tone of voice and my accent  
 
We must conclude that sententialism is correct.  
  
Nonetheless, from the sententialist point of view, there is a crucial difference between direct and 
indirect speech reports. For sententialists, the difference depends on why we denote a sentence 
– to mimic or to represent – and not, as Kaplan suggests in the passage quoted above, on 
whether the sentence is used or mentioned. 
 
The fact that we have no liberty with direct speech reports – we can only mimic and repeat – 
but we have the liberty of choosing the sentence with propositional attitude sentences explains, 
from the point of view of sententialism, many other aspects of the difference between direct and 
indirect speech reports. For example, take formal addresses and the Italian report 
 
Warpe ha detto che Lei è simpatico, 
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
in Amharic we would use something whose literal translation is 
John says that I am a hero. 
If, as Schlenker urges, the Amharic and the temporals in English are genuine cases of indirect speech 
reports and not cases of direct reports, then from the sententialist perspective they show that there are 
languages and cases also in English in which there is a systematic shift. But, crucially, the shift is not at the 
level of denotations – ‘that’-clauses would still denote sentences – but at the level of what is conveyed. 
Thus sententialists can explain them quite easily, by holding that there is a departure from the norm, 
because there is a reason for it, whatever it is. Put differently, since nothing changes in the denotations, 
these cases are not particularly problematic for sententialists because, as Kaplan 1977: 510-511 remarks, 
“[i]f we mention the indexical rather than use it, we can, of course, operate directly on it.”     
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in which the formal ‘Lei’ occurs. As Predelli (2013: 87-88) notes, the choice between the formal 
and the informal does not depend on the relationship between Warpe and my addressee, but on 
my relationship with the addressee, i.e. I should not be familiar with him. Why? According to 
sententialism, this is the case because I could choose the sentence and my choice tells about my 
relationship with the addressee. The use of swear words can be similarly explained. Suppose 
Sam utters 
 
Stan won’t turn off his damn radio. 
 
Suppose, moreover, that I make the following report:  
 
Sam says that Stan won’t turn off his damn radio. 
 
As Bach (2006: 493-494) notes, my report is taken as expressing my own feeling about Stan’s 
radio. Sententialists can explain that this is the case because I could have chosen a sentence in 
which no swear word occurs, and having chosen one in which a swear word occurs indicates 
something about my feeling. Surely, sometimes we can use a swear word or a derogatory word 
and still the report will not be taken as expressing our feelings. These are a couple of examples 
discussed by Predelli (2013: 106-107): 
 
Racists believe that Italians are wops 
I am not prejudiced against Caucasians. But John, who is, thinks/claims that you are the 
worst honky he knows.  
 
According to Predelli and Bach, these examples should be taken as involving some form of 
quotation. Sententialist clearly cannot hold that in  
 
I am not prejudiced against Caucasians. But John, who is, thinks/claims that you are the 
worst honky he knows, 
 
but not in  
 
Sam says that Stan won’t turn off his damn radio, 
 
the ‘that’-clause is quotational. But the sententialist can explain the difference between these 




I am not prejudiced against Caucasians. But John, who is, thinks/claims that you are the 
worst honky he knows 
 
we are wearing John’s shoes, for whatever reason. Thus the radio case is to be assimilated to 
indirect speech reports, while John’s example is to be assimilated to direct ones.   
 
Going back to indexicals, I think we can then conclude that sententialists can perfectly explain 
both the mystery behind Bach’s pronouns and the difference between  
 
Otto said “I am a fool” 
Otto said that I am a fool, 
 
so that indexicals do not seem to threaten sententialists’ core thesis, i.e.  
 









Let us go back to the last chapter’s example of a representation of Olga’s preferences 
concerning the shapes of fruits. Depending on what we are interested in, in order to represent 
her preferences, we can use numbers for the different shapes, we can use colours, we can use 
bits of chalk and we can use shapes. If we use numbers, for example, our representation does 
not tell us anything about what shapes she likes: the representation tells us that Olga likes 2 
more than 3, so we know the structural relations between Olga’s preferences, but we know 
nothing about the kind of shape Olga actually prefers. Similarly, if we use shapes and we assign 
shapes randomly to polygons, we know that Olga prefers the dodecahedron to the triangle, so 
we know her hierarchy of preferences; but we do not know anything about what she likes. The 
situation is different when we match the shapes, in some way or other, to what can count as the 
most similar polygons. In this case, the representation allows us to understand not only the 
structural relations between Olga’s preferences, but also the kind of shapes Olga really prefers: 
we know that she likes things having a shape similar to a dodecahedron more than things having 
a shape similar to a triangle.  
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Now, according to sententialism’s third tenet, i.e. 
 
(S) ‘That’-clauses denote sentences, 
 
in propositional attitude sentences we denote a sentence. Moreover, as we have seen, according 
to the account we are here considering the sentence represents the attitude of the subject. We 
could have chosen sentences randomly, or on the basis of their length, or on the basis of how 
many vowels occur in them. But speakers understand the sentences they can understand, even 
though the sentences are merely mentioned, so the contents of the sentences are still there as a 
free lunch for the hearers, a lunch they usually cannot but devour. What, then, would be the point 




in order to represent a belief about snow, when we can choose a sentence about snow? Thus 
from the sententialist point of view in natural languages, we maximise the information provided 
by our representation by relying also on the meanings of the sentences we denote, meanings that 
would anyway be understood. Since, as we have seen, those sentences are understood, the 
situation is more similar to when we represent shapes with similar shapes than to when we 
randomly assign bits of chalk to those shapes. Because the sentences are understood, in using 
“Flamingos fly” for a belief about snow we would, first of all, lose the chance to represent as 
much as possible. Secondly, we would unnecessarily and systematically mislead the hearer who 
would have flamingos conveyed to her, even though we are speaking about a belief of Olga 
about snow. While we can imagine a language in which we assign sentences to attitudes 
depending merely on their length, this is not the way English works. In English, in denoting 
“Snow is white” to represent a belief of Dave, given that the hearer will understand the 
sentence, we enable her to know something about what Dave’s belief is really about, or, to use 
Schiffer’s phrases, to know that Dave has a belief that is true if, and only if, snow is white and, 
secondly, to know that it is about snow and whiteness (1987: 133; 2008: 289).  
 
Lying behind the objections seen in this chapter, most notably behind Church’s translation 
argument and Schiffer’s problem, there is the common assumption that sententialism makes 
contents disappear from propositional attitude sentences. But this assumption is false. 
Sententialism is an account of propositional attitude sentences in terms of language-dependent 
entities that have a content. But this does not mean that contents disappear or that they do not 
matter; rather, it is only that they are not denoted. In recognizing the impeccable observation 
that speakers of a language immediately understand sentences of that language, sententialists can 
answer all the objections that supposedly doom it. Whether or not it is to be considered as a 
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better account than propositionalism, I think we have to conclude that it is a viable alternative 
for accounting for sentences like  
 
Olga believes that Cicero is smart. 
 
Having rescued sententialism for propositional attitude sentences, in the next chapter we will 
move to the different battle field of wh-attributions, such as 
 













Some predicates of propositional attitude can be followed not just by ‘that’-clauses, but also by 
clauses that begin with one of the following – what, who, whom, which, whence, when, why, where, 
whither, how, whether – as in  
 
Jim knows what Rose told you  
Laura asked whom Rose invited 
George understood whether Rose will leave.  
 
Some of these strings are obviously ambiguous. Take for example  
 
Jim told me what Rose told you.  
 
As Vendler (1972: 94) puts it, there are ‘what’s and ‘what’s. In one of its readings, the string is 
equivalent to  
 
Jim told me that which Rose told you, 
 
where the pronoun begins a relative clause. On this reading, the string is true, for example, if 
Jim told me that Joseph is nice and Rose told you that Joseph is nice. On a second reading, on 
the other hand, the clause is interrogative, and the sentence is true, for example, if Rose told you 
that Joseph is nice and Jim told me that Rose told you that Joseph is nice. There are predicates 
that allow both readings, such as ‘to tell’ and ‘to know’. Even if it is much more natural to read 
‘to know’ as followed by an interrogative in   
 
I know what he told you, 
 
nonetheless, the two readings are there, and in something like  
 
I already knew what he just told you, 
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for example, the that which reading seems actually the most natural.45 Other predicates allow only 
one of the two readings. The predicate ‘to believe’, for example, allows only the that which 
reading: the sentence 
 
Jim believes what you said 
 
can only mean that Jim believes that which you said. On the other hand, in contemporary English 
‘to wonder’ allows only for the interrogative reading. The sentence  
 
Jim wonders what Rose told you, 
 
for example, only means that Jim wonders which are the things Rose told you, and something 
like   
 
Jim wonders that which Rose told you 
 
is in fact ungrammatical. There are some diagnostics that may help in understanding whether a 
clause is a genuine interrogative clause (Schaffer 2009: 488-489): according to a first diagnostic, 
only if the clause is genuinely interrogative can we add some particular idioms: ‘who’ may 
become ‘who the hell’, ‘what’ may become ‘what on earth’ and ‘when’ may become ‘when in 
tarnation’, etc. In fact,  
 
Jim told me what on earth Rose told you  
 
does not retain the that which meaning, and  
 
Jim wonders what on earth Rose told you  
 
is still perfectly fine. According to a second diagnostic, only if the clause is interrogative can we 
substitute multiple ‘wh’-constructions, like ‘what Rose told whom’. In fact,  
 
                                                          
45 Vendler 1972: 98; 1980: 278 holds that “twist as we might,  
[I know what he said] 
is not ambiguous” (1972: 98) and can only be read in the interrogative reading. Similarly, Vendler also 
holds that 
I know what you believe 
only has an interrogative reading. While I agree that this reading is much more natural, I do not see why 
the that which reading has to be considered as completely ruled out. This squares with the fact that the 
following, 
I am not coming to your speech, since I already know everything you will say,  
for example, is perfectly fine.   
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Jim told me what Rose told whom  
 
does not have a that which reading.46  
 
‘Wh’-clauses that pass the two diagnostics above are the topic of this chapter. As we have seen, 
according to the so-called face-value theory of propositional attitude sentences, i.e.  
  
(THE ALLEGEDLY FACE-VALUE THEORY)  
(RP) Propositional attitude predicates occurring in propositional attitude sentences designate 
relations; 
(ST) ‘That’-clauses are singular terms; 
(P) ‘That’-clauses denote propositions,  
 
in something like 
 
John believes that snow is white, 
 
the ‘that’-clause denotes the object of John’s belief and that object is a proposition. In the 
previous chapters, I suggested that embracing sententialism, i.e. holding  
 
(S) ‘That’-clauses denote sentences  
 
in place of (P), is a promising alternative way of completing theses (RP) and (ST). The purpose 
of this chapter is to see whether sententialism remains a viable alternative to the face-value 
theory when it comes to extending the two competing accounts to wh-attributions. 
 
I will start by considering whether we are justified in treating ‘that’- and ‘wh’-clauses 
homogeneously. I will show that although there is no compelling reason, the extension is 
natural, very plausible and methodologically welcome. I will then show that in extending the 
face-value theory to ‘wh’-clauses, those clauses denote answers, which are propositions. In 
                                                          
46 Schaffer 2009: 489 detects also another diagnostic, based on the idea that only ‘wh’-clauses can be 
changed into non-finite ‘wh’-clauses: from  
Jim understood what he needs to prove 
we may move to  
Jim understood what to prove.  
Since the two diagnostics in the main text are sufficient to establish whether a clause is interrogative, I will 
not engage in a discussion of ‘what to’, which is, at least prima facie, a different construction.  
We can note that the ambiguity between the interrogative and the that which readings is resolved in some 
languages. As Austin 1946: 168 remarks, in Latin for example the interrogative is rendered by ‘quid’, while 
the that which reading is rendered by ‘quod’. 
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extending sententialism, on the other hand, ‘wh’-clauses are best taken to denote indirect 
questions, which are linguistic items (§4.1). 
 
We will then see, firstly, that there are some good reasons to think that some ‘wh’-clauses 
denote questions and not propositions, and, secondly, that there are reasons to think that all 
‘wh’-clauses denote questions. Thus, we will conclude that when it comes to ‘wh’-clauses 
sententialism seems not just a viable alternative to the face-value theory, but actually a better one 
(§4.2). 
 
I will then discuss some classic problems concerning wh-attributions – the problem as to 
whether their truth-conditions are essentially contextual and the so-called problem of convergent 
knowledge – and I will show that while the problem of convergent knowledge constitutes a 
serious issue for propositionalists, from the sententialist point of view it can be easily and very 
naturally solved (§4.3). 
   
I will conclude that even if we are not forced to treat ‘wh’- and ‘that’-clauses homogeneously, 
the treatment of ‘wh’-clauses developed here gives us a reason to think that the version of 
sententialism for ‘that’-clauses suggested in the previous chapters may indeed not just be a 







4.1      EXTENDING THE ACCOUNTS TO WH-ATTRIBUTIONS  
 
Concerning ‘that’-clauses, both the face-value theory and sententialism share theses 
 
(RP) Propositional attitude predicates occurring in propositional attitude sentences designate 
relations; 
(ST) ‘That’-clauses are singular terms. 
 
Thus, for both accounts, treating ‘that’- and ‘wh’-clauses homogeneously means holding  
 
(RP’) Propositional attitude predicates occurring in wh-attributions designate relations; 




In order to see whether the extension is correct, we can start from these two theses that both 
accounts share. We will then see in §4.1.2 what, according to the two accounts, we should take 




4.1.1   UNIVOCITY OF THE PREDICATES AND ‘WH’-CLAUSES AS SINGULAR TERMS 
The easiest way to justify 
 
(RP’) Propositional attitude predicates occurring in wh-attributions designate relations 
 
is to show that the predicates that can be followed by both ‘that’- and ‘wh’-clauses retain the 
same meaning in both cases. Since, as we saw in Chapter 1, we have good reasons for endorsing  
 
(RP) Propositional attitude predicates occurring in propositional attitude sentences designate 
relations, 
 
if the predicates do not change meaning (RP’) also is indirectly justified. Schaffer (2007: 396), in 
fact, follows exactly this route and holds that there are three considerations that support the 
thesis that the predicates retain the same meanings when followed by ‘that’- and ‘wh’-clauses. 
Let us consider each in turn.  
 
According to Schaffer’s first point, the predicates are not ambiguous because ambiguity is a one-
off lexical accident while there are many predicates that can be followed by clauses of both kinds.47 
This consideration has some appeal to it: why would we have developed a language in which so 
many different predicates are ambiguous? But the consideration is far from conclusive. One may 
in fact deny that, in general, ambiguity is a one-off lexical accident and give a reason why we 
systematically use the same predicate. Take an at least not completely implausible theory 
according to which ‘book’ is ambiguous, having at least a token, a type, and a content meaning, 
as in, respectively, 
                                                          
47 Forgetting about clauses in their that which meaning and focusing on ‘that’- and ‘wh’-clauses, we have, 
firstly, predicates that cannot be combined with ‘wh’-clauses, such as ‘to assert’, ‘to assume’, ‘to hope’, ‘to 
insist’, ‘to think’. Secondly, there are predicates that can be followed only by ‘wh’-clauses, such as ‘to 
investigate’ and ‘to wonder’. Thirdly, we have predicates that can be combined with both kinds of 
constructions: ‘to ask’, ‘to determine’, ‘to discover’, ‘to forget’, ‘to indicate’, ‘to inform’, ‘to know’, ‘to 
learn’, ‘to mention’, ‘to notice’, ‘to predict’, ‘to recall’, ‘to remember’, ‘to remind’, ‘to show’, ‘to specify’, ‘to 
tell’. The predicate ‘to believe’ can be followed by ‘wh’-clauses in its negated idiomatic form, as in 
I cannot believe who came to the party 
I do not believe what I did.  
On this, see Belnap 1990: 16; Boër 1978: 312-315; 322; Karttunen 1977: 5-6; Vendler 1980: 284-287. See 
Égré 2008: 86 and Vendler 1980: 287-288 for the fact that the division of predicates in this way is cross-
linguistically well supported. 
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Take the book on the third shelf  
Due to the censorship, the book was burnt in every house 
The book inspired generations of English people.  
 
The fact that ‘dissertation’, ‘poem’ and ‘letter’ behave similarly is obviously unable to show that 
‘book’ cannot be ambiguous. One may well argue that the relation between the alleged different 
meanings is such that ambiguity is systematic. For example, one may hold that the type-token 
ambiguity is widespread across terms that denote objects subject to the type-token distinction 
exactly because a token is a token of a type and a type is a type of tokens, so that we use the 
same word for both the type and the token. Similarly, contra Schaffer, one may hold that a 
certain ambiguity is widespread across predicates having to do with psychological attitudes 
exactly because of the relations, whatever they are, between those attitudes.  
 
As for the second of Schaffer’s points, it is the classic translation test for ambiguity (see also 
Masto 2010: 402; Stanley 2011: 36-37). The datum is a strong and systematic one: ‘to know’ is 
translated in the same way when it is followed by either a ‘that’- or a ‘wh’-clause, and it is also 
translated in the same way in languages which distinguish between different predicates for the 
English ‘to know’. Let us take Italian as an example. As we have already seen in §1.1.6, the two 
English sentences 
 
Jim knows Rose 
Jim knows that Rose will come 
 
would be translated with different predicates: 
 
Jim conosce Rose 




Jim knows what time it is  
Jim knows that he promised to cook dinner tonight 
 
would be translated with the very same predicate ‘sapere’: 
 
Jim sa che ore sono 




The same happens with German and French. Thus Schaffer’s datum is strong and cross-
linguistically well supported. But, again, it seems unable to prove the univocity of ‘to know’ and 
other predicates once and for all. First of all, as we have already seen, we have again the general 
Quinean scepticism concerning the thesis that there is something like the translation of a 
sentence. Moreover, one may hold that for terms whose different meanings are connected in 
some way or other, it is because of these connections that the term is translated homogeneously, 
even if the term is ambiguous. Take for example ‘book’ again and the Italian ‘libro’. Apart from 
some idiomatic expressions in which ‘book’ occurs that would be translated without employing 
‘libro’ (nobody who cares about the Italian reader or listener would translate ‘not in my book’ as 
‘non nel mio libro’, in which the idiomatic meaning gets completely lost), the two words are 
homogeneously translatable with each other. In particular, as it occurs in the English sentences 
 
Take the book on the third shelf  
Due to the censorship, the book was burnt in every house 
The book inspired generations of English people, 
 
‘book’ can always be translated into Italian as ‘libro’: 
 
Prendi il libro sul terzo ripiano  
A causa della censura, il libro fu bruciato in ogni casa 
Il libro ha ispirato generazioni di inglesi.  
 
But this does not prove that ‘book’ is not ambiguous. One may in fact hold that the translation 
is homogeneous because the relations between the different meanings are so strong that every 
language uses the same term for all of those meanings to preserve exactly the explicit links 
between them.  
 
Finally, on to the third of Schaffer’s points, which is the classic zeugma test (see also Boër 1978: 
309-313; Groenendijk & Stokhof 1982: 185). The idea is that since in each of the following 
sentences, 
 
John knows that Peter has left for Paris, and whether Mary has gone with him 
I know what time it is, and that I promised to cook dinner, 
 
a single occurrence of ‘to know’ occurs, then the predicate should have the same meaning when 
followed by a ‘what’-, a ‘whether’- or a ‘that’-clause. As we have already seen in §1.1.6, this test 
does not seem completely reliable either. In particular, as we have seen, the acceptability of the 
conjunction seems to depend on the relations between the conjuncts. In the examples Schaffer 
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provides there is a clear relation between the conjuncts, and this may be the reason why the 
sentences are acceptable. In fact, a sentence like  
 
I know what I ate yesterday and that 2 plus 2 is four 
 
is a bit odd. On the other hand, I think we should recognize that   
 
I know that I ate cheese yesterday and that 2 plus 2 is four 
 
does not look completely fine either. In this sentence, the predicate arguably retains the same 
meaning because it is followed by clauses of the very same kind, but the sentence sounds fine 
only if we think about some special and unusual contexts, such as one in which I am asked to 
say randomly two things I know.  
 
All of the usual considerations for the univocity of the predicates that may be followed by both 
‘that’- and ‘wh’-clauses are thus disputable. Are the predicates ambiguous, then? They say that if 
it looks like a duck, swims like a duck, and quacks like a duck, then it is a duck. That is clearly 
false – it may well be a well-designed toy duck. But it may also be a duck, and its being a duck is 
the most natural explanation of why it looks like one, swims like one and quacks like one. Thus 
even if there are other explanations of the fact that many predicates may be followed by both 
‘that’- and ‘wh’-clauses, of the fact that ‘to know’ is translated homogeneously, and of the fact 
that we can coordinate across a conjunction, the simplest and most intuitive explanation is that 
the predicates do have the same meanings when followed by clauses of the two kinds. Schaffer 
takes his considerations to show that the two kinds of clause have to be treated homogeneously, 
but I think that we should instead hold that the positive result is weaker, relying on this being 
the simplest explanation, not on this being the explanation. Still, we should also recognize a 
stronger negative result: exactly because the predicates pass the translation test and the 
coordination across conjunction test, we really have no good reasons to introduce an 
ambiguity.48 In the absence of other independent reasons for taking the homogeneous account 
as incorrect, I think we had better assume the univocity of the predicates.  
 
Thus, since the predicates retain the same meaning when followed by ‘that’- or ‘wh’-clauses and 
given that, as we concluded in Chapter 1, it is better to take propositional attitude predicates 
                                                          
48 The thesis of the univocity of ‘to know’ when followed by a ‘that’- and a ‘wh’- clause should be 
distinguished from the thesis that ‘to know’ retains the same meaning also in something like 
Jim knows how to dance. 
Phrases like ‘how to dance’ can be taken to be (Stanley & Williamson 2001: 419-420; Stanley 2011: 70-97), 




occurring in propositional attitude sentences as designating relations, then we can quite safely 
assume that it is better to endorse the following as well: 
 
(RP’) Propositional attitude predicates occurring in wh-attributions designate relations. 
 
Having shown that we have good reasons to endorse (RP’), we can now move to the second 
step in extending the accounts of ‘that’-clauses to ‘wh’-clauses, which is tantamount to 
endorsing 
 
(ST’) ‘Wh’-clauses are singular terms.  
 
Surely, the thesis does not follow directly from the univocity of the predicates. Even if in 
sentences like 
 
Jim knows what time it is  
Jim knows that he promised to cook dinner tonight 
 
the predicate should be taken to have the same meaning, this does not show that clauses of the 
two different kinds make a contribution of the same kind in the two sentences. Jumping to the 
conclusion that the contribution is the same because the predicate has the same meaning would 
be like jumping to the conclusion that ‘to Rose’ and ‘quickly’ make the same kind of 
contribution in the following sentences,  
 
Emanuel wrote a letter to Rose 
Emanuel wrote a letter quickly, 
  
because ‘to write’ has the same meaning in both. Thus in order to support the extension of an 
account of ‘that’-clauses to ‘wh’-clauses, some further reasons are needed to take ‘wh’-clauses as 
singular terms.  
 
One might think that we can nonetheless rely on  
 
(RP’) Propositional attitude predicates occurring in wh-attributions designate relations 
 
and hold that since the predicates have the same meaning when followed by a ‘that’- or a ‘wh’-
clause, then the adicity of the predicate should be the same in the two constructions (Schaffer 




Jim knows that he promised to cook dinner tonight 
 
‘to know’ is dyadic, so it should be in  
 
Jim knows what time it is  
 
and we could then conclude that ‘wh’-clauses also contribute one relatum, and are therefore best 
taken to be singular terms. But I think that it is better not to rely on the thesis that if a predicate 
does not change meaning, then the adicity is the same. For this thesis may well be disputed and 
has been strongly disputed, for example by Oliver and Smiley (2004). They give various diverse 
reasons why we should allow that there are predicates that retain the same meaning, no matter 
the adicity. Here is just one rough example: from  
 
Jim ate pizza 
 
it follows  
 
Somebody ate pizza. 
 
Similarly, from  
 
John and Rose ate pizza,  
 
it follows  
 
Somebody ate pizza. 
 
The quantified  
 
Somebody ate pizza 
 
seems to express the same in both cases, and the predicate ‘to eat’ thus seems unambiguous. But 
if the predicate needs to have the same adicity in order for the existential claim to be 
unambiguous, then since, so to say, ‘Jim’ occupies only one place, ‘Jim and Rose’ should occupy 
just one place and should therefore somehow be a unity. But no intelligible unity that we can 
create out of Jim and Rose seems to work: the set of Jim and Rose did not eat pizza, and neither 
did the pair, the ordered pair, the class, the group, and what have you. I am inclined to think 
that there are predicates that retain the same meaning no matter what the adicity. But even if 
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this is disturbing and implausible, as Strawson (1979: 146) urged, so that it is better to hold that 
predicates change meanings when the adicity changes, this cannot be simply assumed but 
necessitates a discussion of the pizza and other cases. We would then need to defend  
 
(ST’) ‘Wh’-clauses are singular terms 
 
on the basis of a controversial thesis, and this is neither straightforward nor very appealing.  
 
Luckily, this is in fact not needed. For it is clear that reasons similar to those that support  
 
(ST) ‘That’-clauses are singular terms 
 
can be put forward regarding ‘wh’-clauses as well. Let us see the points very briefly. First of all, 
it is easy to see that ‘wh’-clauses are best taken to be syntactic units (Stanley & Williamson 2001: 
417-418). Just to give an example, if in  
 
Jim knows what (on earth) Rose said (to whom) 
 
‘what’ is taken to be part of the predicate ‘knows what’, we do not have the same predicate ‘to 
know’ occurring in both 
 
Jim knows what (on earth) Rose said (to whom) 
Jim knows that Rose finds Dave nice, 
 
and this goes against the data we saw above. For example, it would not be possible to obtain 
 
Jim knows what (on earth) Rose said (to whom) and that Rose finds Dave nice,  
 
while in fact it is fine (Lewis 1982/1998: 49). Secondly, exactly as with ‘that’-clauses, ‘wh’-clauses 
move into subject position in the passive form: from 
  
Jim established what (on earth) they will tell (whom) 
 
we can in fact move to  
 
What (on earth) they will tell (whom) was established by Jim, 
 
but not to  
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*They will tell (whom) was established what (on earth) by Jim, 
*What (on earth) they was established will tell (whom) by Jim.  
 
The passive form does not only show that ‘wh’-clauses are syntactic units, but also suggests that 
they are either singular terms or quantified phrases: as we saw in §1.1.5, in the passive 
transformation, we change the role of some relata, so that the patient(s) becomes the agent(s) 
and vice versa. Since the ‘wh’-clause moves into subject position, it seems that it denotes or 
characterizes the object that, in the transformation, becomes a subject. Furthermore, there is 
other data that also goes in the same direction. Given the following question, 
 
Who did establish what (on earth) they will tell (whom)?, 
 
these are perfectly acceptable answers: 
 
Jim established that 
Jim established it, 
 
in which ‘that’ and ‘it’ seem indeed to stand for the object of Jim’s decision. As we concluded in 
§1.2.2 for ‘that’-clauses, it seems correct to discard the thesis that clauses are quantified phrases 
not reducible to singular terms, if possible.49 It seems possible: we have no reason why we 
should not take ‘wh’-clauses to be singular terms, and so I think that we can safely assume that  
 
(ST’) ‘Wh’-clauses are singular terms 
 




4.1.2   WHAT DO ‘WH’-CLAUSES DENOTE? 
Since, in accordance with  
 
(ST’) ‘Wh’-clauses are singular terms, 
 
‘wh’-clauses are best taken to be singular terms, we now need to establish what they denote. As 
we will see, this is where, unsurprisingly, sententialism and the face-value theory differ when it 
comes to wh-attributions.  
                                                          
49 Moreover, as Dummett 1981: 71-72 shows, ‘wh’-clauses do pass the inferential tests for singular terms 
seen in §1.2.2.  
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Sententialism, as developed in the previous chapters, quite clearly and naturally extends to ‘wh’-
clauses in the following way:  
 
(SENTENTIALISM FOR WH-ATTRIBUTIONS) 
(RP’) Propositional attitude predicates occurring in wh-attributions designate relations; 
(ST’) ‘Wh’-clauses are singular terms; 
(Q) ‘Wh’-clauses denote indirect questions, intended as linguistic items.50  
 
According to the account, as it occurs in something like  
 
Jim knows whether Rose likes flamingos, 
 
‘whether Rose likes flamingos’ denotes a linguistic item, an indirect question. Just as ‘that’-
clauses represent attitudes, so indirect questions are best taken to represent attitudes, and in the 
example above the indirect question ‘whether Rose likes flamingos’ represents something Jim 
knows.51  
 
What can propositionalists say about wh-attributions? With some exceptions, which, as we saw 
in §2.1.2, include Frege (1892/1984: 167-168), who held that ‘wh’-clauses do not denote 
propositions, the face-value theory of propositional attitude sentences has generally been 
extended to wh-attributions by holding that ‘wh’-clauses denote propositions too (Böer & Lycan 
1986; Hamblin 1958; Hintikka 1975; Stanley & Williamson 2001; Braun 2011: 246-249). The 
reason is clear. Take 
 
Jim knows that Rose likes flamingos  
Jim knows whether Rose likes flamingos. 
 
There are some important differences between these two sentences. In particular, imagine that 
you decided to take Rose to the zoo to have a look to the flamingos. You ask me whether it was 
a good idea. If I do not know whether Rose likes flamingos, but I think that Jim knows, I might 
use 
 
Jim knows whether Rose likes flamingos 
 
                                                          
50 While it is generally agreed upon that ‘wh’-clauses are indirect questions, Brogaard 2009: 458-463 
suggests that they are pseudo-clefts. For an array of evidence against Brogaard’s account, see Schaffer 
2009: 486-491.   
51 For the orthogonal problem of what a piece of knowledge is, see footnote 21.      
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to send you over to Jim to gain the piece of information you need. But if I do not know whether 
Rose likes flamingos, I cannot use   
 
Jim knows that Rose likes flamingos,  
 
because for me to be in the position to utter this sentence, I would have to think that Rose does 
like flamingos. Moreover, there might be reasons why, even though I know that Rose likes 
flamingos, I might prefer not to reveal this piece of information, and then in those cases I would 
use the wh-attribution. Suppose I know that Rose adores flamingos, but I promised Rose not to 
tell anybody. I cannot use 
 
Jim knows that Rose likes flamingos, 
 
because my utterance would be revelatory of what I know. Still, if I want you to know that she 
will love the day out, I can use 
 
Jim knows whether Rose likes flamingos, 
 
which does not reveal what I know and so allows me to keep my promise while helping you 
nonetheless. Thus there are some differences in when we are in a position to utter either   
 




Jim knows whether Rose likes flamingos, 
 
and moreover differences in which one we would choose, given our purposes. But this does not 
change the fact that they both concern the very same piece of knowledge of Jim’s. Suppose that 
the propositional attitude sentence is true. Intuitively, the wh-attribution is true as well. 
According to the sententialist account, we can easily hold that in fact we are ascribing the very 
same attitude. For according to the account, the first sentence is true iff there is something Jim 
knows that can be represented by “Rose likes flamingos”, while the second is true iff Jim knows 
something that can be represented by ‘whether Rose likes flamingos’. The fact that that piece of 
knowledge can be represented with a ‘that’-clause does not prevent the possibility that also an 





knows Represented by 
both 
Jim     KNOWS     “Rose likes flamingos” 
                              ‘whether Rose likes flamingos’ 
 
 
                                                        
             Some thing 
 
Thus according to the sententialist account, the intuitive identity in truth-value between the 
propositional attitude sentence and the wh-attribution is easily explained as an identity in 
representational power of the two clauses. But the face-value theory should explain the identity 
in truth-value of the two ascriptions differently. For according to the face-value theory, the 
clause provides us with the object Jim knows, not with something that represents that object. If 
the ‘that’-clause and the ‘whether’-clause provide us with different objects, it follows that if the 
two sentences are true, there are two pieces of knowledge Jim has, and this seems highly 
counterintuitive. Thus in order to preserve the intuition that in the two ascriptions we are simply 
phrasing differently the same attitude of Jim’s, it seems better, from the point of view of the 
face-value theorist, to take the ‘whether’-clause as also denoting what the ‘that’-cause denotes. 
Since the ‘that’-clause denotes a proposition, the ‘whether’-clause denotes a proposition too. 
Thus, it has been generally thought within the propositionalist account that since  
 
Jim knows whether Rose likes flamingos 
 
is true iff Jim knows that p, where p is a correct answer to the question “Does Rose like 
flamingos?”, and since moreover answers are propositions, then ‘whether Rose likes flamingos’ 
denotes the proposition that counts as a correct answer to that question. The correct bit does not 
concern only ‘to know’. For those predicates that can be followed by both ‘that’- and ‘wh’-
clauses, and that are not factive when followed by a ‘that’-clause, become factive when followed 
by ‘wh’- clauses (Boër 1978: 313-314; 333; Hintikka 1975: 21-22; Kartunnen 1977: 11; Stanley 
2011: 42).52 Take ‘to tell’. If we know that Jim told Baptiste that Rose came, we cannot conclude 
that Rose came. But if we know that Jim told Baptiste who came, then we can conclude that 
Baptiste was told the truth about who came. Thus, in general, ‘wh’-clauses stand for a truth and 
therefore, in general, propositionalists hold that the proposition denoted by a ‘wh’-clause is a 
                                                          
52 As always, there seem to be some counter-examples. In the following sentence, 
Every day the meteorologists tell the population whether it will rain, but they are often wrong, 
for example, ‘to tell’ does not seem to be factive, and it is still followed by a ‘wh’-clause (Égré 2008: 110). 
Other similar examples can be given. Still, as has been shown by Tsohatzidis 1993; 1997 and Holton 1997, 
these cases are pretty rare and should be taken as deviations from the norm, as when ‘to know’ sometimes 
is not factivity when combined with a clause about the future: take  
I know I will miss the train, I can only hope it is late.  
If ‘to know’ were use as factive in this example, there would be no point in hoping that the train is late.   
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proposition that counts not just as an answer to the corresponding question, but as a correct 
one.  
 
The best way to extend the face-value theory to wh-attributions is therefore the following:  
 
(THE ALLEGED FACE-VALUE THEORY FOR WH-ATTRIBUTIONS) 
(RP’) Propositional attitude predicates occurring in wh-attributions designate relations; 
(ST’) ‘Wh’-clauses are singular terms; 
(P’) ‘Wh’-clauses denote propositions. 
 
Thus, as in the case of propositional attitude sentences, sententialism’s and the face-value 
theory’s extensions to ‘wh’-clauses diverge on what the clauses denote. For sententialists, they 
denote linguistic items, and thus objects that have meaning. For the face-value theorists, by 







4.2      PROPOSITIONS OR QUESTIONS 
 
Does it make much of a difference if we take ‘wh’-causes to denote propositions that count as 
correct answers, in accordance with the natural extension of the face-value theory to ‘wh’-
clauses, or to denote questions as linguistic items, in accordance with the natural extension of 
sententialism to those clauses? The first consideration that comes to mind in the direction of 
answering this question is that it is intuitively very difficult to take indirect questions to denote 
their answers: an indirect question is neither true nor false, so that it seems hard to take it to 
denote a proposition, which is instead something that is either true or false. Moreover, as Lewis 
(1982/1998: 49) notes, it also seems that ‘wh’-clauses cannot denote propositions because a 
term denoting things of those kinds ought to make sense in various positions where a ‘wh’-
clause cannot in fact occur. Here is one of Lewis’s examples:  
 
*Whether Mustard did it or Scarlet did it is some sort of abstract entity.  
 
But on the other hand it should be recognized that an account in terms of questions also has its 
prima facie counterexamples. For example, when Jim discovered what (on earth) Rose said (to 
whom) it does not seem that he discovered a question. Similarly for ‘to know’. The following, 
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Jim knows what (on earth) Rose said (to whom) 
Jim knows the question as to what (on earth) Rose said (to whom), 
 
clearly have different truth-conditions (Ginzburg & Sag 2000: 67; Roselfedt 2008: 317). This is 
the problem we saw in §1.1.6 for ‘that’-clauses: Jim can be acquainted with the question, without 
knowing what (on earth) Rose said (to whom). But these prima facie immediate counterexamples 
can be explained away, exactly in the same way in which we explained them away in the case of 
‘that’-clauses. One may in fact hold that the predicate ‘to know’ is ambiguous and has different 
meanings when followed by a clause, be it a ‘wh’- or a ‘that’-clause, or a definite description, 
such as something of the form ‘the question as to …’ (Stanley 2011: 64-65). Still neither the 
thesis that ‘wh’-clauses denote propositions nor the thesis that they denote questions is 
obviously and intuitively correct. Thus, one might really wonder whether taking one route or the 
other makes any difference at all. But, as we will now see, on further reflection, we should 
recognize that it does indeed make a difference whether we go sententialist or propositionalist, 
and the difference is in fact in favour of sententialism.  
 
A first consideration in this direction is that at least for some wh-attributions, it seems that we 
really cannot see how the object of the attitude could be a proposition. Let us take the following 
sentence: 
 
Jim wonders why kettles emit a humming noise just before the water begins to boil.   
 
If the sentence expresses a relation to a proposition that counts as a correct answer to the 
embedded question, then if the sentence is true Jim has an attitude toward an answer which can 
be expressed as wondering. This account can explain some cases, as when Jim realizes that he 
already knew what he was wondering about, without realizing it; but there seem to be cases in 
which the attitude cannot be accounted for in terms of an attitude toward an answer. As 
Bromberger (1992: 26-28; see also Friedman 2013: 162-163) remarks, these are the cases:  
 
 
Let us describe someone as in a p-predicament (p can be thought of as standing for ‘puzzled’ or 
‘perplexed’ but for mnemonic purposes only) with regard to some question Q, if and only if on 
that person’s views, the question Q admits of a right answer, yet the person can think of no 
answer, can make up no answer, can generate from his mental repertoire no answer to which given 
that person’s views, there are no decisive objections … I can think of nothing, I can imagine 
nothing, I can conjure up nothing, I can invent nothing, I can remember nothing that can survive 





In the cases described by Bromberger, we are sure about all the answers we can think of, we are 
actually correct about them, and we still wonder. Thus there seem to be some cases in which the 
relation expressed by a wh-attribution is not a relation toward a proposition that counts as a 
correct answer. One might be tempted to hold that in fact also these are cases in which we are 
related to an answer, and it might seem that we are not, simply because we cannot realize it. But 
now take the following question 
 
When did Mary stop beating her partner?, 
 
and let us assume that Mary never started beating her partner, so that the question, by having a 
false presupposition, simply does not have a correct answer. Similarly, there is no largest 
number, and so there is no correct answer to the question 
 




Jim wonders what the greatest number is 
Jim wonders when Mary stopped beating her partner 
 
can be true. But what are the propositions denoted in the attributions, which count as correct 
answers to the questions above, and which Jim is related to? There simply is no proposition that 
could work, because the questions do not have correct answers. Therefore there are puzzlement 
cases in which we wonder even if there is no correct answer and so a fortiori no correct answer 
that we are related to. In fact it does often happens in philosophy that we stop wondering 
exactly when we finally understand that there was actually no answer because the question was 
somehow misplaced.  
 
The most natural extension of the face-value theory for wh-attributions thus has a problem to 
solve. The best way to solve it, presumably, is to hold that even though in  
 
Jim knows whether Rose likes flamingos 
 
the clause denotes a proposition, so as to account for the fact that if Rose likes flamingos we are 
ascribing the very same attitude in  
 
Jim knows that Rose likes flamingos  
Jim knows whether Rose likes flamingos, 
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in other contexts ‘wh’-clauses can denote questions, and not their answers. Put differently, the 
best way for propositionalists to solve the problem created by puzzlement attribution is to hold 
that wh-attributions are ambiguous, sometimes denoting questions, sometimes denoting answers, 
i.e. propositions (Higginbotham 1996: 379; Ginzburg & Sag 2000: 67-71; Groenendijk & 
Stokhof 1982: 177-178).  
 
But this, as we will now see, does not seem enough. As we have seen, given that for something 
like 
 
Jim knows whether Rose likes flamingos, 
 
the face-value theory should take the clause to denote a proposition, it follows, presumably, that 
the face-value theory should take ‘wh’-clauses to always denote propositions in the context of 
‘to know’. But now take the following attributions, 
 
Jim does not know what is the greatest number 
Jim does not know when Mary stopped beating her partner. 
 
Since Mary never started beating her partner, and since there is no largest number, Jim cannot 
know when Mary stopped beating her partner and what the greatest number is; but what are the 
propositions denoted in the attributions, which count as correct answers to the corresponding 
questions, and which Jim in fact does not know? Again, there simply is no proposition that 
could work because the questions do not have a correct answer. If a clause cannot denote a 
proposition when the question does not have a correct answer, then what does it denote? 
Holding, from within a propositionalist account, that when (and only when) the question does 
not have a correct answer the clause denotes the question itself seems highly counterintuitive. 
For the two clauses occurring in  
 
Jim knows when Mary stopped beating her partner  
Jim knows whether Rose likes flamingos 
 
seem to work exactly in the same way, i.e. either they both denote questions, or they both 
denote answers. But since it is possible that there is no correct answer, as in the first case, it 
seems they both denote a question. Since also in the context of ‘to know’ ‘wh’-clauses end up 
denoting questions, we are left with no context in which they denote answers, exactly as the 




The possible absence of a correct answer also shows that mixed accounts, according to which 
‘wh’-clauses denote both a question and an answer, as in the account suggested by Schaffer 
(2007: 394-395), seem similarly incorrect. Schaffer takes sentences like   
 
Jim knows what (on earth) Rose said (to whom), 
There is an answer Jim knows to the question “What (on earth) did Rose say (to whom)?”  
There is a question Jim knows the answer to, 
 
to be able to show that in the first sentence a question and an answer are denoted. But, first of 
all, a sententialist may well say, together with Brogaard (2009: 464) and Masto (2010: 398), that 
there being a question and an answer corresponding to a ‘wh’-clause does not imply that there is 
literally a question and an answer denoted in each wh-attribution. Moreover, since there are 
questions that have no correct answer, it is simply not the case that we always have an answer to 
denote.   
 
Thus while puzzlement attributions show that answers cannot always do, I think that the fact 
that questions can have no correct answer show that answers can never do. In considering wh-
attributions, therefore, we find a reason to think that sententialism is not just a viable alternative 
to the face-value theory, but actually a better one. As we will see in the next section, questions 
with no correct answers are not, in fact, the only reasons to think that sententialism might be the 







4.3      QUESTIONS AS TOOLS OF REPRESENTATION 
 
According to sententialism extended to ‘wh’-clauses, in something like  
 
Jim knows whether Rose likes flamingos 
 
we denote a question in order to represent what Jim knows. But when is it that a question can 
represent an attitude? We will start from this question (§4.3.1). We will then move to the so-
called problem of convergent knowledge. As we will see, while at least in one of its versions the 
problem is a serious issue for propositionalists, sententialists can solve it perfectly and easily 
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(§§4.3.2-4.3.3). This will give us further reasons to think that, all in all, sententialism really 




4.3.1   CONTEXTUALISM 
When is it that a question can represent an attitude? In accordance with the spirit of the face-
value theory, but not with its letter, since the answer is not denoted in the attribution, the most 
intuitive idea that comes to mind is that a certain question represents something Jim knows if he 
knows something that can count as a correct answer to that question. The account is then in 
accordance with Lewis (1982/1998: 48) when he claims that “those questioned are supposed to 
tell the truth without any special requests”. A second thing to notice is that we tend to denote a 
question to represent an attitude when the attitude can count as an informative, non-trivial answer 
to the question. If Jim merely knows that those people that Rose invited were invited, it does 
not seem that we would use “whom Rose invited” to represent what Jim knows. As Hintikka 
(1975: 4) puts it, uninformative trivial answers would simply spoil the game in most cases. 
Moreover, for some questions there are both complete and incomplete answers. In different 
contexts, we tend to focus on either one or the other kind of answer. For let us suppose that 
Rose invited George, Gabriel and Dave. If Jim only knows that Rose invited George, it does not 
seem that we would use “whom Rose invited” in order to represent what Jim knows. Similarly, 
imagine that Rose gave a long articulated speech in which she actually tried to prove that 
arithmetic is complete after all. Imagine, moreover, that her talk started with “Gödel told us that 
arithmetic is incomplete”. We would hardly say that Jim knows what Rose said if he just listened 
for a couple of minutes and only knows that Rose said that Gödel told us that arithmetic is 
incomplete. On the other hand, sometimes, the mention one answer is enough: if we want to buy 
an Italian newspaper in London and Jim only knows that an Italian newspaper can be bought on 
the Strand, we would probably say that Jim knows where to buy an Italian newspaper, even if he 
does not have the complete map of Italian newspapers sellers. On the other hand, if for some 
reason we want to buy all copies of the Italian newspapers sold today in London, what Jim 
knows is clearly not sufficient for us to be willing to say that he knows where to buy an Italian 
newspaper. Other variations concern what the answer is about. Suppose we are now in Paris 
and we ask Jim where to buy an Italian newspaper. Suppose moreover that Jim tells us again that 
the only thing he knows about Italian newspapers is that they can be bought on the Strand. In 
this context, we would hardly say that Jim knows where to buy an Italian newspaper.  
 
Thus what counts as an answer to a question depends on many different aspects of the context 




Jim knows who Rose is  
 
to be true in some contexts we require Jim to be able to visually individuate Rose, while in other 
contexts we require Jim to know what Rose does for living, etc. Since we need to rule out the 
possibility of knowing who Rose is by simply knowing, for example, the logical truth that Rose 
is the denotation of ‘Rose’, some have held that knowledge-wh cannot be reduce to knowledge 
of a proposition (Kaplan 1977: 556, f. 72). According to many (Boër 1978: 331-332; Boër & 
Lycan 1986; Ginzburg & Sag 2001: 103-104; Schaffer 2007: 398; Stanley 2011: 69; 100-110), we 
should somewhere and somehow introduce into our analysis mode of presentations or silent 
parameters.53 In these ways, our  
 
Jim knows who Rose is  
 
has different truth-values in different contexts because the piece of knowledge attributed is 
always relative to a way of thinking about Rose – as when we say that Jim knows who Rose is 
when it comes to her appearance – or a standard of knowledge – as when we say that Jim knows what 
water is by scientific standards.  
 
Sententialists take things differently. As we have seen, the notion of representation is essentially 
a contextual notion, in which a role is played by what we are interested in, the other attitudes we 
are concerned about, etc. Thus, if we go sententialist, the fact that in different contexts the same 
kind of question can or cannot represent an attitude is simply due to the fact that the question 
represents something, and the representational aptness of a question, as well as the 
representational aptness of a sentence denoted by a ‘that’-clause, depends on context. Put 
differently, sententialism is essentially a contextualist account. But the contextual variations are 
not to be seen as due to a hidden indexical, or a silent parameter. On this account, reasons why 
we should introduce parameters or ways of thinking seem to be missing. According to 
sententialism there is nothing like an attribution is isolation, but each attribution is to be seen as 
part of a representation; and different representations naturally mean different attributions, 
because the representational tools and their representational power are different. Thus even 
without parameters and indexicals the attributions are already context-dependent. Moreover, 
even though sententialism is essentially a contextualist account, this does not mean that 
according to sententialism in different contexts subjects have different attitudes. As Braun 
(2006; 2011: 251) puts it, the issue as to whether we should go contextualist or invariantist is the 
issue as to whether knowledge ascriptions vary in truth-value from context to context. Since the 
debate is usually considered from within accounts that take what follows the predicate as 
                                                          
53 On the fact that the linguistic data are compatible with a silent parameter (but do not show that there is 
such a parameter), see Ludlow 2005: 27-35.  
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denoting the object of the attitudes, the question is often phrased in terms of whether we know 
different things in different contexts – for example, because the standards for knowledge are 
different, or because what we know depends on what else we know, or because knowledge is 
always knowledge among alternatives. But from the point of view of sententialism, the question 
is primarily whether in different contexts we can represent the very same pieces of knowledge in 
the same way, i.e. with the same clauses. Since, as we already know from Kripke’s puzzles, 
nothing in general guarantees that the same representation is a good representation in two 




4.3.2   THE PROBLEM OF CONVERGENT KNOWLEDGE – A OR B 
So far, or at least it seems, so good. But any account, like the one I am suggesting, according to 
which knowledge attributions have somehow to do with answers, needs to face the so-called 
problem of convergent knowledge.  
 
I will start with Schaffer’s way of putting it, and I will show that although both 
propositionalists and sententialists can solve the problem, the sententialist solution seems 
preferable. I will then move to Stout’s formulations of the problem in the next section, and 
I will show that one of Stout’s versions of the problem is indeed problematic from the face-
value point of view. Since sententialists can easily solve this version of Stout’s formulations, 
we will have found another reason to prefer a sententialist account. 
 
Schaffer’s version of the problem goes as follows (2007: 386-389):  
 
(THE PROBLEM OF CONVERGENT KNOWLEDGE – A OR B) 
 
(SC1)  
Suppose that Bush is speaking on television. Then the questions  
Is Bush or Janet Jackson on television?  
Is Bush or Will Ferrell on television ?  
are convergent—they have the same correct answer, namely 
Bush is on television; 
 
(SC2)  
So the following knowledge claims  
I know whether Bush or Janet Jackson is on television 
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I know whether Bush or Will Ferrell is on television 
turn out to be equivalent, since both are true iff the following is true: 
I know that Bush is on television; 
 
(DATUM)  
Yet this seems false. The two attributions are clearly inequivalent. Knowing whether Bush or 
Janet Jackson is on television is a relatively easy task. Virtually anyone (with decent vision 
and minimal cultural background) can know whether it is Bush or Janet Jackson. In contrast, 
knowing whether Bush or Will Ferrell is on television is a relatively hard task. If the 
impersonation is good enough, the question of whether it is Bush or Will Ferrell may be a 
rather hard question. So one may well know whether Bush or Janet Jackson is on television, 
but fail to know whether Bush or Will Ferrell is on television; 
 
(CONCLUSION) 
Knowledge cannot be knowledge of an answer. 
 
What can sententialism say about this case? According to the sententialist account we are 
suggesting here, in  
 
I know whether Bush or Janet Jackson is on television 
I know whether Bush or Will Ferrell is on television 
 
two different ‘whether’-clauses are denoted, and the question then becomes whether they 
represent the same piece of knowledge. As Schaffer shows with this case, it seems they cannot, 
because the two attributions seem to have different truth-conditions. Why are things so, 
considering that, as we have seen, knowing a question is knowing something that counts as a 
correct answer, and the two questions seem to have the very same answer? Quite clearly, the 
solution is to hold that in fact the two do not have the same answer, and this is in fact the 
solution that propositionalists also have provided (Aloni & Égré 2010: 7-8, Kallestrup 2009: 
471-472; Stanley 2011: 62-64). What needs to be established is what the different answers to the 
two questions are. A first way to solve the issue is to hold that we denote questions to represent 
pieces of knowledge only if the pieces of knowledge can count as complete answers to those 
questions. The two questions Schaffer employs,   
 
Is Bush or Janet Jackson on television?  
Is Bush or Will Ferrell on television?, 
 
can be both incompletely answered by  
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Bush is on television,  
 
but when it comes to attributions, we represent a piece of knowledge with a question only if it 
can count as a complete answer. Since the questions clearly have different complete answers, i.e., 
respectively, 
   
Bush is on television and Janet Jackson is not on television 




I know whether Bush or Janet Jackson is on television 
I know whether Bush or Will Ferrell is on television 
 
are not equivalent, exactly as Schaffer urges in his conclusion.  
 
Another way to solve the issue is to go in the opposite direction, by holding, in company with 
Lewis (1982/1998: 52-54), that we can represent a piece of knowledge with a question when 
that piece of knowledge counts as either a direct or an indirect answer to the question. The 
questions  
 
Is Bush or Janet Jackson on television? 
Is Bush or Will Ferrell on television? 
 
each have two answers: the answers to the first are 
 
Bush is on television 
Janet Jackson is not on television, 
 
while the answers to the second are          
 
Bush is on television 








is true iff either I have a piece of knowledge that is representable as  
 
Bush is on television 
 
or a piece of knowledge that is representable with  
 




I know whether Bush or Will Ferrell is on television, 
 
instead, is true iff either I have a piece of knowledge that is representable as  
 
Bush is on television 
 
or a piece of knowledge that is representable with 
  
Will Ferrell is not on television. 
 
If I knew that Bush is on television, so that I knew something representable with  
 
Bush is on television, 
 
then both  
 
I know whether Bush or Janet Jackson is on television  
I know whether Bush or Will Ferrell is on television 
 
would be true. But in the case envisaged by Schaffer, I do not know that Bush is on television, 
exactly because I am unable to distinguish him from Will Ferrell. Still, the first attribution is true 
because I know that Janet Jackson is not on television, so that we can represent what I know also 
with ‘whether Bush or Janet Jackson is on television’. But the second attribution is still false, 
because I know neither something that we can represent as  
 
Bush is on television, 
 
nor something that we can represent as  
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Will Ferrell is not on television. 
 
Both strategies are genuine solutions to the problem, in that according to both  
 
I know whether Bush or Janet Jackson is on television 
I know whether Bush or Will Ferrell is on television 
 
do not have the same truth-conditions, but we should note that neither seems to represent our 
practise of attributing wh-attributions in general. Sometimes it seems that we attribute 
knowledge in accordance with the first solution. As Boër (1978:310) puts it:     
 
 
Suppose Bob likes coffee and hates tea, but that John knows only that Bob likes coffee (i.e., John 
has no opinion regarding Bob’s attitude towards tea; perhaps John does not even know what tea 
is!). … there is a lingering intuition that  
[John knows whether Bob likes coffee or tea]  
is not clearly true unless John also knows that Bob does NOT like tea. 
 
 
Think moreover about other predicates. Imagine that we know that there is only one thing Bob 
likes, but we cannot remember what that is. We ask John: 
 
US: What does Bob like? 
John: Bob likes coffee 
US: Amazing, so no tea even though he is English 
John: You know, I cannot tell you anything about tea 
US: You liar, you just told us whether Bob likes coffee or tea.  
 
This would be quite a bizarre conversation. But there are also cases in which it seems that we 
would denote a question to represent an attitude even if the subject does not know something 
that counts as a complete answer. Imagine for example the following scenario. We are really 
looking forward to the broadcast on television of Janet Jackson’s last concert, but we really do 
not like politics, so that we want to be sure that we see the entire concert, but no politics. We 
know that the concert will start just after Bush’s talk and we run into the living room and ask 
our friend: 
 




Our friend does not even know who Bush is, but answers that Janet Jackson is surely not on 
television. In this case we would happily say that she told us what we were asking, i.e. whether 
Bush or Janet Jackson is on television, and that she knows that.  
 
Thus there are cases in which a question represents only what can count as a complete answer, 
and cases in which indirect answers would do. After discussing Schaffer’s problem, Aloni and 
Égré (2010: 14-17) conclude that ‘to know whether’ is ambiguous between knowing either a 
direct or an indirect answer to the question, as opposed to knowing the complete answer. But 
while it does explain Schaffer’s case, this thesis seems rather ad hoc, and in fact ‘to know 
whether’ does not pass any of our tests for ambiguity. But from the point of view of the account 
we are presenting here, the contextual variation is not to be seen as due to an ambiguity, but as 
due to the usual variations on account of the different aims we have in representing what a 
subject knows. In our attribution, we are representing what a subject knows with a clause. 
Depending on what we are interested in, the same kind of clause can or cannot represent a 
certain kind of knowledge. In the coffee/tea dialogue, we are speaking about what John knows. 
So we need to take on board that he declares that he knows nothing about Bob’s attitudes 
toward tea. Thus, in that case, in order to represent faithfully John’s attitudes, we need him to 
tell us both that A and that not B in order to ascribe to him an ascription of the form whether A or 
B. In the television case, instead, we just care about what is on television, not about 
understanding our friend, and thus it is enough that our friend knows that B is not the case for us 
to be in the position to ascribe to her knowledge with a clause of the form whether A or B.  
 
Thus sententialists can easily solve the problem as Schaffer presents it. Propositionalists can 
solve it too: they can say that we should always consider complete answers, they can say that we 
should always also consider indirect ones, or they can posit an ambiguity. None of these 
solutions seems very appealing, in that the first two do not mirror our practise in general and the 
third seems rather hard to justify; but still we cannot conclude that when it comes to Schaffer’s 
case sententialism is better off than propositionalism.  
 
But, as we will immediately see, there are other versions of the problem of convergent 




4.3.3   THE PROBLEM OF CONVERGENT KNOWLEDGE GENERALIZED 
Schaffer focuses on questions that concern two alternatives – Bush or Janet Jackson, Bush or 
Will Ferrell – but it is clear that the problem is not essentially linked to that kind of example and 
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there are many other similar cases. For instance, the following is discussed by Stout (2010: 396-
397):   
 
(THE PROBLEM OF CONVERGENT KNOWLEDGE GENERALIZED) 
 
(ST1)  
Take the following questions: 
What does 3 + 5 make?  
What added to 5 makes 8?. 
The two questions are answered by the same proposition, i.e. the one expressed by  
3 + 5 makes 8; 
 
(ST2)  
Therefore the following are convergent attributions: 
Rebecca knows what 3 + 5 makes 
Rebecca knows what added to 5 makes 8; 
 
(DATUM)  
But Rebecca is 5 years old and she knows an answer to  
What does 3 + 5 make?  
She knew it before she was asked any other questions. She has learnt it and not forgotten it. 
The answer to this question is firmly established in her mind. But she does not know an 
answer to  
What added to 5 makes 8? 
She can get knowledge of the latter in the same sort of way that the boy in Plato’s Meno 
‘uncovers’ knowledge that the square of the diagonal of a square shape is twice that of the 
square of its side. We ask her: “Does 1 + 5 equal 8?”, “Does 2 + 5 equal 8?”, “Does 3 + 5 
equal 8?”, she answers these correctly and as she answers the third, her eyes light up; she has 
worked out an answer to the earlier question: “What added to 5 makes 8?” She did not know 
an answer to that question before going through this process. She did however know what 3 
+ 5 makes. She was not reminded of an answer to that question by being asked it. She knows 
those sorts of sums; but she still has to work out the other sort; 
 
(CONCLUSION) 
Answers are not propositions. 
 




Rebecca knows what 3 + 5 makes 
 
we denote ‘what 3 + 5 makes’ in order to represent a piece of knowledge of Rebecca’s. In   
 
Rebecca knows what added to 5 makes 8, 
 
we instead denote ‘what added to 5 makes 8’ in order to represent a piece of knowledge of 
Rebecca’s. As Rebecca shows, the two questions do not represent the very same piece of 
knowledge. But where does the difference in representational power of the questions 
 
What does 3 + 5 make?  
What added to 5 makes 8? 
 
come from, considering that they both concern the mathematical truth that 3 + 5 is 8? 
Interrogative pronouns somehow leave a gap (Fiengo 2007: 7-10), and to use Frege’s 
(1918/1984: 355) terminology, questions in which such pronouns occur are incomplete. This is the 
idea that sententialists can rely on in understanding the different representational power of the 
two questions above. For they can say that the difference comes exactly from the fact that in the 
two questions the occurring interrogative pronouns open two different gaps or, as Frege would 
have said, make the questions incomplete in a different way. For Rebecca to know what 3 +5 
makes, she needs to know how to fill the gap left by the pronoun, so to say. She knows that 8 
fills the gap and thus the attribution is true. But in order to know what added to 5 makes 8 she 
needs to know how to fill another gap and she does not know that. Thus Stout’s case shows that 
the representational power of a question depends also on what gap, in the question, the 
pronouns occurring leave open.  
 
One might think that this case is a genuine problem for propositionalists, according to which 
‘wh’-clauses denote propositions that count as correct answers. For one might urge that both  
 
What does 3 + 5 make?  
What added to 5 makes 8?; 
 
are answered by  
 
3 + 5 makes 8, 
 








Rebecca knows what added to 5 makes 8. 
 
But as Stout (2010: 397-398) himself remarks, accounts in terms of answers are actually able to 
explain this case. For they can urge that the two questions do not have the same answer (Bach 
2005; Textor 2009: 73):   
 
What does 3 + 5 make?  
 
is answered by  
 




What added to 5 makes 8?; 
 
is answered by  
 




8 is what 3 added to 5 makes, 
3 is what added to 5 makes 8  
 
express different propositions, for example because the propositions expressed have different 
structures, then accounts in term of answers can differentiate  
 








as they should. Stout’s case, therefore, does not show a failure of an account in term of answers.  
 
But this is not the only case Stout discusses, and we can now see that there are other cases, 
similar to the one just discussed, that do show that the face-value theory is in trouble, while 
sententialism is not. Here is Stout’s second case for the conclusion that ‘wh’-clauses cannot 
denote propositions (2010: 399):  
 
(THE PROBLEM OF CONVERGENT KNOWLEDGE GENERALIZED*) 
 
(ST1*)  
Take the following questions: 
What added to 5 makes 8? 
Is 3 what added to 5 makes 8? 
The two questions are answered by the same proposition, i.e. the one expressed by  
3 is what added to 5 makes 8.  
 
(ST2*)  
Therefore the following are convergent attributions: 
Rebecca knows what added to 5 makes 8 
Rebecca knows whether 3 is what added to 5 makes 8; 
 
(DATUM*)  
But this seems false. Faced with the assertion that 3 is what added to 5 makes 8, Rebecca 
knows instantly to assent to it (albeit she may get confused by the convoluted expression of 
the proposition). She knows this despite not knowing what added to 5 makes 8. This may 
seem paradoxical, but in order to know what added to 5 makes 8 she needs to know a 




Answers are not propositions. 
 
As Stout remarks, an account according to which ‘wh’-clauses denote answers and answers are 
propositions, as the one the face-value theory extended to ‘wh’-clauses seems forced to endorse, 
cannot distinguish 
 






Rebecca knows whether 3 is what added to 5 makes 8, 
 
because both questions  
 
What added to 5 makes 8? 
Is 3 what added to 5 makes 8? 
 
are answered by the very same proposition, i.e. the one expressed by   
 
3 is what added to 5 makes 8.  
 
Thus this of Stout’s cases is a genuine problem for accounts in terms of propositions. On the 
other hand, it is clear that this second of Stout’s cases is not problematic from the sententialist 
point of view, either. For in this case, we have the following questions: 
 
What added to 5 makes 8? 
Is 3 what added to 5 makes 8? 
 
Sententialists explain the difference in the representational power of the two by holding that 
while in the first an interrogative pronoun occurs which marks a gap that Rebecca needs to 
know how to fill in order for  
 
Rebecca knows what added to 5 makes 8 
 
to be true, there is no interrogative pronoun in the second question, so that Rebecca needs to 
know something different for  
 
Rebecca knows whether 3 is what added to 5 makes 8 
 
to be true. For  
 
Rebecca knows what added to 5 makes 8 
 
to be true, i.e. for us to be in the position to represent what Rebecca knows with 
  
What added to 5 makes 8?, 
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she needs to know how to fill the gap left by ‘what’, or, to put it differently, she needs to be able 
to come up with 3. For 
 
Rebecca knows whether 3 is what added to 5 makes 8  
 
to be true, on the other hand, she needs to know something that counts as an answer to  
 
Is 3 what added to 5 makes 8?, 
 
and thus she needs to know whether 3 does or does not have the property designated by the 
predicate. In other words, for us to be in the position to represent what Rebecca knows with 
 
Is 3 what added to 5 makes 8?, 
 
Rebecca needs, when provided with 3, to know whether it does or does not have the property 
of being what added to 5 makes 8. Therefore, according to sententialism the two attributions 
attribute different pieces of knowledge, and can then have different truth-values, as they should.  
 
In this example of Stout’s as well, the key aspect of questions that explains what they can 
represent is, so to say, in what gaps are left open in the questions. Stout’s cases show, moreover, 
that from the sententialist point of view, ‘wh’-clauses can mark a difference in attitudes that 
‘that’-clauses cannot mark. While with attributions like  
 
Jim knows whether Rose likes flamingos 
 
it seems that the ‘that’-clause ‘that Rose likes flamingos’ would equally do, this is not always the 
case. For both  
 
Rebecca knows what added to 5 makes 8 
Rebecca knows whether 3 is what added to 5 makes 8 
 
would be rendered as  
 
Rebecca knows that 3 is what added to 5 makes 8, 
 
and so the distinction would vanish. When it comes to reporting an ability to fill gaps, ‘that’-
clauses, since they do not have the resources to mark gaps, do not have the same 
180 
 
representational power as ‘wh’-clauses.54 Thus Stout’s cases show that wh-attributions cannot 
always be reduced to propositional attitude sentences, and this is simply another way to restate 
that the case is genuinely problematic for the face-value theory extended to wh-attributions, 
according to which both propositional attitude sentences and wh-attributions report an attitude 






   
CONCLUSION 
 
From his cases, Stout (2010: 400) suggests that knowledge is knowledge of answers, but holds 
that answers are sui generis entities not reducible to either facts or propositions, since  
 
 
answers may essentially be responses to questions; the identity of an answer would then depend on 
the question it is an answer to. 
 
 
Embracing Stout’s account is not really a viable option for propositionalists, because then the 
two clauses occurring in  
 
Jim knows that Rose likes flamingos  
Jim knows whether Rose likes flamingos 
 
would denote two different pieces of knowledge that Jim has, i.e. a proposition and a sui generis 
answer, and this seems highly counterintuitive. The propositionalist would also need to hold 
that ‘that’-clauses denote sui generis answers. But then, I think, we are justified in holding that 
when it comes to ‘wh’-clauses, the sententialist account is to be preferred to an account that, in 
                                                          
54 Some have suggested that there are names that are genuinely empty, i.e. names that have no denotation. 
In order to account for propositional attitude sentences in which these allegedly empty names occur, 
Kaplan 1977: 496, f. 23; Braun 1993 and others have held that we do not need to give up the idea that 
names are directly referential, and we should instead hold that what Olga believes when  
Olga believes that Santa Claus is nice 
is true is a partially filled or gappy proposition, i.e. a structured entity part of which is literally a gap. Even 
leaving aside the problems that gappy propositions encounter in general, it is clear that propositionalists 
cannot rely on them in order to solve the issue we are considering here. What Rebecca knows when she 
knows what added to 5 makes 8 is not something gappy (and moreover, what the gap would look like?), 
but how to fill a gap.  
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order to hold on to the thesis that clauses denote the objects of the attitudes, needs to maintain, 
first of all, that all our mental life consists in answers whose identities depend on the questions 
they are answers to, and needs, moreover, to populate our world with these sui generis entities. In 
the end, Stout himself recognizes that “having question-involving things out there in reality may 
be metaphysically unacceptable to some people” (2010: 401). For those people, apart from the 
considerations on questions without answers and puzzlement states, sententialism is thus to be 
taken as the correct account of wh-attributions.  
 
As we saw at the beginning of this chapter, we cannot prove once and for all that ‘wh’-clauses 
should be treated analogously to ‘that’-clauses. Thus no advantage or problem for sententialism 
with respect to ‘wh’-clauses is directly an advantage or problem for sententialism with respect to 
‘that’-clauses. Nonetheless, as we have seen, there are good reasons to think that it is correct to 
treat clauses of the two kinds analogously. Thus, I think we are entitled to conclude that, in a 
weaker way, the sententialist treatment of ‘wh’-clauses suggested here is a good sign that the 
account of ‘that’-clauses suggested in the previous chapters may indeed be not just a viable 
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